FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

JANUARY, 1930

The Permanent Bases of French Foreign Policy	*Jules Cambon*	173
Church and State in Mexico: The American Mediation	*Walter Lippmann*	186
Stresemann	*Viscount D'Abernon*	208
Ten Years of the League	*Eduard Beneš*	212
Arabs and Jews in Palestine	*Henry W. Nevinson*	225
Pan-Europe?	*Edouard Herriot*	237
Dutch Rule in the East Indies	*M. W. F. Treub*	248
British Labor and the Soviets	*Louis Fischer*	260
The Changing Rôle of the Orthodox Church	*William Miller*	274
Cadorna and Diaz	*Count Carlo Sforza*	282
A Solution of the Chinese Eastern Railway Conflict	*C. C. Wang*	294
The New Kingdom of Jugoslavia: Maps and Note		297
The Publication Policy of the Department of State	*Tyler Dennett*	301
Some Recent Books on International Relations	*William L. Langer*	306
Source Material	*Denys P. Myers*	320

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The Editors.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 8 JANUARY, 1930 No. 2

THE PERMANENT BASES OF FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

By Jules Cambon

AIMLESS and contradictory as appear the happenings in the history of each nation, one nevertheless is able to discern, when one surveys them as a whole and in their proper sequence, that they are not disobedient to certain laws. Revolutions do not work any definite change; the institutions which a people set up are only the expression of its ideas at a certain moment, and they do not modify its position with regard to other nations. The relations of a government with foreign governments may be affected, but not the necessities imposed upon it by its geographical position, its history, its need to live. That is what we call its traditions. At the present moment, we have a striking example of this fact. The policy of the Soviet Government in the Far East may differ in method from that which the Tsarist Government followed; but it does not differ from it in spirit or in objective.

The geographical position of a nation, indeed, is the principal factor conditioning its foreign policy — the principal reason why it must have a foreign policy at all.

This is a truism of which the whole history of England is a demonstration. English history is determined and limited by the fact that Great Britain is an island. She is a European Power, but as she is separated from the Continent by the sea she has not experienced the constant tribulations of the Continental states. Twice, in the times of Philip II and of Napoleon I, she has feared attacks on her own territory; but the history of those events showed how impossible it was for her adversaries to penetrate her natural defenses. Hence her disdain for the military establishments of the Continent, and her inbred dislike of the system of conscription. Oftentimes she has mixed in European quarrels, but only to play the rôle of an umpire who is unwilling for the vic-

tor to be too victorious. And when the time came to make peace it has not been hard to sense that she did not consider her own security as being in the least at stake. Elizabeth and Cromwell, Pitt and Palmerston, had the same views, which one may characterize as "insular" in the real sense of the word. On the other hand, the naval policy of England has had quite a different character, because it was essential that she should never encounter any superior sea power. All the other nations have had to struggle against her for the freedom of the seas. Her maritime imperialism grew out of her need of assuring her security and her sources of supply.

And cannot what I have said of England also be said of the United States of America? Separated from the Old Worlds by two oceans, her only neighbors too weak to dare to contradict her, free from any fears regarding security, possessing in her immense territory all the riches of the earth, all the forces and products of industry, she has almost limitless liberty of action. That is why expressions of the noble idealism which is the real honor of the American spirit sometimes sound strange in the ears of the European nations, brought up as they have been in other circumstances and preoccupied with hopes and fears in which the United States has no share. The geographical isolation of the American people has given it its force, has allowed it to become great and powerful. The Monroe Doctrine is nothing but the expression of its determination to let nothing impair that isolation. This celebrated doctrine has been the cornerstone of the American Government's policy for a century, and today it explains why the United States has not wished to participate in the League of Nations.

France, like England, has sought through the centuries to realize her destiny; but, like England, which by reason of her special situation has put her trust in a preponderant naval power, France, whose frontiers to the north and to the east were open to invasion, has put her trust in military power. And so these two Powers, whose behavior at first glance seems to have been so different, in reality obey the same instinct: both look for security, each in the manner dictated by its geographical position.

It is true that sometimes accidental happenings have misled or bewildered foreign opinion as to the real objectives of England and France. But we do not understand history if we do not give the right value to accidents, as well as to the personal schemes of

those who play great historical rôles at particular moments. I should like to cite two examples from the history of France.

France is often accused of imperialism because throughout her history she has wished to make the Rhine her frontier. The origin of this tendency, which goes far back, must be made clear. Caesar in his "Commentaries," Tacitus in his "Customs of the Germans," Strabo himself, fixed the Rhine as the boundary of Gaul; the jurists who played so important a part in the policy of the ancient kings and who loved to rely on old texts to justify their territorial claims, never failed to cite these hoary traditions, which gradually became part of the national soul. When, during the wars of the French Revolution, the armies of the Republic entered into the Rhenish provinces, they certainly believed that they were taking possession again of what had always belonged to them. And our long occupation of those lands left a deep imprint on the Rhenish people themselves. The Foreign Minister of the German Empire, Kiderlen-Waechter, one day admitted to me that up to 1866 France would have been able to reëstablish the Rhine frontier without encountering any opposition from the local population. It was the foundation of the new Germany, he said, which had changed this state of mind.

Napoleon and his prodigious conquests intoxicated France. In spite of that, and glorious as his achievement was, it is not paradoxical to say that this epoch in our history was an "accident." At St. Helena he avowed that he had wanted to set up a great Germany and a great Italy, to join in a single mass all the peoples of the same race. He foresaw the future. But the very grandiosity of his views proved how foreign his genius was to the traditional policy of France, who always regarded herself as the guardian of weak princes. Napoleon's imperial spirit, founded on the memories of the grandeur that was Rome, was not hampered by a consideration of French interests *per se*. His gaze went beyond our frontiers. But the tradition of our policy was something altogether different; it cared only for France; it was essentially conservative, circumspect, deliberate. That is what Rivarol indicated very well when in 1783, in his celebrated essay on the universality of the French language, he wrote: "France acts against her best interests and misunderstands her rôle when she lends herself to the spirit of conquest." And Vergennes, the great Minister of Louis XVI, said in 1777, in his report to the King: "France must fear expansion much more than desire it." These principles were

merely the practical application of the ideas of Montesquieu, who in his "Spirit of Laws" invited sovereigns always to have a wary eye open to the inconveniences, not to say the dangers, of grandeur.

In the eighteenth century, then, the policy of France, as defined by her philosophers and her statesmen, was far from being imperialistic. It based itself rather upon the idea of the balance of power. It seemed as though the peace of Europe and the security of each of its component parts would necessarily result from an equilibrium. Here is the explanation of the sudden transformation of French policy in the eighteenth century, sometimes called the overthrow of the alliances. France had supported Prussia in her early stages and had aided her to become strong. When Frederick II openly menaced the established order in Germany, the government at Versailles ranged itself on the side of Austria and Maria Theresa. French opinion received this abandonment of the Prussian alliance with every sign of mistrust; but it undoubtedly was in conformity with the policy of the balance of power followed by M. de Choiseul.

For the rest, we must admit that at the start this policy of equilibrium was of a purely empirical character and grew out of events. Later on, naturally enough, theorists were found to give it its name and to make of it the fundamental law on which rested peace between the European Powers.

Today, after the war of 1914, people jeer at the guarantee of peace afforded by the old system of the balance of power. It is described as an illusion. That is going too far, but we must recognize that democracy does not rest content with quantitative analyses of opposing forces, carried on quietly in diplomatic offices. It demands new methods which will permit weak nations, like the strong, to play a rôle in the settlement of matters of general concern. This is a step forward; the League of Nations is constantly taking on more importance and authority, and assuredly is destined to develop further still. But all that does not make it any less prudent always to maintain a certain balance between the Powers. What is happening today in the case of naval disarmament is evidence of what I say. The United States and Great Britain seek to adjust their naval armaments, but the condition which they set to any action is that it shall not impair naval parity between them. To each the idea that it might wake up one day to find itself in the presence of a superior naval force is intolerable.

It is useful, then, to search the past and learn why and how the system of the balance of power came into being, and to follow through successive centuries the application which has been made of it. Perhaps I shall be pardoned an historical digression. It will allow us — in spite of momentary accidents which now and then break the sequence — to recognize the unity of purpose which has characterized French policy in dealing with the difficulties which have always faced it. So we shall be led to understand what are its permanent characteristics.

We must go back to the end of the Middle Ages to find the origins of French foreign policy in modern times. The Hundred Years' War between France and England, which marked the end of this formative period, at first had the characteristics of a feudal war, but even in the midst of their miseries the French people developed a common consciousness. Jeanne d'Arc personified the dawn of national feeling, and that is why she appears to us the greatest figure in our history. It was not long afterwards, at the time of the Renaissance, that the French people, having at last constituted themselves into a nation, found that they were encircled on all sides — south, east and north — by a single sovereign power. The House of Austria ruled Germany, the Low Countries, Spain. The Emperor Charles V was the most powerful potentate that the world had known since Charlemagne, and the common saying was that the sun never set on his dominions. He had genius, ambition and prodigious activity, and immense forces were under his control. Inevitably he wished to stifle the independence of France, which, placed in the center of his possessions, prevented him from unifying them. Nature itself had made Francis I, who reigned at Paris, his rival and his enemy. Poets and writers of romance have been pleased to paint Francis I merely as a lover of the arts and of pleasure. They have not seen in him the politician that he was. He was unlucky in war, but he was the initiator of a policy which his successors had to follow, a policy which triumphed in the eighteenth century and which since then has been followed through many changing circumstances — I dare to say it — down to the present day. It should be noted that from the very beginning this policy, which was to unite all the French, was disturbed and endangered by the passions which divided Frenchmen amongst themselves. Religious wars rent the country for nearly a century and brought the Spaniards to Paris itself. Two tendencies have always existed in

France and have thrown her statesmen into two camps. Those who in the sixteenth century had a liberal and aristocratic spirit and tended toward reform were partisans of union with England. Admiral Coligny, who represented this party, maintained relations with Queen Elizabeth. On the contrary, those who belonged to the Catholic party, the Guises and the chiefs of the League, wished to rely on Spain and Germany. Between the two, the King and his policies manœuvred as best they could. It sometimes seems as though even in our day these two tendencies still exist and continue to set Frenchmen against each other.

Be that as it may, the nature of things led the Monarchy to seek allies against the might of the German Emperor. In this way she became the supporter of the weak German princes who were trying to escape the talons of the imperial eagle, and who for the most part became partisans of the Reformation. Hence the rôle of France in the Thirty Years' War. And hence the policy of France always to be the ally of the little Powers of Europe. It was this same search for an equilibrium which led Francis I to court the friendship of the Grand Turk (to the great scandal of Christendom), which had for its consequence the opening up of the East to Christian traders of all nationalities.

Our great Henry IV was one of the first to inaugurate the policy of coöperating with the weak and of showing moderation in spite of strength. His favorite minister, Sully, defined it when he wrote in one of his reports: "The Kings of France should aim to acquire friends, allies and confederates, bound by the sure ties of commerce and common interests, rather than to nourish ambitious projects and thus draw irreconcilable hatreds down upon their heads."

Princes of the Church though they were, both Richelieu and Mazarin backed the Protestant princes of Germany against the Emperor. Mazarin even went so far as to form an alliance with Cromwell. The steady pursuit of this policy resulted in the Treaty of Westphalia which, through the Rhine League, secured the independence of the Protestant princes and gave Germany a constitution that lasted two centuries. This policy of alliances and compromises constituted what has been known as the classic system of French diplomacy. It corresponded to the national temperament, which mistrusts imagination in matters of state. The men responsible for this policy were not theorists who stuck to their preconceptions regardless of hard facts; Jean-

Jacques Rousseau and his disciples had not yet been born; and as our eminent historian, Albert Sorel, observes, "these great men had method without having any spirit of system."

Europe relied upon the balance of power, but when Louis XIV, abandoning the policy of moderation which France had followed until his time, appeared on the point of shattering it, he found aligned against him a coalition which included even our old allies. He has been reproached by many historians for accepting the inheritance of Charles II and thus entering upon the disastrous war of the Spanish Succession. However, he had serious reasons for acting as he did. If his grandson, the Duke of Anjou, had not ascended the throne of Spain, it would have passed into the hands of an Austrian Archduke, and once again France would have been faced with a united Spain and Austria, a combination which she had fought against for centuries. The war ended in a compromise. France no longer threatened Europe. By renouncing for himself and his descendants the right to reign in Paris, a Bourbon was permitted to reign in Madrid.

In my opinion, the worst result of Louis XIV's abandonment of our traditional policy was the distrust which it aroused towards us abroad. Perhaps we even suffer from it today.

Throughout the eighteenth century the policy of every European government was one of intrigue and ambition: the period is well represented by the skeptical and realistic Frederick II, who knew how to exploit the jealousies of the various courts. In France, statecraft completely lacked continuity. Louis XV, intelligent and weak, was typical of his epoch. He followed a policy separate and distinct from that of his ministers — what was called "le secret du Roi" — with results easy to imagine. By the time the Seven Years' War was over, France had lost all influence and authority. This became obvious when Prussia, Austria and Russia started to dismember Poland, and France found herself in no position to oppose them. The eclipse of French prestige was a tragedy for the little nations.

France learned her lesson. Vergennes, to whom Louis XVI intrusted the portfolio of foreign affairs, was imbued with the traditional ideals of the old régime, the ideals in particular of Henry IV and of Richelieu. His policy was one of moderation, of collaboration with the lesser Powers and support of the weak. Public opinion, piqued by the decline of national prestige under his predecessors, backed him up when he offered French military,

financial and moral support to the United States, who wished to become an independent nation. In this he was but repeating the assistance given by France early in the seventeenth century to Portugal and the Low Countries.

Meanwhile the German Emperor, Joseph II, an ambitious and restless sovereign, wished to follow in the footsteps of Frederick II. Thinking to profit by his sister Marie Antoinette's influence at Versailles, he dreamed great dreams; he dreamed of annexing Bavaria to Austria, of creating a kingdom for the Elector of Bavaria in the Netherlands, and of buying French complicity by ceding part of Belgium to her. He even went so far as to offer us Luxemburg. Vergennes spurned these proposals; in fact he urged the German princes (who were of course much disturbed) to unite against the Emperor, and in a memorandum on this subject prepared for the King he wrote: "If one stops to consider the crying injustice which would be entailed by the acceptance of the idea of partitioning the Netherlands, no honest man can contemplate it seriously." And the Ambassador, Baron de Breteuil, said: "The King should look upon himself as guardian of the lesser princes. This policy has for centuries constituted the glory and security of the Crown." These statesmen, in other words, based the country's security upon the principle of respecting the rights of others and they did not separate the peace of France from that of Europe.

Such were the ideas, also, of two men destined one day to play an important rôle at the start of the Revolution, Mirabeau and Talleyrand. Both were partisans of the English alliance and hated the spirit of conquest. Territorial bargainings between states, wrote Mirabeau in his book on the Prussian Monarchy, are iniquitous, and added: "It is arbitrary and tyrannous to make such exchanges without consulting the inhabitants."

"Consulting the inhabitants" — these are new words and new ideas in international relations. Despite the storm of revolution, despite the Napoleonic wars, despite the reaction of the Holy Alliance, they persisted and little by little made their way. They reappeared in the nineteenth century, and they furnish the main clue to an understanding of its events.

But the Revolution, which at first had made much of its renunciation of the spirit of war and conquest, was to be swept along by its enemies into a war lasting for almost twenty-five years. The European courts were on the whole quite indifferent to the fate

of the unfortunate Louis XVI; indeed, they congratulated one another upon the weakened and distracted state of France, and, profiting by a situation which left them with free hands, made haste to finish off what remained of Poland amongst themselves. Nevertheless, a certain sense of the community of royal interests held them from going too far and led them to combat the Revolution as such. Brunswick made his pronouncement. But he had not counted upon what the enthusiasm of a people can do. Twenty-three years later the war ended at Waterloo with the defeat of Napoleon, but the ideas which his army had sowed across Europe were to germinate during the course of the nineteenth century. The Emperor had indeed been vanquished, but the Revolution triumphed.

I have already noted how the imagination of Napoleon, who when a young man in Egypt had dreamed like Alexander of eastern conquests, broke through all the traditional limits of French policy. According to Montesquieu, France is in the happy position of having a territory proportionate to her strength and abilities. This was also the opinion of Frenchmen of the eighteenth century, and particularly of Mirabeau's old friend Talleyrand, who used to say that real richness is to be won not by invading the territory of others, but by exploiting one's own to the utmost. He felt Europe's growing fear of the Emperor's insatiable ambition and he dreaded the future consequences of this ambition for France. He realized the dangerous fragility of the imperial edifice, and detached himself from the Napoleonic cause. His conceptions were those of the old school of French diplomacy; they could not be harnessed up with the grandiose schemes of the hero whose servant he had been. And when Napoleon had fallen, and Louis XVIII sent Talleyrand in 1814 to the Congress of Vienna, he drafted his own instructions so that they should carefully point out the need for France to inspire those around her with her spirit of moderation and her desire to be of service by aiding the cause of justice.

At Vienna, Talleyrand faced Europe's natural reaction against all the works of the Empire. Greedy ambitions demanded satisfaction on all sides. Prussia in particular gave herself over to the same spirit of conquest which had caused her so much suffering; in Germany, she hoped to aggrandize herself at the expense of the King of Saxony, who had long been the ally of Napoleon, and in France to seize our eastern provinces, which had formed part of

the territory of the old Monarchy. Basing his claim on the principle of legitimacy, Talleyrand set himself to obtain the reëstablishment of the pre-Revolutionary territorial status, including of course the maintenance of our old frontiers. He returned to the old doctrines of our diplomacy, and undertook the defense of the lesser states against Prussia. He managed to secure the support of England, and even of Austria, whom the Russian spectre was beginning to alarm. He triumphed, and with him triumphed the essential factor in French diplomacy which I have several times described. These negotiations at Vienna may be considered Talleyrand's diplomatic *chef-d'oeuvre*. It was based on a principle which is of course open to discussion, that of legitimacy, and it thus introduced into the settlement of diplomatic problems the consideration of abstract ideas in a disinterested way and above the passions of the moment.

Fifteen years later, in 1830, the Belgian people rose against Holland, to whom they had been arbitrarily united in 1815. France was faithful to her past; she intervened to assist them to gain their independence, and her army took Antwerp. But though she thus was responsible for the triumph of liberty, she proved that she wished to draw no special profits from it, for when the Belgians offered the crown of Belgium to the Duke de Nemours, son of Louis Philippe, the King refused it. In consequence of this refusal Prince Leopold of Coburg became King of the Belgians.

This policy of restraint was so thoroughly a national policy, without distinction of party, that when on February 24, 1848, France proclaimed herself a Republic and Europe was being rocked to its foundations by the storm of revolution, the head of the provisional government, M. de Lamartine, sent our agents abroad a celebrated circular in which he reaffirmed the conservative intentions of the Paris cabinet. This declaration meant much, because since the fall of Napoleon the slogan of the advanced parties of Europe had been the destruction of the European order as constituted by the Congress of Vienna.

When the republican régime was overthrown in its turn, the Emperor Napoleon III, fired by his uncle's example, dreamed of remaking Europe. Nevertheless, when he joined England in defense of Turkey against the Emperor Nicholas of Russia, his action was in accord with the precepts of the old Monarchy. In the same spirit at the Congress of Paris he undertook to establish the independence of Rumania, up to that time a mere Turk-

ish province. The wave of democracy then sweeping Europe found in him a convinced supporter. He upheld Piedmont against Austria, and one may say without exaggeration that his benevolent attitude toward the states of the peninsula made him the chief author of Italian unity. But many who had applauded him for assisting the weak against the strong began to be troubled when it appeared that he was dominated by the Napoleonic rather than the old French tradition, and that national security was no longer his principal aim. The war of 1866 between Austria and Prussia justified these anxieties; the Europe of the Treaties of Westphalia and Vienna vanished. Public opinion in France was bewildered. The war of 1870 put the finishing touch to what had been begun in 1866. It marked the end of that balance of power which, under the leadership of France, had guaranteed some sort of order in Europe during two centuries.

In France, however, the Republic had succeeded the Empire. For forty-four years it acted wisely and prudently. France came to enjoy the esteem and friendship of all the Powers which were harassed by the presumptuous policies of Berlin.

Never before had the supreme objectives of a long line of our greatest statesmen imposed themselves so insistently upon France. We sought — we sought *only* — security. I remember how once, while I was Ambassador at Berlin, a high German official suggested to me in the course of a private conversation that Germany, France and England might agree among themselves to divide up the Belgian Congo. I promptly repelled the suggestion, basing my position on our policy of always upholding the smaller states. In this I simply conformed with the *dicta* of Vergennes, Mirabeau and Talleyrand; and the ideas which led my German colleague to speak as he did were those of Frederick II, Hardenberg and Bismarck.

After the World War, at the Peace Conference of 1919, France naturally became the protagonist of all the nationalities which had been suppressed in centuries past; they wished to live again, and they invoked the principles of justice and liberty which had been avowed by the Allies throughout the long struggle. Poland came to life. The Czechs of Bohemia, who since the time of John Hus had often revolted against the Austrian domination, formed a young republic. Rumania won back her kinsmen in Transylvania. The Slavs of Croatia and of Illyria united with the Serbs of old Serbia to form Jugoslavia. And the French Republic gave

these young nationalities the support which the old Monarchy, from Henry IV to Louis XVI, had given all nationalities who wished to live an independent life.

Democracy, dominant in the world at last, was unwilling to limit itself to the ordinary methods of the old diplomacy. And when President Wilson took the initiative in proposing that a League of Nations be set up he was merely responding to the obvious need for the creation of some new international instrument. Despite scoffs and misgivings the League of Nations was established; its authority has grown; and it has become the most efficient instrument yet found for preventing international disputes from degenerating into armed conflicts. France's rôle at Geneva has been in keeping with her tradition. She is happy to see the lesser states granted a hearing on world problems on an equality with the Great Powers, for in this she sees the endorsement of her age-long policy towards them.

M. Briand, who has been active at Geneva and who put forward the anti-war proposal which has since become the Briand-Kellogg Pact, has found his inspiration in the same order of ideas that governed apostles of the balance of power. Political methods change, but the objectives remain the same. In essence, the traditional aims of France, the aims which she has today, center about the quest for security. And what is that but the maintenance of peace?

To sum up. If in the past France has sometimes given herself over to the spirit of conquest, either she was led to do so in the enthusiasm of victory after attacks had been launched against her, or because she felt that she was carrying the torch of liberty to the peoples of other nations. Even then, in the hours of their greatest triumphs, our statesmen (knowing how quickly the French spirit can change) thought like Talleyrand that the surest foundation of peace lay in the reëstablishment of the balance of power. This view we still hold.

Of course the situation is not precisely the same today as formerly. At Geneva discussions are carried on in public, and for that reason a preoccupation with the principle of the balance of power seems out of date. But it would be a mistake to take this view. There are groups, cabals and oppositions inside the League of Nations, and though political action may take new forms, at heart it is the same. National aspirations are the expression of national interests, and these, as I have said, persist through the

ages because human nature does not change. They condition the relations of peoples, and according to circumstances bring them together or set them one against the other. So it was with France and England; they had long been enemies, but they united at last in the face of a common danger. It is true that by the Briand-Kellogg Pact most of the nations have solemnly renounced war, but in 1914 how little the most solemn engagements were worth when the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, declared that necessity knows no law! We therefore are under compulsion to neglect nothing which can guarantee us against the danger of war.

When I have said that security has always been the cardinal aim of France, that term must be understood in its fullest sense. There is a France outside our own frontiers. Just as England cannot permit her communications with India to be menaced in Egypt, and just as the United States considers that one of her elementary interests is to safeguard the Panama Canal, just so France must guard her communications with her possessions in North Africa and preserve her freedom of action in the Mediterranean. Here we touch the problem of the relations of states at its most delicate point. For it is when states come into direct contact that practical accommodations become imperative.

Security! The term signifies more indeed than the maintenance of a people's homeland, or even of their territories beyond the seas. It also means the maintenance of the world's respect for them, the maintenance of their economic interests, everything, in a word, which goes to make up the grandeur, the life itself, of the nation. But all peoples have not the same ideal; each follows what it considers to be its national interests in accordance with its own traditions. If the nations are to live in peace, those who direct the foreign affairs of each state must try diligently and long to understand and respect the aspirations of others. For by a statesman's comprehension of the forces which direct the destiny of nations one measures the breadth and depth of his genius.

CHURCH AND STATE IN MEXICO: THE AMERICAN MEDIATION

By Walter Lippmann

ON June 21, 1929, President Portes Gil and Archbishop Ruiz y Flores issued separate public declarations which ended the latest phase of the long conflict between the Mexican Government and the Catholic Church. These declarations were the outcome of an effort at mediation undertaken by Ambassador Dwight W. Morrow following an interview he had had with Father John J. Burke, C.S.P., the General Secretary of the Catholic Welfare Conference. The suggestion of this interview was made to him in October 1927 by Cardinal Hayes and Judge Morgan J. O'Brien of New York. The negotiations were conducted in the first instance by Father Burke and President Calles. They were facilitated and directed by Mr. Morrow; they resulted in an understanding which was reached by Father Burke and President Calles at their secret meeting in Vera Cruz on April 4, 1928. With only slight alterations this was the understanding to which President Portes Gil and Archbishop Ruiz, acting with authority from the Holy See, gave their public approval fifteen months later.

The history of this mediation is a notable chapter both in the history of Mexico and in the history of American diplomacy. No one is in a position today to write a definitive account of the matter. The records are in the archives of the Mexican Government, of private individuals in Mexico, of the Mexican hierarchy, of the American hierarchy, and of the Vatican. They have not been assembled and they are not available as yet to the historian. The data available are, nevertheless, sufficient to attempt a contemporary interpretation. It has been my privilege to observe certain aspects of the negotiation, and to know some of the principals in it. The data which I shall use have all at one time or another been published, and all that I could or shall attempt to do is to arrange them in such order as may bring out their significance. I have, for example, already referred to a secret meeting at Vera Cruz between Father Burke and President Calles. The fact that this meeting took place was subsequently reported in the American press; that the understanding reached at this meeting was in fact the understanding which finally received public ap-

proval was recognized by President Portes Gil in an interview given on June 23, 1929 to *El Universal* of Mexico City.

The interpretation of a matter which contains so much controversial matter is, of course, a delicate business. My apology for undertaking it is not only the natural interest which Americans must feel in an historic event to which Americans have made so great a contribution; there is a very practical reason why it may be useful to crystallize now an interpretation of the nature of the understanding arrived at. This understanding contains no decision on the questions of principle which for more than sixty years have so frequently provoked bitter conflict in Mexico; it is nothing but a *modus vivendi* which depends thus far upon the state of mind of relatively few men. Within a short time these men will relinquish their authority. If the peace which they have made is to endure, their present state of mind must be transmitted to their successors. The imponderables are thus the essence of the matter. After three years of bitterness punctuated by violence, after twelve years of intermittent conflict, after a century of opposition, the spokesmen of the popular movement in Mexico and the leaders of the Episcopate have for the first time reached some basis of confidence in each other. That was the whole aim, and is the only result, of Mr. Morrow's mediation. There is no concordat between Church and State. There is no contract to fall back upon which any tribunal can apply if churchmen and politicians relapse into their former distrusts. It may be useful, therefore, to set down a record that will make it easier to remember the nature of the present understanding.

II

When Mr. Morrow went to Mexico City on October 23, 1927, the decision of the Mexican bishops to suspend their offices had been in effect for more than a year. This decision by the bishops was the outcome of a chain of events which began on February 5, 1926. That date was the anniversary of the adoption of the Constitution of 1917. Into that Constitution the revolutionaries who had overthrown Porfirio Diaz wrote their political philosophy and their aspirations. The powers of the State in relation to the Church were defined in Articles 3, 5, 27 and 130.

Article 3 forbade churches or ministers of any creed to establish or direct primary schools; Article 5 prohibited the existence of monastic orders; Article 24 prohibited the performance of all

religious acts of a public nature outside of the buildings intended for that purpose, and these buildings were placed under the permanent supervision of the civil authorities. Article 27 confirmed the nationalization, already provided for in the previous constitution, of all church property and disqualified religious organizations from owning, directly or indirectly, any real estate; Article 130 denied the status of a legal person to parishes, dioceses, or religious associations, placed the priesthood in the position of a profession subject to regulation by the civil power, gave the civil power the right to determine the maximum number of ministers of religion, made it obligatory that priests should be native born Mexicans, compelled officiating ministers to register with the civil authorities, forbade religious periodicals to comment upon political events, and deprived ministers of religion of all political rights.

These provisions became the law of the land in February 1917, and the Mexican prelates immediately protested against them. Nine years passed, however, before the government made any serious effort to enforce the dicta of the Constitution. Throughout the term of President Obregon and for the first two years of President Calles' term there was no enforcement act and there were no penalties attached to the law. Benedict XV, though he had approved the protest of the bishops against the Constitution of 1917, pursued a temporizing policy, and President Obregon was evidently content to let the constitutional provisions stand as theoretical threats without carrying them further. The conflict, therefore, though it was irreconcilable in principle, remained dormant. Occasionally it became overt. One such occasion was the expulsion of the Apostolic Delegate, Mgr. Filippi, on January 17, 1923, for having broken the law against public acts of worship outside of churches by presiding at a great outdoor ceremony devoted to laying the cornerstone of a monument to "Christ, King of Mexico." But in this instance, though Mgr. Filippi was expelled, the Vatican avoided a complete break by allowing Mgr. Crespi, the Secretary of the Apostolic Delegation, to remain in Mexico. More than a year later an understanding was reached by Cardinal Gasparri and President Obregon's Foreign Minister, Aaron Saenz, in regard to the appointment of an Apostolic Delegate. The government agreed to permit him the use of the cipher, and in case of difficulty to demand his recall by the Holy See, instead of expelling him. The Vatican, in turn, agreed that in

selecting bishops, ecclesiastics would be chosen who had not participated in political affairs. Following this agreement the Pope on December 18, 1924, appointed Mgr. Serafino Cimino the Apostolic Delegate.

General Calles succeeded General Obregon in January 1925. He declared that he did not consider himself bound by the agreement because it violated the spirit if not the letter of the Constitution. The relations between Church and State soon became much more strained. Various state legislatures enacted laws of an extremely anti-clerical character. Thus in the state of Tabasco a law was enacted in March 1925 forbidding priests who were unmarried and less than forty years of age to practice; in Yucatan the quota of priests allowed was limited to nine. A schismatic church, calling itself the Apostolic Mexican Church, was founded under the leadership of an unfrocked priest, and although it never amounted to very much, it was believed to have the backing of the government and the help of the Methodist missions. It was deeply resented by devout Catholics. In various parts of the country the schismatics tried to seize churches. There was looting and disorder. In March 1925 a militant organization of Catholics, known as the League for Religious Defense, was created to fight for the repeal of the religious articles of the Constitution. The new Apostolic Delegate, Mgr. Cimino, arrived on April 1, 1925, but after a short time left Mexico for Denver. The reason given for his departure was the state of his health, but there are well-informed persons who believe that Mgr. Cimino was too conciliatory to suit the more intransigent bishops. When he desired to return, President Calles refused permission. The Vatican continued, however, to avoid a break. It retained the Secretary of the Delegation, and the Pope in his Apostolic letter, *Paterna Sane Solicitudo*, dated February 2, 1926, exhorted the bishops to hold themselves "entirely aloof from every kind of political party or faction."

Nevertheless, two days after the date of this letter the event occurred which brought about the rupture of relations. On February 4, 1926, the Mexican newspaper *El Universal* sent a reporter to interview the aged Archbishop of Mexico, Mgr. Mora y del Rio. Whether the editor of *El Universal* was indulging in a mere bit of newspaper enterprise or whether he was moved by ulterior purposes I have never been able to learn. The fact is that the aged prelate was asked to say on the anniversary of the

adoption of the Constitution whether the hierarchy still adhered to its protest made nine years before. He replied that "the doctrine of the church is invariable, because it is divinely revealed truth. . . ." He confirmed a report that "a campaign against the laws which are unjust and contrary to Natural Law should be undertaken. . . ." He declared that "the Episcopacy, clergy and Catholics, do not recognize Articles 3, 5, 27 and 130 of the existing Constitution, and we shall fight them."

The government immediately replied that the attitude of the Archbishop constituted rebellion, and that the facts were being presented to the Attorney General for action to uphold the law. On February 10 the authorities arrested seventeen Spanish priests who were officiating at churches in Mexico City and expelled them summarily. A nation-wide hunt for foreign-born priests was instituted. The government was evidently in a state of nerves. To understand its action one must recall that in the precise moment when the Archbishop was defying Articles 27 and 130, the United States Government was complaining about other provisions of these same articles because of their bearing upon the claims of the oil companies. Interventionist propaganda was active in Washington, and there can be no doubt that General Calles and his supporters conjured up the spectre of a repetition of the events under the Emperor Maximilian when a foreign power with economic grievances combined with the clerical party to suppress the popular movement led by Juarez. Circumstances conspired to convince President Calles that if domestic insurrection leading to foreign intervention was to be avoided there must be a show of power and that therefore the Constitution should be energetically enforced. This determination persisted although Archbishop Mora y del Rio repudiated the more militant parts of his interview and although the legal proceedings against him were dropped. The government, according to President Calles, closed 73 Catholic convents and expelled 185 foreign-born priests.

In the midst of this tension the new Apostolic Delegate, Mgr. George Caruana, arrived in Mexico on March 3, 1926. Mgr. Caruana was born in Malta, was a naturalized American citizen, and had served as chaplain in the American Army during the World War. It is said that Mgr. Caruana publicly advised the clergy to resist the laws. I have been unable to confirm this allegation. President Calles, however, distrusted him and ordered

an inquiry into the conditions under which he had entered Mexico. It was charged, and believed by the government, that he had represented himself to the frontier officials as a Protestant professor entering Mexico as a tourist. The government certainly believed that the selection of an American citizen was an effort to involve the State Department in the religious controversy. Mgr. Caruana was expelled on May 10, 1926, for violating the immigration laws.

The tension increased. The government proceeded to draft regulations laying down penalties for the purpose of enforcing religious laws. On June 21, 1926, the presidential decree was issued to take effect on July 31 and for the first time since the Constitution came into effect the government had legal power to punish disobedience to its provisions. This decree did not change the law; it provided that violations of the law should be deemed misdemeanors punishable by specific penalties.

The Episcopate was now confronted with what appeared to be indisputable evidence of the government's intention to proceed with the enforcement of the laws. It became necessary to decide whether priests in charge of churches should or should not register with the civil authorities. In the early days of July 1926 the bishops were by no means unanimous as to the course which they should adopt. There were some who counselled open rebellion; others advised passive resistance; some desired purely constitutional effort to obtain amendments of the law. It is said that at first a majority of the bishops wished to temporize, and that the Vatican through the Secretary of the Apostolic Delegation advised this policy. However, at the meeting of July 11 the more intransigent bishops prevailed and the decision was taken to refuse registration and to suspend worship; the Holy See was informed that the absence of orders to the contrary would be considered as approval of the decision. Mgr. Crespi, the Secretary to the Apostolic Delegation, continued his efforts at conciliation; the Vatican, though it had apparently decided that it must approve a unanimous decision, nevertheless made an effort at the end of July to obtain some relaxation of the rigors of the law. But the government was in an irreconcilable mood. Thereupon, on July 27, the Holy See condemned the presidential decree of June 21. On July 29, the government ordered Mgr. Crespi to leave the country on twenty-four hours' notice. Worship was suspended by the clergy on August 1; the government, for its part,

left the churches open and in charge of committees of the faithful. The League for Religious Defense declared a boycott. There were great anti-clerical demonstrations by the labor unions.

Even after the rupture an effort was made to repair it. Through the medium of Eduardo Mestre, a prominent lay Mexican, a conference was arranged for August 21 between President Calles and two of the bishops, Mgr. Diaz and Mgr. Ruiz. At this discussion the prelates on their side disclaimed any revolutionary intent and the President on his part stated that the registration of priests had a purely administrative purpose in connection with the use of religious edifices which were owned by the State but entrusted to the priests. The committee of the bishops then issued a public statement which was published in *El Universal* on August 22 recounting this understanding and declaring that "the interview with the President was indeed satisfactory." This is an extremely important matter, for it will be seen when we come to the agreement reached three years later that it rests upon this same foundation. At this time, however, the understanding broke down. On the day after the bishops published their account of the interview with the President, he gave out an interview which, though literally correct and consistent with the bishops' statement, was presented in such a way as to seem like a repudiation of the understanding. The bishops, therefore, changed their decision and decided not to return to the churches. Thus each side believed that the other had repudiated the understanding, and the situation became deadlocked. There was an uprising of Catholics in the west; the situation became tremendously embittered. Another effort at conciliation by Sr. Mestre was begun in March 1927, but it failed because of a singularly atrocious attack on a passenger train near Guadalajara in which it was alleged that the Catholic rebels had participated. By a dramatic coincidence Sr. Mestre was a passenger on that train and was wounded in the attack. He made still one more attempt at conciliation a few months later, in August 1927. Again the government agreed that it would treat the registration as an administrative measure and would not use it to interfere with the spiritual offices of the clergy. The assurances were laid before the Mexican bishops assembled at San Antonio, Texas, who approved them with certain changes and transmitted their decision to the Vatican. In the midst of these promising negotiations, the Serrano-Gomez rebellion broke out. No reply was ever received from the Vatican by the negotiators.

At about this time Mr. Morrow arrived at his post in Mexico City.

III

This account of the principal events leading up to the rupture has been necessary, I think, in order to make clear the events which followed. From the point of view of the successful mediation which was at last accomplished they are significant chiefly on three points. They show, first, that in theory the contentions of Church and State were irreconcilable, for the State claimed the right, however much or little it might insist upon exercising it, of subjecting the Church to the civil power; second, that as a matter of practical administration a *modus vivendi* was possible as early as three weeks after the suspension of worship; and third, that agreement on a *modus vivendi* was frustrated again and again by the distrust felt by the government and the prelates towards each other and by the intransigent supporters of both.

The task of the mediator, therefore, was to replace distrust with confidence, to create a will to peace which would impel the leaders on both sides to discipline and subdue their intransigent supporters. Seizing every advantage of favorable circumstances, this is what Mr. Morrow did. It took him about eighteen months of unremitting effort.

To understand the nature of this distrust, and how it was dispelled, it is necessary to understand the deposit left in the memory of the Mexican people by their peculiar social history. I am referring not to the objective history, not to what actually took place *sub specie eternitatis*, but what Mexicans now think took place. It must be plain, I think, to anyone who has known the Mexicans implicated in this struggle that there were two great historical traditions current among them which determined their attitude towards the question of Church and State. There was the tradition of the revolutionary party and there was the tradition of the ecclesiastical party.

According to the revolutionary tradition, the Church had been throughout Mexican history the ally of the foreign conqueror and the great feudal landlords. I have not the space here to set forth the tradition in all its detail. The government in 1927 published a volume of nearly five hundred pages ("La Iglesia y El Stado en Mexico," by Lic. Alfonso Toro) which on this point sets forth the whole creed of the Revolutionary Party. Few Mexi-

cans, I imagine, have read it, but all the literate revolutionists are deeply impressed with certain notable features of the story it tells. They recall that more than a century ago, at the time of the rebellion against Spain, the two priests who led the national forces, Father Hidalgo and Father Morelos, were excommunicated. They believe that the Mexican Catholic Church headed the movement which put the Emperor Iturbide in power, and that in 1833 it took an active part in overthrowing Gomez Farias because he had obtained the passage of laws depriving the clergy of their control of education, abolishing the collection of tithes and the enforcement of monastic vows by the civil authorities. They recall that the slogan of the Conservative Party in that counter-revolution was *religion y fueros* (religion and privileges). They recall that during the war with the United States, when the Mexican Congress tried to raise fifteen million pesos by the sale or mortgage of church property, the clergy closed the churches in Mexico City and incited the troops to revolt. They charge the clergy with fomenting the counter-revolution of 1852, which established the dictatorship of Santa Anna. They charge them with leading the counter-revolution against the Constitution of 1857, and they point out that the clergy threatened to excommunicate all who swore allegiance to that Constitution. They argue, therefore, that the Church has been in opposition to the constitutions of Mexico for seventy years. They recall that when the popular party won the civil war after 1857, members of the clerical party led the intrigue in Europe which established the empire of Maximilian. They insist that the clergy opposed the Madero revolution of 1911, that it supported the counter-revolution under General Huerta, that it opposed the popular revolution led by Carranza, Obregon, and Calles.

These memories were in the minds of the revolutionists who drafted the Constitution of 1917 and the laws pursuant to it. It will be seen that they provide a perfect basis for a highly nationalistic and anti-clerical policy, and the laws must be read with this in mind. They are quite evidently laws of war. They are an assumption of the unlimited right of the civil power to crush any ecclesiastical organization; and their justification in the minds of the revolutionists was that the Church in Mexico had been always, and was then, identified with reaction at home and intervention from abroad. Since the government during the ensuing nine years did little to use its power, the purpose of the laws seems plainly

to have been not to extirpate the Catholic faith but to have power to crush counter-revolutionary agitation if and when it started. It is highly significant that the threat to enforce the laws coincided with the propaganda of the oil companies in the United States, and it is no less significant that as early as August 1927 the government was assuring the prelates that the threat to crush the Church would not be carried out if they dissociated themselves from political rebellion. The conclusion seems to me inescapable that the Constitution was not meant seriously to define the normal relations of Church and State, but that it was designed to empower the government in emergencies. The government, we must remember, was satisfied that the sympathies of the prelates were with the great landlords and with the interventionists in the United States. From my own talks with at least three of the prelates I am satisfied that in 1927 this view was correct.

Against these beliefs of the revolutionary party must be set the beliefs of the clerical party. They too had a philosophy of Mexican history which determined their conduct. It is difficult for Americans, I think, to do full justice to their point of view, because it rested upon a denial of all the premises which practically every American takes for granted. The Mexican clergy and the Mexican aristocracy of Spanish descent has been for more than two hundred years isolated from the main influences which have shaped the western world. The Reformation apparently made no impression whatever upon Mexico. The ideas of the French Revolution made none upon the upper classes. The general conception of the world held by the prelates was fairly well represented by the Syllabus of 1864, and in their social outlook they assumed that the feudal order was part of the nature of things. They could not conceive of a righteous society in which the Church was not the dominant power. Their whole history confirmed their conviction of the inherent righteousness of that state of affairs which Lord Acton described in 1868 when he wrote that "The largest landowner in Mexico was the Church; and as there was no religious toleration, it was the church of the whole nation, the only teacher of the moral law to the natives, the sole channel through which the majority of the people had access to the civilization of Christendom."

Believing that this was the proper order of human society, the clergy had resisted the popular movement at all times, and they persuaded themselves that the popular leaders from Juarez to Calles

were the lieutenants of Satan. The defense of privilege was in their minds a defense of the faith itself, and in this atmosphere the jacobinism of the revolutionists was countered with fanaticism. There can be no doubt that in 1926 and 1927 the majority of the prelates looked for a solution only through the overthrow of the government. There was little distinction in their minds between the laws directed against the Church and the laws directed against the great landlords. For prelates and landlords constituted one social class with the same social outlook and they were unmistakably committed to the hope of counter-revolution.

It thus transpires that the crux of the conflict was not really the status of the Church as the guardian of souls but the position of prelates and clergy on the burning question of whether the revolution was to survive. The laws in a country like Mexico are flexible in the extreme. Political theories about the relation of Church and State are of consequence only when more mundane matters are at stake. The real question was whether the clergy would accept the revolution as an accomplished fact and whether the government would believe that the clergy had accepted it.

The mediation undertaken by Mr. Morrow turned on this question.

IV

In November 1927 when Mr. Morrow arrived in Mexico City to present his credentials civil war had been going on for a year. In the summer of 1926 the League for Religious Defense had proclaimed a boycott intended "to paralyze the social and economic life of the nation," and this boycott had been endorsed by the Committee of the Bishops. On September 24 the Chamber of Deputies rejected the Catholic petition for amendments to the Constitution. Armed bands, carrying the banner of "Viva Cristo Rey" appeared in various parts of the country, and many acts of violence were committed by these bands and by the government's troops and its supporters. It would be unprofitable to attempt to describe the series of atrocities which followed, or to attempt to separate fact from fiction in the reports of them that have come down to us. There can be no doubt that both sides were responsible for acts of cruelty. The government on its part was convinced that these acts of violence and rebellion were approved and directed by the higher clergy; the clergy were convinced that

the government approved and directed the violence committed against the Catholics.

On the evidence available it seems to me that neither the clergy nor the government can be exonerated, and, on the other hand, that there were at all times moderate influences in both camps which sincerely deplored what was happening. Thus on April 30, 1927, Archbishop Ruiz as spokesman for the exiled bishops in the United States denied that the Church approved the acts of the Catholic rebels; on the other hand, Archbishop Gonzales y Valencia of Durango in a pastoral letter from Rome, dated February 11, 1927, had said: "To our Catholic sons risen in arms for the defense of their social and religious rights, after having thought at great length before God and having consulted the sagest theologians of the city of Rome, we should say to you: Be tranquil in your consciences and receive our benedictions." Writing further of his meeting with the Pope, the Archbishop said: "We have seen him moved on hearing the story of your struggle, we have seen him bless your resistance, approve all your acts, and admire all your heroisms." It will be noted that this pastoral letter approving the rebellion came two months earlier than Archbishop Ruiz's statement of disapproval. It appears that when the Holy See realized the meaning of the armed resistance organized by the League for Religious Defense it ordered the Mexican bishops to repudiate the League. But not all of the bishops and clergy seem to have obeyed the instructions of the Holy See. To students of Mexican history such disobedience is not a novelty. Incidents could be cited to show that Rome itself has frequently had serious difficulty in maintaining discipline among the Mexican clergy. Thus one must conclude that the rebellion was carried on with the disapproval of the central authorities of the Church but with considerable approval from scattered local members of the hierarchy.

The government also had difficulty in disciplining its supporters, and its sincerity in respect to the illegal violence of the troops in 1926–1927 may be doubted. There were raids, looting, and executions in disregard of the Constitution and of all considerations of justice and humanity, and there is no sufficient evidence that the government discountenanced them. Religious wars are notoriously savage, and this one in Mexico was no exception.

It reached its climax just as Mr. Morrow took up his post in Mexico City. There had been an unsuccessful attempt on the life of General Obregon. The police seized four men, one of them a

much beloved priest, Father Pro, and executed them summarily. That the four victims were active organizers of the rebellion seems to be established; that any or all of them were implicated in the crime for which they were executed has never been satisfactorily proved. The government did not conduct a public trial.

It was an inauspicious moment to begin the process of mediation. Yet it had to be undertaken. For the civil war in Mexico had indirect but profound effects on the relations between Mexico and the United States. American lives and interests were constantly in danger because of the disorder. The policy of adjustment which Ambassador Morrow was entrusted to carry out could come to nothing as long as Mexico was inflamed by religious war. In the United States not alone the Catholic population but all other persons of sense and sensibility were deeply concerned that the conflict should be settled. Before his departure for Mexico Mr. Morrow had been requested by Cardinal Hayes and by Judge O'Brien to use his good offices. Interest, expediency, and sheer human considerations impelled the Ambassador to do what he could within the limits of official propriety.

Since the essence of the conflict was the deep distrust of the Catholic clergy and the Revolutionary politicians each for the other, it was necessary for Mr. Morrow to do two things: he had to build a bridge of personal confidence between President Calles on the one side and the Catholic clergy on the other; he had to dispel completely from the minds of both sides the central idea that the fate of the social revolution in Mexico was an issue in the religious conflict.

It was not possible to begin with a direct meeting between President Calles and a representative of the Church. The distrust was too great. Mr. Morrow began, therefore, by establishing personal confidence between President Calles and himself and between Father John J. Burke and himself. In this he succeeded immediately, and therefore from the outset a means of communication was prepared which might be used later when circumstances were auspicious. Through his personal relationships with President Calles and Father Burke, Mr. Morrow was able to explore the controversy, and certain conclusions soon became quite clear. They were that on the plane of theoretical principle the conflict was insoluble; that on the plane of practical adjustment a *modus vivendi* was possible on the same terms as those which President Calles and the two bishops, Mgr. Ruiz and Mgr. Diaz, had

discussed in August 1926 when the conflict had just started. The problem was to allay personal distrust by removing the question of the fate of the social revolution, and thus to achieve peace by means of a *modus vivendi*. The clarity and completeness with which at the very beginning Mr. Morrow conceived the exact nature of the settlement which was arrived at more than eighteen months later is most impressive. When one realizes that Mr. Morrow was a stranger to Mexico and without previous experience in dealing with the Catholic Church, his immediate success in envisaging the whole problem, which it took eighteen months of patient and resolute efforts to solve, must be set down as a triumph of the trained historical imagination.

V

The period which I am now going to discuss extends from October 1927 to June 1929. It begins in Washington before Mr. Morrow's departure to take up his post, that is to say just after Father Burke called upon him at the instance of Cardinal Hayes and Judge O'Brien. It ends at the National Palace in Mexico City with the signing of the *modus vivendi* by Archbishop Ruiz. To comprehend it one must take account of two concurrent chains of events: the negotiation by responsible individuals in Mexico City, Washington and Rome, and the larger movement of historic circumstances which accompanied the negotiations and affected them. The pattern is intricate and I shall try only to disengage what appear to be the most significant motifs.

It was evident from the first exploration of the problem that the question which had produced the decision to suspend worship presented no insoluble conflict of principle. This was the question of whether the clergy would obey the law by registering with the civil authorities. Father Burke made it plain at once that there was nothing in the canon law which made registration as such intolerable. What was intolerable was the threat that the civil authorities in registering priests would either assert the right not to register those priests who had been designated by the bishop of the diocese or would assert the right to register schismatics and outsiders. Obviously, if it was the purpose of the law to place this power in the hands of the civil authority, then the discipline and the constitution of the Church would be destroyed. The law itself was not clear. It could be read so as to mean either that it confined the civil power to the making of a purely statistical record or

as a grant of power to intervene in the most intimate internal affairs of the Church. President Calles had, to be sure, told the bishops on August 21, 1926, that the law would be administered only for purposes of record, but the events of the civil war had so embittered men's minds that these assurances had either been forgotten or were disbelieved. Mr. Morrow, however, satisfied himself very soon that the interpretation of August 1926 was still valid. He knew, therefore, that on the immediate issue a meeting of minds between President Calles and Father Burke was possible.

It was no longer possible, however, to settle the conflict by agreement as to the interpretation of one law. Too much blood had been shed. If agreement on the issue of the registration law was to have any lasting value many profound antagonisms and preconceptions had to be removed. It was necessary to convince the government that the clergy would dissociate themselves from counter-revolution and foreign intervention; it was necessary to convince the clergy that a restoration of their historic privileges was impossible, but that if they accepted the social revolution as an accomplished fact they could recover the essential liberties of the Church and could proceed with their spiritual mission.

The government's fear and the clergy's hope of foreign intervention were decisively removed by the action of the United States Government. In selecting Mr. Morrow for Ambassador, President Coolidge quite plainly intended to end the destructive drift towards intervention by the United States and to substitute a constructive policy of conciliation. The settlement of the oil controversy is in itself no part of this story, but it had at least two immensely important consequences in the religious conflict. It convinced both President Calles and all but the most unintelligent of his opponents that American intervention need no longer be considered. This relieved the Mexican Government of its greatest fear, and therefore, of the greatest motive to violent action. It also compelled the opponents of the régime, both lay and clerical, gradually to face the fact that they could not count on outside assistance in carrying on rebellion against the government. The removal of the interventionist threat cut the ground from under the intransigents in both camps.

It is not a mere coincidence, I think, that the first meeting between President Calles and Father Burke took place within two weeks of the public announcement of the settlement of the

Mexican-American oil controversy. It may be something of a coincidence that the two events came so very close together, for it had taken weeks of negotiation to arrange the visit. But it is a fact that these negotiations became successful concurrently with the later and successful stages of the discussion about oil. For the settlement of the oil question altered the mood of the government, and established its complete confidence in the Ambassador and in anyone in whom the Ambassador had confidence. When Father Burke and his collaborator, Mr. Montavon, arrived in Vera Cruz on April 4, 1928, their reception had been well prepared. The details of this historic conference will be told when the actors present write their memoirs. It is known, however, that letters were exchanged that day between Father Burke and President Calles and that they are the same in substance as, even if they were not identical in language with, the public declarations made fifteen months later by President Portes Gil and Archbishops Ruiz and Diaz. Therefore, we may conclude that the outcome of this first conference was an understanding that a settlement would have to rest, not upon technical details, but upon broad assurances of toleration and coöperation between Church and State.

The Vera Cruz conference did not result in a settlement, for Father Burke, though he was acting with the knowledge and approval of his superiors, did not have final power to speak for the Church. It was necessary to obtain the approval of the Mexican bishops who were in exile and scattered, and finally, of course, the approval of the Holy See. Ten of the twenty-nine bishops met in San Antonio at the end of April. If I am correctly informed, none of them, unless they included Archbishop Ruiz, which is not altogether certain, knew of the Vera Cruz conference and the Calles-Burke letters. The bishops voted unanimously that they were not so intransigent against the existing government but that they could return to Mexico and resume their offices on conditions which the Holy See approved. They drew up suggestions dealing with such matters as education, the use of church properties, and amnesty, but these were in the form of suggestions and not of demands. The significant fact is that at least a third of the Episcopate was ready to dissociate the cause of the Church from political counter-revolution. The Mexican Government, in its turn, whether by coincidence or arrangement I do not know, made a striking public gesture of conciliation. Speaking at a patriotic

festival on April 15 in the presence of President Calles and General Obregon, and obviously with their approval, Dr. Puig Casauranc, the Minister of Education, said:

> And this revolution which has been converted into a government is completely respectful of religious beliefs and it is absolutely false that it is trying to tear from Mexican hearts the beliefs that they have had for many centuries back. It is false, completely, that it wants to erase the religion which was bequeathed to us by our ancestors and still less true that it is trying to cause to disappear the tradition of the whole race to adore the Virgin of Guadalupe, that divine image which is cherished in the hearts of all good Mexicans and which is like an infinite longing for betterment.

Thus, in the month of April, there had been a satisfactory conference between Father Burke and President Calles, a moderate vote by ten of the bishops, and a highly conciliatory public statement by a spokesman of the government. President Calles was then prevailed upon to receive Father Burke a second time, accompanied now not only by Mr. Montavon but by Archbishop Ruiz. Meetings took place in Mexico City from May 17 to May 19, 1928, and letters were written by the President and the Archbishop. These letters were not exchanged, pending approval from Rome. It was hoped that approval would be given by cablegram in order to permit the immediate resumption of services.

The approval was not given. Archbishop Ruiz was called to Rome, and departed on May 26. Considerable publicity attended Mgr. Ruiz's arrival in Paris, and there is some evidence that this provoked intransigent Mexicans residing in Rome to activity to prevent a settlement.

VI

While matters were drifting in this fashion, a fanatic named Toral assassinated General Obregon. This was on July 16, 1928. The presidential succession was thrown into doubt. The government in its first excitement made wild charges against the Catholics; the *Osservatore Romano* published a series of bitter and grossly uninformed articles charging President Calles himself with the murder of his friend. Thus the old enmities, which had been so nearly allayed during the spring, flared up again, and it seemed as if the hopes aroused at the Burke-Calles and the Ruiz-Calles conferences had ended in disaster. But in the midst of the hysteria the moderating influences of Ambassador Morrow and Father Burke prevailed. The government, after a first outburst, toned

down its subsequent statements and refrained from replying to the attacks in the Vatican newspaper. Instead of shooting the assassin and his alleged conspirators summarily, as had been done in the case of Father Pro, the government delayed and held a public trial. Certain of the Mexican and American clergy issued statements which took the sting out of the *Osservatore Romano's* articles. Thus by one means and another complete disaster was avoided. The settlement was delayed but it was not rendered impossible. In this ordeal by fire the inherent soundness of the progress made in the mediation was tested and proved.

Until November no further progress was made. Then Archbishop Ruiz returned to Washington from Rome bringing with him the Vatican's views on a settlement. They were moderate views, but owing to the trial of Obregon's assassin the atmosphere in Mexico was not favorable to a renewal of the negotiations, especially since the Holy See desired additional assurances from the government. President Calles was retiring from office on December 1, and he was not willing to go beyond his assurances to Father Burke and Archbishop Ruiz.

Matters drifted for some months after the inauguration of the new provisional President, Portes Gil, and on March 3 the military rebellion led by Topete, Aguirre and Escobar broke out. By order of President Hoover, who had just been inaugurated, the United States Government acted promptly and decisively to discourage it. The Catholic authorities in the United States immediately took steps to discourage Catholics from showing sympathy for the rebels by pointing out that among the rebels were military adventurers, some of whom had committed violent attacks upon Catholics, one of them being the executioner of Father Pro. In Mexico itself there was no indication of Catholic support for the rebellion. Thus the tragedy of the rebellion proved to be a blessing in disguise. For it demonstrated to the government that the clergy would not capitalize the hazards of counter-revolution, and it impelled the government to make friendly statements. The clergy, for their part, began to issue condemnations of violence. All of this led up to public declarations in the press by President Portes Gil on May 2 and by Archbishop Ruiz on May 3, which may be summarized in the words of Mgr. Ruiz that "the religious conflict was not motivated by any cause which may not be corrected by men of sincere good will."

The President replied in a statement published May 8, welcom-

ing Mgr. Ruiz's words and saying that "if Archbishop Ruiz should desire to discuss with me the method of securing the co-operation in the moral effort for the betterment of the Mexican people which he desires, I shall have no objection to conferring with him on the subject."

At this time Father Edmund Walsh of Georgetown University was in Mexico City at the request of the Pope; he had come to examine and report upon the situation. Permission was asked of the Holy See to proceed with negotiations for a settlement, and on June 8 Archbishop Ruiz accompanied by Bishop Diaz arrived in Mexico City. Assisted by Father Walsh and by Senor Cruchaga, a Chilean who had the use of the Chilean cable code for communication with the Vatican, the negotiations with the government were carried on, Mr. Morrow acting as mediator.

The churchmen decided that they would rest their case upon the broad assurances given at Vera Cruz more than a year before by President Calles to Father Burke; President Portes Gil took the position that he would stand upon the same ground as President Calles. The prelates and the President met on June 12 and again on June 13. There was very strong pressure from the outside to prevent a settlement. At least one state legislature passed resolutions, and there were protests from labor organizations and Masonic lodges; the prelates, too, were subjected to pressure from extremists. Nevertheless, an agreement was reached on June 21, 1929. It took the form of two public statements, one by the President and one by Archbishop Ruiz.

As a result, worship was resumed in the churches and amnesty was accorded to the Catholic rebels who were in prison and to those still in the field who would come in and deliver up their arms.

VII

The statement of the President cites the belief of the prelates that the provision of the laws requiring the registration of ministers and the provision which grants the separate states the right to determine the maximum number of ministers "threaten the identity of the Church by giving the State the control of its spiritual offices." He then records the assurances given him by the bishops that they "are animated by a sincere patriotism and that they desire to resume public worship if this can be done consistently with their loyalty to the Mexican Republic and their

consciences." He then declares "publicly and very clearly" that it is not the purpose of the Constitution, nor of the laws, nor of the government, "to destroy the identity of the Catholic Church or of any other, or to interfere in any way with its spiritual functions." He says that he is disposed to hear "from any person, be he a dignitary of some church or merely a private individual, any complaints in regard to injustices arising from undue application of the laws." He then declares in regard to certain provisions of the law "which have been misunderstood that: 1, the government cannot "register those who have not been named by the hierarchial superior of the religious creed in question or in accordance with its regulations"; that 2, religious instruction may be given "within church confines"; and that 3, the clergy have the constitutional right to petition "for the amendment, repeal or passage of any law." The concurrent statement by Archbishop Ruiz records that "the conversations have been marked by a spirit of mutual good will and respect" and that as a consequence of the President's statement "the Mexican clergy will resume religious services pursuant to the laws in force."

Two days later in a newspaper interview the President stated categorically that the result reached is the same as that "which in the month of April 1928 was on the point of being brought to a happy conclusion between Father John J. Burke and Archbishop Ruiz on the one hand, and President Calles on the other." He stated that this would appear in the files of the archives of the Presidency of the Republic. Since these files are not open to public inspection, an exact comparison of the documents cannot be made, but I do not believe that it is far from the truth to say that while the Burke-Calles and the Ruiz-Calles letters are identical in substance and in principle, the Portes Gil-Ruiz statements do make somewhat more explicit the assurances which were implicit in the previous exchanges.

The discussion as to whether the ultimate agreement differs in any substantial respect from the earlier agreements does not turn, as perhaps at first it may seem to do, upon a mere question of historical accuracy. It is the central point in the interpretation of the whole conflict. The conflict lasted from August 1, 1926, to June 21, 1929. In those three years there were three occasions when representatives of the State and the Church met and arrived at what seemed to them the basis of a working agreement. The first occasion was August 21, 1926, in a conference between President

Calles and Monsignori Ruiz and Diaz. The second occasion was in April and May of 1928, in the Burke-Calles and then the Burke-Ruiz-Calles conferences. The third occasion was in June 1929 in the Ruiz-Portes Gil conferences. If the record showed that the last conference resulted in substantially different agreements from those which preceded it, the interpreter of this historic affair would have to decide whether the State or the Church had made the greater concessions. But if the facts are as I have stated them to be, if the three years of conflict resulted in an understanding on substantially the same basis as that which was arrived at three weeks after the conflict started, then the task of the interpreter is to decide why it took so long to get back to the starting point. Why did President Portes Gil and Archbishop Ruiz succeed in making peace in 1929 on terms which failed to bring peace in 1926?

My own view of the answer to this question has already been indicated. It is that the crux of the conflict was not the divergence of principle as to the status of the Church and the State. There was not really an insoluble conflict as to the meaning of the laws. The crux of the conflict was whether the Mexican clergy would continue to oppose or would accept and coöperate with the régime resulting from the social revolution. The three years' conflict did not alter the text of the laws. But it altered profoundly the social policy of the Mexican hierarchy. For nearly a hundred years they had identified the interests of the Church with a Mexican state dominated by the great landlords and by foreign interests; they had regarded the revolutionists against the conservative state, from Father Hidalgo through Benito Juarez to Carranza and Obregon and Calles, as the enemies of the Church. And because the Church was identified with the conservative state and with foreign intervention, the revolutionists became in practice enemies of the clergy. In the three years' conflict the Mexican clergy came to realize that a restoration of the old social order was impossible, that American intervention was no solution, that the new régime, regardless of palace rebellions and military revolts, was likely to endure. During their exile in the United States under the wise tutoring of liberal and far-sighted American priests they realized that the Catholic Church did not need, in fact was far greater without, the support of a privileged feudal order. Thus the Mexican hierarchy achieved a new orientation. It ceased to identify itself with the small class of great landlords

who had been overthrown by the revolution, and learned to identify itself with the aspirations of the common people. In a public statement issued immediately after the settlement, Father Edmund A. Walsh said: "The language and spirit of these declarations place the relations of the Church and State in Mexico on sure foundations of mutual respect, mutual coöperation and a common sharing of fundamental rights by all Mexican citizens."

In this new orientation is to be found the significance of the settlement and the only possible guarantee that it will last. The Mexican Church has started to become a democratic church. With that change of allegiance, the powers vested in the government by the Constitution and the laws cease to have any real significance. They were war powers directed against a hierarchy which was inveterately hostile to the new régime and threatened its overthrow. Against a hierarchy which accepts a new régime such as Mexico has now been promised, they will not be used, and in the course of time will either be forgotten or repealed.

STRESEMANN

By Viscount D'Abernon

YOU must not expect from me a balanced, critical account of Stresemann. I was too close to the man, too intimate with him, too attached to him. For six years we were in almost daily intercourse, either in personal interview or by intermediaries, and I believe that no two men in similar positions were ever more frank with one another or more free in interchange of suggestion and criticism.

My real acquaintance with Stresemann began in 1921. I had met him before but we had only exchanged commonplace civilities. In one of the numerous crises which occurred between Berlin and the western capitals during the years following Versailles, Stresemann (as representing an important parliamentary group) came to the British Embassy with four questions which he wanted answered. These questions were so pungent and precise that I was totally unable to answer them myself, and, indeed, when I promised to telegraph to London to ascertain the views of the British Government I anticipated receiving from official sources either an evasive reply or a reminder that it was hardly consistent with diplomatic usage to put definite points of such a searching nature. However, it so happened that Curzon, who was then at the head of the Foreign Office, was no less ready with pen and tongue than Stresemann, and was not more inclined than he to seek safety in silence or evasion. So the answer came to these four questions, and from that date Stresemann and I became close friends. Once he was reassured of the essential good faith of the English attitude, once he felt convinced that we were not seeking to hold Germany down in a subordinate position but to procure peace in Europe on an endurable basis, his whole attitude towards our policy became one of cordial coöperation. It was part of his frank, buoyant nature to put his whole case forward, to explain his own difficulties and to relate, without reticence, what caused him doubts and hesitation — when, indeed, these crossed his mind, for the occasions were few when he doubted or hesitated about anything, and no man had a clearer view or a more rapid power of decision.

It is impossible to review the years from 1920 to 1926 — that is to say, the years which led from post-war animosity to the peace-

ful haven of Locarno — without endeavoring to ascertain which of the statesmen of Europe deserves the highest meed of praise for what was achieved. As readers of my diary know, I have the highest opinion of Briand and his services to the cause of peace, but if one estimates the value of service by the amount of difference it would have made had that person's services not been rendered, Stresemann is perhaps entitled to an even higher place. He assumed bigger risks in carrying out his policy and he was more peculiarly fitted to influence public opinion in his own country than was either Briand in France or Chamberlain in England. And this for a simple reason: by temperament and by historical antecedents he belonged to the other side. If he was for peace, there must be reasons of exceptional force.

Stresemann began life as a militant and aggressive Nationalist, a pugnacious student of the full-blooded type. During the war he was an advocate of the strongest and most bellicose measures; an opponent to any pledge to restore Belgium, an advocate of submarine warfare and a bitter critic of all negotiations which would, in his opinion, lead to premature peace. This past gave him a position with the Nationalists (the party from whom opposition to the peace policy was most to be feared) of an exceptional character. They might detest the measures he proposed; they might consider his concessions dishonorable and dangerous, but they could not attack him with the same vehemence with which they would have attacked similar measures introduced by a Socialist or Catholic minister. His general orientation had been similar to theirs; he had not recanted in principle; he must have adopted measures of conciliation from imperative motives of expediency.

Stresemann's relations with his former friends of the Right and Right Centre were peculiar and fluctuating. At times he coöperated with them; at times they were his bitterest opponents. While fundamentally in sympathy with them in being a partisan of the Hohenzollerns, he diverged fundamentally from them in readiness to adopt measures he considered politically necessary. Stresemann, in pursuit of his policy, was prepared to coöperate with any party, either with the Nationalists on the one side or the Socialists on the other; he found no consistent support from either; he did not find support even in his own party — the *Volkspartei* — itself divided into several sections and sub-sections. So, to gain the necessary majorities for carrying measures that he considered essential, he had to get together casual —

almost fortuitous — majorities, enlisted from wherever he could find them.

What was his essential policy? To bring about such an appeasement of the relations between France and Germany as would permit European pacification. So long as the acute fear of German attack existed in France, so long as Germany was under the menace of armed invasion by France and threatened by a repetition of the Ruhr invasion, any broad policy of European pacification was impossible. Once public opinion in Germany and France was reassured as to the particular danger arising from the other side of the Rhine, everything became easier. There was no more definite objective in Stresemann's mind than the above. The first step was all that he visualized clearly; once that step was achieved, international politics would settle down and many other things might become possible.

It is called the triumph of Stresemann's career that he achieved not only Locarno but the revision of the Dawes Plan at the Hague. I have always thought Locarno incomparably the more important of the two. Indeed, I have doubted the wisdom of bringing about the revision of the Dawes Plan at so early a date, and my doubt has not been removed by the fact that the negotiations consequent upon the Young Agreement undoubtedly precipitated the death of Stresemann. What financial benefit can be compared with the loss to Germany and to Europe of such a man? As to the merit of Locarno, that appears to me incontestable. In a few weeks the European barometer passed from "Storm" to "Fair," and while it has since fluctuated at times, it has never receded to the phase of "Storm" and "Tempest" which was normal in the years before 1925.

Comparing Stresemann with other German statesmen of the last half of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth, one must clearly remember that Bismarck and von Bülow had at their disposal military force and military prestige. These conditions were completely lacking in Stresemann's case. When we measure his achievement, this fundamental difference in basic conditions must be kept in mind. Stresemann can claim to have raised Germany from the position of a stricken and disarmed foe into that of a diplomatic equal entitled to full consideration as a Great Power and enjoying international guarantees for the protection of its frontiers. To have achieved this in a few years of power without the support of armed force is an achieve-

ment worthy of those who have written their names most memorably on the scroll of pacific fame. Stresemann has left Germany infinitely stronger than when he took the helm in 1923, and Europe incomparably more peaceful. The accomplishment of this result is the more remarkable in that Stresemann was not, by temperament, a pacifist; it might indeed be said that no more aggressive champion of pacification ever achieved pacific results.

The last years of Stresemann's life were marred by ill health, largely brought about by overwork in the interest of his country and in the interest of peace. He would, indeed, have broken down many months before the final catastrophe but for his indomitable will and intense nervous vitality. He was, moreover, unusually fortunate in his family life; two sons in the early twenties, both of them good-looking, intelligent and artistic — one of them something of a musical genius; his wife, one of the most charming members of Berlin society, looking as young as her children and maintaining in the family circle an atmosphere of cheerfulness which made the home stimulating and refreshing.

If Stresemann looked older than the other three members of the family group, he enjoyed life as much as the youngest of them. He relished his own talents, his incisive resonance, his unique capacity for clear thought and clear expression; he was proud to be German, prouder still to be the compatriot of Goethe. Admirably versed in German literature, he could quote with verbal accuracy long passages both of poetry and prose. Indeed, he went beyond the limits of German, for he could quote long passages of Shakespeare, both in German and in English. In addition to literature, he had an intense appreciation of the good things of life; good wine, good music, were appreciated to the full; his capacity for enjoyment was not marred by any pangs of doubt as to whether the course he happened to be pursuing was right. It was always right — always inevitable. He once said that he never regretted anything he had done — his only regret was for the opportunities for enjoyment which he had foregone or missed. Above all, he enjoyed the success of his own policy and was rightly proud of the services he had rendered to his country and the great personal position he had achieved.

TEN YEARS OF THE LEAGUE

By Eduard Beneš

THE League of Nations is today an integral part of international life. That in itself is a remarkable fact. Anyone who has not watched the League closely during the past ten years must find it almost impossible to realize the laborious development which has brought it to its present high estate, the innumerable difficulties which have had to be surmounted. It took the devastation, moral and material, of a world war to transform the outlook of mankind sufficiently to allow idealistic schemes to be given a place on the working tables of responsible statesmen. The mentality which the philosophers and historians who were the bulwark of autocracy in centuries past had propagated in their own interests had to be swept away, along with the innumerable obstacles by which autocracy or theocracy in their modern forms sought to hinder the progress of democracy and humanity.

The Covenant of the League of Nations is based upon the idea that the preservation of peace and the welfare of mankind call for efforts far exceeding the capabilities of individual nations, and instruments more efficient than they can separately devise: hence, that international coöperation is necessary. It considers that there is an adequate basis for the welfare of mankind in the system of independent states, but that in order for them to be in a position to work for the well-being of their citizens they must feel secure. It believes that this end cannot be attained through the efforts of individual nations but only through the organized coöperation of all the nations. The final requirement, then, is that international relations must be founded on justice and honor, must be openly conducted, and must be guided by the prescriptions of international law and particularly by the obligations contained in international treaties.

THE PERIOD OF ORGANIZATION

The circumstances under which the League of Nations began its existence were not favorable. Few placed whole-hearted hopes in it. Sceptics and the supporters of the old political methods were opposed to it from the start. Moreover, the faith of progressive people was shaken when they realized with what distrust the League idea was viewed by the majority of Old World

statesmen, the very men through whom the decisions of the League were to be rendered. Then, too, there was the fact that the United States remained outside. It seemed that the League of Nations, without the United States and in the hands of statesmen imbued with the old traditions, would be only a shadow of the influential institution which Woodrow Wilson had had in mind, an institution which was to draw its power from its universality and its progressiveness. In addition, Europe was passing through a period of the greatest unrest; the post-war economic and social upheavals, the resistance to the new political order which appeared in many quarters, aroused justifiable fears that these forces would destroy the new organization before it had taken root.

Gradually, however, the magnetic force of the League idea exerted itself. People of good will in all countries rallied to it. The difficulties of the political and economic situation increased the power of attraction which the League had for the public generally, and also brought some of the older statesmen into line; indeed, one might say that they took refuge in the League. And the League itself pursued the very sound policy of spending its first energies on its own organization, and of undertaking only things which it was really competent to handle.

First of all, the Secretariat was properly established. Few realize fully how much effort and skill went into its organization. Suitable personnel had to be found, its various duties — immediate and future — had to be defined, and novel methods for carrying out those duties had to be devised, for the officials who were to coöperate in the Secretariat were of all sorts of nationalities, with diverse mentalities and interests. The task of fusing together the different elements and producing in them the spirit of the League of Nations, something so fundamentally dissimilar to the spirit which governs citizens of particular states, was far from easy. Today the Secretariat is a great reservoir of talent, the result of special training, special experience and special knowledge. Any number of valuable international services would be quite unthinkable without its work of preparation and coördination. New appointments to its staff must continue to be made, as hitherto, mainly on the basis of personal efficiency.

In addition, it was necessary to establish a series of technical commissions so that the Council might have proper expert advisers constantly on call. The following committees and commissions were therefore set up: the Economic and Financial Commis-

sion, the Advisory and Technical Committee for Communication and Transit, the Permanent Advisory Commission on Military, Naval and Air Questions, the Permanent Mandates Commission, the International Committee on Intellectual Coöperation, the Opium Commission, and several others.

The establishment of these commissions is significant of a definite working method. The specialists who participate in them are citizens of many states and have influence — some direct, some indirect — on the development of affairs at home. By meeting periodically they learn to know one another, and gradually create common interests and a common will superior to their individual interests and will. Problems are studied on a technical and systematic basis. Only then do the political organs of the League — the Council and the Assembly — take them up for final action, basing their decisions on considerations of political desirability and feasibility.

My remarks on the effect of systematization and coöperation on the mental habits of the experts applies also to the members of the Council, and to a large extent of the Assembly itself; in their case, too, systematic coöperation leads to a vision of common interests above individual interests, to the creation, in a word, of what is generally described as "the spirit of Geneva."

Just how unique an accomplishment in international life was the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice can be estimated only when we recall the apparently insuperable difficulties which attended all efforts to set up a real international court before the war. Those who know the authority of the Court and the confidence which it inspires after only eight years of activity, and who have paid attention to the importance of its rôle (direct and indirect) in examining complicated political disputes from a calm juridical point of view, realize how fully it has justified the highest hopes. And if we compare the existing Court today with the sort of court which the Powers aimed to create before the war, we can see what an immense progress has been made in the world's conception of the proper method of dealing with juridical and political conflicts.

HUMANITARIAN AND INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITIES

Part of the League's work has been to ameliorate the sufferings of prisoners of war and refugees. The treatment of these called for a general plan and for coördinated and rationalized

supervision, and this the League was able to supply. A total of 500,000 war prisoners, particularly from Siberia, were repatriated within a period of two years. As for the war refugees, the League has helped them to become productive elements in the economic life of the countries where they are now installed; among those taken care of in this way have been large numbers of Russians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Armenians and others. Its action has been of assistance not only to the refugees themselves but also to states like Greece and Bulgaria, which would have been swamped by the problem if left to deal with it single-handed.

At the very outset the League entered vigorously into the struggle against epidemics (for example, in Poland and Greece), and has subsequently built up a great health organization, which coördinates scattered efforts and succeeds where individual states would fail. The League has established a regular epidemiological press service and a special office of epidemiology at Singapore, and, aided financially by the Rockefeller Foundation, it has organized an exchange of sanitary personnel, etc. My brief mention of the humanitarian aspects of the League would not be complete without reference to the efforts which it has made to limit the use of narcotics, especially opium, and against the white slave traffic.

Intellectual relations between the nations were severed in the course of the war, and it has been necessary to reëstablish them. Here also the League has taken the initiative. In the first place, it conducts investigations into the post-war conditions of intellectual life in the individual countries. When it finds a state of affairs (often of an economic nature) which threatens to paralyze intellectual development, it intervenes and requests institutions and societies to render assistance. America and England in particular have responded to the call, and help has been rendered especially in Austria and Hungary. This work of the League incidentally rationalizes the labor of intellectual workers, thereby increasing their efficiency. All this is an indirect safeguard of peace, for it adds to the consciousness of human solidarity and removes ill-will which often springs merely from insufficient knowledge.

FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

The League has shown great activity from the outset in the economic sphere.

Difficult problems of transport and transit have been dealt with at general conferences under the aegis of the League in a spirit of freedom and equality for all nations. The means developed include general agreements, as well as model bilateral and collective agreements. In this connection the Committee for Communication and Transit performs a valuable function by acting as arbitrator in transport disputes.

In finance, the League's work has been more than useful; it has been essential. Not only was it necessary after the war to restore the bonds which held the world together in a great economic whole, but also to reorganize economic life so that it might satisfy the new conditions and demands. For this it was not enough to have international collaboration; the work had also to be supported and directed by some authority with a higher prestige than that of any individual state.

As early as 1920 the Council of the League organized a conference at Brussels to make an investigation of the underlying difficulties and to find means of overcoming the economic and financial crisis. That conference, both in method and results, is characteristic. The League calls together the most eminent experts of almost every nation; the problems are examined from the most varied standpoints, in accordance with the needs of individual states and with a view to their habits, convictions and experience; gradually the powerful pressure of circumstances forces them all onto a common path, the one path which leads to a solution; the conference, being composed of experts and not of representatives of states, only makes recommendations in an advisory capacity; it recommends definite financial principles to be adopted and suggests specific means for putting them into practice.

For a time the Brussels resolutions appeared only theoretical. But later it was seen what rich resources had been created there for practical adaptation and use. First individual finance ministers began basing their policies on the Brussels program, quite independently of the League. Then the League, being called to the task of clearing up the economic and financial chaos of Austria, availed itself of the findings of the Brussels Conference. The work in Austria is worthy of more than passing note because it proved what broad powers of recuperation are inherent in a state even as disorganized as Austria, given far-sighted coöperation from outside. Furthermore it proved the efficacy of

direct coöperation of a state with the League itself, and in that respect established an encouraging precedent. The case of Hungary followed that of Austria; then came the Esthonian, Greek and Bulgarian loans, and the action taken in regard to Danzig. The League's experience is useful also outside its own field. Thus Sir Arthur Salter, head of the financial and economic section of the Secretariat, was quite right when at the recent economic conference in Prague he declared that he did not think the Dawes Plan could have been realized as early as the year 1924 if it had not been for the pioneer work of the League. In the same way, it would not have been possible for the Young Plan to supersede the Dawes Plan, and for the Hague Conference to be held, without the economic and particularly the political influence of Geneva.

In the economic field the climax of the League's activity for the time being has been the 1927 Economic Conference, which set out a more far-reaching program than has ever been known before in the economic history of mankind. The conference opposed the short-sighted policy of national self-sufficiency, which tends toward economic imperialism, and artificial intervention by the state through customs duties, prohibitions and dumping. On the other hand it supported endeavors to bring about a natural division of labor throughout the world, by the association of the state with private initiative in the formation of industrial agreements and agrarian coöperative societies.

At present the League is concentrating on getting the resolutions of the Economic Conference put into effect gradually by means of international agreements. An agreement has been prepared and negotiated looking toward the removal of import and export prohibitions and restrictions. In the near future two further agreements will probably follow, one dealing with economic statistics and the other with the treatment of foreigners. The recommendation regarding the reduction of customs tariffs has already led to two international agreements regulating the export duties on hides and bones. The adjustment of import duties is, of course, a much more difficult matter, and for the time being the League is restricting its study to certain manufactures or products — aluminium, cement, timber, fruit and vegetables. It is also studying the world crisis in coal and sugar. Finally, supreme importance is attached to the resolution of the League of Nations passed at the 1929 meeting of the Assembly calling for an

armistice in the tariff war — a resolution which was submitted on the initiative of the British. Its fulfilment will be a work of many years, but the move undoubtedly opens up the way for the economic reorganization of the whole of Europe.

The methods employed by the League of Nations in the economic sphere are similar to those which it employs in other branches. It conducts a technical investigation of problems, lays down principles, formulates ways and means, and carefully follows up the details of application.

DISARMAMENT, SECURITY, ARBITRATION

The most prominent matter which so far has engaged the attention of the League of Nations is the reduction and limitation of armaments or, to use the shorter term, the question of disarmament. This is natural. The League came into being mainly as a result of the desire to end war, and certainly one of the chief causes of the last war was the rivalry in armaments. The Covenant binds the states members of the League to reduce their armaments to a degree compatible with their security and their ability to share in any necessary joint action. So far, of course, no positive and final results have been achieved in this direction, but that is not to say that nothing has been accomplished. Indeed, from the technical point of view it is possible to consider this problem as solved, at least with regard to the immediate future. The extent of this success will be understood only by those who realize that this extremely complicated problem had not been studied at all before it came before the League of Nations, and that many years of energetic work on the part of innumerable military, naval, aeronautical, economic, financial and transport experts have been required before all the different sides of the question could be made clear and before it was possible to elaborate the plan which was accepted in April 1927 at the first reading by the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament.

This technical preparation laid the ground work, and permitted us to see that disagreements on this question are mostly of a political nature. Thus the nations can henceforth concentrate their energies upon a few points, instead of spreading their attention as formerly over the whole confused field.

Security, another question engaging the attention of the League, acquired its importance mainly in connection with the

question of disarmament, when governments realized that they could not undertake the responsibility for any reduction of their armaments unless in return for the resultant loss of security they obtained compensation in the form of strictly defined promises of help from other states in case of unprovoked attack. In this matter the League has already achieved some positive results. The proposed Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923 and the Geneva Protocol of 1924 fell through, but the principles on which the Protocol was based were adopted in the Locarno agreements and now they have been adopted also in the model treaties recommended at the last meeting of the Assembly.

The universal organization of security has not been achieved; but regional security has been provided in the most inflammable part of Europe. This has been done outside the framework of the League, but as a direct result of the League's pioneer work and in accordance with its principles.

A further positive result of the League's activity in this field is to be observed in the volume of arbitration agreements now being concluded. The number has grown unexpectedly since the Geneva Protocol, and there has also been an increase in the proportion which stipulate that political disputes are included among those to be submitted for settlement by arbitration. The last meeting of the Assembly has given a new impetus to the process, by recommending model treaties which cover all requirements. These have been worked out by the most experienced experts and they represent the best thought available today.

The immense advance which has been made in the signing of arbitration treaties during the last two years allows us to speak today of a new juridical organization of Europe and of the world.

THE SETTLEMENT OF POLITICAL CONFLICTS

Of great assistance to the League in its efforts to organize the peaceful settlement of disputes will be the codification of international law. For this purpose the League in 1924 established a special commission and entrusted it with the task of ascertaining the successive steps by which codification is desirable and possible. The first conference summoned in 1927 discussed international agreements dealing with the questions of nationality, territorial waters and the responsibility of states for damage done in their territories to the persons or property of foreigners.

In this connection reference should be made to the fact that (in accordance with Article 18 of the Covenant) the League of Nations publishes all treaties submitted to it for registration. The importance of this collection of treaties lies not only in the fact that it is very valuable to those seeking knowledge of the treaty obligations of states, but also because it provides a means for ascertaining whether the treaties concluded by the member states are in agreement with the spirit and principles of the Covenant.

The regulations for the registration and publication of treaties are intended to produce a feeling of mutual confidence among the states. It is not sufficient, therefore, that treaties should simply be registered and published. It is necessary that guarantees should be provided, through the organization of an effective supervision, to prevent the registration and hence the entry into effect of any treaty which is not in accord with the principles of the Covenant. In this connection great and burning questions await consideration by the League, and cannot be long postponed.

Up till now one article of the Covenant dealing with treaties (i. e. Article 19) has not been applied at all. This article lays down that the Assembly may call upon member states to re-examine treaties which have become inapplicable and also to take under consideration international conditions which might threaten world peace. This article promotes international confidence, for it means that the Covenant does not rest on the idea that the *status quo* of 1919 is petrified and unalterable.

For the time being, the importance of this article has lain mainly outside the League, in connection with efforts to mobilize resistance to the present European political order. In particular, it is frequently made use of for propaganda in favor of a revision of the peace treaties. But when this article comes actually to be applied, I think it will prove an effective weapon precisely against those who are striving to secure an alteration of the present régime and who assert that the present order is founded on unjust treaties based on erroneous and one-sided information. Following its accustomed scientific method, the League of Nations will proceed to inquire into the question whether the pretensions of those who criticize the present régime are correct and whether conditions warrant the invocation of Article 19. The League will discover, according to my view, that these assertions are made only to mobilize public opinion against the treaties.

In addition to the above-mentioned activities, the League of Nations has settled several serious disputes and has also been of assistance in smoothing over a number of difficult questions which have come before it. I need only mention the question of the Åland Islands, the Polish-Lithuanian dispute, the question of Upper Silesia, the Javorina dispute, the question of Memel, the question of Mosul, and the Bulgarian-Greek conflict. It has prevented war where there was a threat of war; it has removed the causes of tension where this was possible, or at the very least has cleared up the pretexts adduced to justify tension. In this way the League has steadily strengthened public trust in it, so that more and more disputes are being submitted to it for settlement. There is no need for it to solve directly all the problems that arise, if only they are eventually solved in the Geneva spirit.

PHASES OF THE FIRST DECADE

Looking back on the history of the League of Nations during these ten years we see that it may be divided into four great phases.

The first phase of development extends up to the year 1922 and comprises the organization of the League machinery. The Secretariat and the individual standing commissions are set up and the traditions governing the meetings of the Council and the Assembly are established. Above all, this phase sees the organization of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague.

The second phase lasts from 1922 until 1925. This is the period of the struggles over security, arbitration and disarmament. It begins in 1922 with the famous Fourteenth Resolution, which lays down the principle that the Disarmament Conference shall not be summoned until a certain degree of universal security has previously been insured. On the basis of the interrelation of disarmament and security the Treaty of Mutual Assistance is prepared in 1923; and in 1924 a third principle is added to supplement the first two, arbitration. On the basis of these three principles, the well-known Geneva Protocol is put to vote in the Assembly in September 1924. This is the culminating point of the second phase of the history of the League.

The third phase of development begins with the struggle conducted by England in the spring of 1925 against the Geneva Protocol. The Protocol is rejected and a proposal is made for the

conclusion of security and arbitration treaties of a regional character. Negotiations between England, France and Germany lead to the Locarno Conference, the Rhine Pact and arbitration treaties between Germany and her neighbors. In 1927 and 1928 the principles embodied in the Locarno Pact are adopted by other League members. Under the influence of the great extension of the principle of arbitration, the Briand-Kellogg Peace Pact is signed. During this phase, after the conclusion of the Locarno treaties, Germany enters the League of Nations, and thus preparation is made for a genuine liquidation of the war so far as Europe is concerned. Although some of these negotiations are not conducted directly in Geneva, the League of Nations in reality acts as sponsor for the majority of them; either it facilitates them or actually calls them into being.

The fourth phase begins in 1929. The liquidation of the war requires the settlement of the question of German reparations. At Geneva — not indeed within the framework of the League, but under its influence — England, France and Germany arrive at an agreement. The Young Plan is accepted and the Hague Conference is held. Owing to the success of the latter, Geneva enters upon a quieter period and the League of Nations finds itself placed on a new basis. It no longer works under the pressure of post-war difficulties and fettered by apprehensions lest some new conflict may arise as a heritage of the struggle of 1914–1918.

The new task set for the League is positive; it no longer is solely the prevention of conflicts but includes in addition the positive organization of world peace. The Assembly meeting in September 1929 revealed how much the League desires to settle the last question that remains from the period of the war — the question of the Disarmament Conference — and then be free to devote its fullest energies to the economic reorganization of Europe and of the world. At this session of the Assembly the questions of a customs armistice and of a European federation were placed on the agenda. As its eleventh year opens the League of Nations enters its genuinely constructive and positive phase, the phase in which the peace of Europe — perhaps even of the world — is to be reorganized.

At present the United States stands aside, but coöperates with Geneva in a number of questions. In my opinion this is a sound and correct policy for the present. I have never thought it

wise to urge any state to enter the League of Nations. Any state's entry must come as a natural development, and it must be left quite free to decide for itself whether such action is or is not in its own interest. The necessary condition is that the League of Nations shall show by its record that it is a powerful factor and one essential to the welfare of the world; it must show that it is working well and that so far as human intelligence can tell it will work well in the future. Then its relation to the United States will be settled satisfactorily in the interests of both and in accordance with the desire of all friends of peace in Europe and in America.

CONCLUSION

Let me now sum up. All the forces of revival working to remove the heritage of damage and fear left by the World War were crystallized in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Covenant brought into being an organization whose task was to see that these forces did not perish but on the contrary grew stronger, that they stimulated to effective and purposeful action all people of good will, that they aroused the indifferent and converted those of ill will. We have seen in what measure the League of Nations has collaborated in healing the wounds caused by the war and in helping the world to rise to a new, more healthy and richer life. The League of Nations is only in its beginnings. Let anyone who feels like reproaching it for not having done this or that, or with not having acted with sufficient speed in any particular question, bear in mind that its efforts to bring about the organization of international coöperation, peace and security have had to pierce the steel armor collected during long centuries around the conceptions of national prestige, national honor and national duty.

The important fact is that there exists an institution which is working systematically for the revision of these age-old shibboleths. The degree of progress made by the League in any particular question depends upon how thick is the armor of the old ideas in comparison to the strength of the onset of international improvement.

The tasks of the League will never be completed; they are eternal. The necessity of organizing international cöoperation will always exist, because new situations will always arise to demand international adjustment. The same is true of the or-

ganization of peace and security; new threats to peace will continue to arise. The answer to the question whether the League of Nations has fulfilled its task in a definite period will always depend on the number of needs that have been satisfied and on the number of factors which remain to cause doubts and fears regarding the preservation of peace. If we consider the work of the League of Nations from this standpoint, we must say that very many tasks still remain for it to deal with in the period now opening.

Above all bear in mind that the League of Nations commenced its activities in a very unfavorable period. For a long time it had to repair before it could construct. The field of its activity lay entirely, or almost entirely, untilled. It has had to create its own implements and methods. But the League is on the right path. The best proof of this is the growth of confidence and trust with which it is regarded. It will succeed in its tasks in proportion as it manages to keep on its side a sufficiently large section of the public opinion of the world, for that is and always will be its strongest weapon.

ARABS AND JEWS IN PALESTINE

By Henry W. Nevinson

THE massacres of Jews in Palestine has lately stirred the indignation and pity of the world. Naturally, the bitterest wrath has been roused among the Jews scattered through various lands to the number of about fifteen millions, but all civilized peoples have deeply sympathized; for we cannot forget that it was from the Jewish race that nearly all civilized conceptions of conduct and divinity were ultimately derived. No matter how old-fashioned and even obsolete many of those conceptions may now appear, they still subsist deeply implanted in us all by tradition, and in our daily thoughts and behavior tradition is usually more powerful than reason herself. Even if we did not owe this moral and spiritual debt to the ancient Jewish race, our horror and sympathy would be moved by the slaughter and violation of so many human beings for the most part helpless and unarmed. For the massacres of Jews in Palestine at the end of last August were marked by the same brutal ferocity as were the pogroms of Russian Jews under the Tsars or the slaughter of Armenians by the Turks under the Red Sultan and under the Young Turks at Adana, and later in northern Anatolia.

A British Commission of Enquiry, consisting of Sir Walter Shaw and three Members of the British Parliament, one from each party, is still holding its sessions in Palestine, and I do not wish to forestall its report. But by fairly recent examination of the position in Palestine itself, helped by intercourse with Jews, Arabs, and British officials on the spot, I have been able to gather a good deal of information which I think may assist others in forming a fair judgment upon the report when it appears. Let me, however, first put one seldom realized part of the British claim for the Mandate — a part which certainly has great influence with the majority of the British people.

You may call it emotional, sentimental, or what you will, but it is on deep feelings of this kind that most men and women form their opinions and act. I refer to the profound religious interest that most English and Scottish people have for Palestine as the scene of Old Testament and New Testament history. In childhood I was taught that the Bible was the Word of God. To doubt it, to question the truth of any single passage, was the unfor-

givable sin. Even the English translations from the Hebrew or Greek were divine, and indeed the Bible was regarded as so essentially British that, though we were accustomed to despise and hate the Jews, we identified ourselves with the Jewish race as belonging to the "Chosen People." We usurped the promises of future salvation made to Jews, and when every Sunday evening we sang, "To be a light to lighten the Gentiles, and to be the glory of Thy people Israel," we thought of the Gentiles as indistinguishable lumps of black or yellow beings, such as negroes or Chinese, fit objects for missionary labors, but we never doubted that we were the people referred to as "Thy people Israel." So far as I remember, there was no reference to the Jews in the Church of England Prayer Book except in the Collect for Good Friday where we prayed specially for Jews, Turks, heretics, and infidels.

The consequence was that the history and geography of Palestine were far more familiar to us all than our own. It is true that I knew the dates and succession of our English kings fairly well, but it was a deeper reproach — it was almost blasphemy — not to know the names and order of the judges or kings of Judah and Israel. We heard chapters of Jewish history read every morning and evening. We learnt long passages of the Jewish poets by heart. We drew maps of Palestine divided into the tribes as a regular exercise. No book was allowed to rest on a Bible. If a Bible fell to the ground, there was a solemn hush as though the heavens fell. Our reverence for Holy Writ went so far that a large section of the Christians among us attempted zealously to prove that the English people were in reality descended from the Lost Ten Tribes of Israel, and so we were in truth to be reckoned among the Chosen People of God. To such lengths did religious enthusiasm for the Hebrew writings compel us.

I dwell upon this peculiarity because it to some extent explains why the English people rejoiced when the Mandate for Palestine was granted to Great Britain by the League of Nations. They felt that their knowledge and reverence for the Hebrew Testament as well as for the Christian Testament gave us a special right to the sacred charge. London newspapers, which, as I hear in New York, are demanding the surrender of the Mandate because it involves too much trouble, should remember with what feelings most English and Scottish people regard the Holy Land. It is their "spiritual home." They will not abandon it again to Moslems without a struggle. The spirit of Crusaders stirs among us.

It is not only the scenes sanctified by the records of Christ's life for which we would contend — Bethlehem, Nazareth, Galilee, Capernaum, the Mount of Olives, the garden of Gethsemane, the probable site of Calvary and the Holy Sepulchre. Almost equally sacred to us are Mount Carmel, where Elijah heard the still, small voice; the mountains of Gilboa where Saul and Jonathan were slain by the Philistines ("Lovely and pleasant were they in their lives, and in death they were not divided"); the city of Beisan where their bodies were nailed to the walls; the little stream where Gideon selected his fighting men by the peculiar method of choosing them according to their way of drinking water; and the great Mount Hermon on which the dew was compared to brethren dwelling together in unity, so sweet it was, and, I suppose, so rare.

But if English and Scottish men and women, brought up in Evangelical Christianity, can feel like this, how much more intense must be the feeling of Jews, whose whole history, law, and religion are bound up with that land! Of all races the Jews have been the most scattered and the most persecuted. But of all races they have clung most tightly to their racial traditions and their patriotism for an ancestral country. "By the waters of Babylon we sat down and wept when we remembered thee, O Zion. As for our harps, we hanged them up on the trees that grow therein. How shall we sing the Lord's song in a strange land? If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, then let my right hand forget her cunning." We all know that poem, though we ignore its appalling conclusion. It is the lamentation sung by Jews for centuries, and beside waters far from Babylon.

The appalling conclusion has not been executed by them, but upon them and their children in almost every country of the world, especially in Eastern Europe. But still the hearts of all Jews have turned to Zion, and they have never forgotten Jerusalem. Early in the fourth century, while Constantine was still establishing Christianity as the official religion of the Roman-Greek Empire, we read of Jews going to their sacred city's ruins to utter their lamentations beside the big stones of the Wailing Wall, sole relics of their Temple. From age to age it was the custom of devout Jews to wander to the City, there to meditate upon the Law, and to die. Such holy pilgrims come even to this day, and I have seen them roaming about Jerusalem clad in enormous hats and long coats from head to foot, wearing besides long curls

on each side of the face according to some Rabbinical precept. Pale and thin they looked, for the support they used to get from Russian Jews has now been shut off by the Soviets. One group at least of these solemn students, and probably more, are to be found among the mountain regions in the north. But though many of these scholars and pious hermits have been killed in the recent massacres — including that gallant Dr. Wiener, chief of scholars, who devoted his life to the service and friendship of Arabs — it was certainly not they against whom the fury of the Arabs was directed.

It was against the permanent settlers who have returned to Palestine from various parts of the world, not to meditate and die, but to labor and live. About fifty years ago, a few Jews in Jerusalem began to found "colonies" in the country, being assisted by Baron Edmond de Rothschild of Paris, who poured money into the cause. Their large and flourishing settlements still exist, such as Petah Tikvah ("Dawn of Hope"), famous for its Jaffa oranges; Rishon-le-Zion, famous for its wines till the United States adopted prohibition, but now converting its vineyards into orange groves; and Rosh Pinah, the beautiful hillside town above Lake Merom in the north. These settlements have been run upon the old-fashioned lines of private property and hired labor, both discouraged under the new Zionist rules. Like all pioneers the early settlers suffered, being harassed by the Arabs and the Turkish rulers, and plagued by malaria and absence of drainage.

Just at the beginning of this century a fresh start was made by the Palestine Land Development Company, which has grown into the Zionist Organization, directed till quite lately by the Zionist General Executive, appointed by the Zionist Congress meeting once in two years. Some change was effected in the constitution at the Zurich Congress last July and August, but the administrative powers of the new "Jewish Agency" are still divided into the two branches of "The Jewish National Fund" (*Keren Kayemeth*), for the purchase, draining, and improvement of inalienable land bought as a rule from big Arab owners incapable of putting it to use; and "The Zionist General Fund" (*Keren Hayesod*), which collects money, organizes immigration, allots settlers, controls the Jewish schools, and treats with the Mandatory Government. These two branches are the responsible instruments of Zionist movement in Palestine.

The main principles upon which these two organizations have

hitherto acted are: 1, that each family should receive not more than 100 dunams (25 acres) on lease at a small rent for 49 years, the first 5 years free; 2, that the settler and this family should work the land themselves, without hired labor; 3, that the cultivation should be "mixed farming," each family supplying its own provisions first; 4, that the land should be prepared beforehand by drainage, water supply, and roads; and 5, that settlers should choose their own social system, whether "individual" or "collective." There is also a practical rule that Hebrew should be the common language. Happily most Jews have some acquaintance with Hebrew owing to their liturgies. Otherwise the numbers of Russian, German, Czech, Polish, American and other races could not communicate. In Tel-Aviv, a purely Jewish town, and at Haifa, mainly Jewish, I found Hebrew the only tongue among the people, though English and Arabic are also the official languages, and German is widely understood.

The expenses for the purchase of land and outfit are heavy. Arab landowners hold about 40 percent of the cultivable land. A great deal even of that is poorly managed, and the owners are always willing to sell more land than the Zionists can buy. With purchase and drainage I found the land cost the *Keren Kayemeth* about $100 an acre; the Fund then owned about 47,000 acres, and the total cost of settling each family worked out at about $6,000. Part of this is already being repaid by the small rent of 2 percent after five years free; on urban land the rent is 4 percent, and is revised every ten years. One may say that the two branches of the Zionist Organization between them have hitherto been bringing about $5,000,000 a year into the country by outside subscriptions. These have come mainly from Jews in the United States — about one-third. The contributions from South African Jews come second. The English Jews come a poor third. Other nations "also ran."

The first object of the Zionist Organization is to establish agricultural colonies, and to me the greatest marvel of the whole scheme was to behold some 26,000 young Jewish men and women actually tilling the ground. There I found them in their own colonies, braving hardship, unaccustomed labor, heat, wet, dust, flies, cold, fever, isolation from the civilized world, and often a hostile neighborhood. Nothing but hope, patriotism, or religion could carry them through, and many had all three. All at least were filled with the joy of having escaped the tyranny, fear, and

contempt under which they and their fathers had so long suffered. They run their colonies on one of two systems — the individualist (*Moshav Ovdim*) or the communal (*Kvutzah*). In the one, each family keeps its own profits; in the other, all produce is placed in a common store and given out according to need. In communal settlements there is no money; a second miracle.

These communal settlements naturally attracted me most, for the interest of their experiment. Some kind of treasurer collected the produce, sold any surplus, and bought what was wanted from outside in a town such as Tel-Aviv. Then if anyone needed clothing, food, fuel, or furniture, he or she applied to the common storehouse and received it. In all the villages where I stayed there was a common hall for meals and concerts or debates; a common nursery for all children by night and day, controlled, not by the mothers, but by women specially adapted by nature to look after children. Thus the mothers were set free for work by day and sleep by night. I asked the mothers how they knew their babies, and they could only say, "Of course we know them!" The Platonic ideal of a communal state in which mothers would never know their own children and would be indifferent whose baby they nursed has not yet been reached. Public opinion, I was told, was strong enough to put any "slacker" to shame, but as a last resort the community might tell him to go. Life in all the colonies looked hard, but patriotism and freedom kept it fairly happy.

Of the towns, Tel-Aviv, which has extended far along the coast north of Jaffa, is the most important. Twenty years ago the site was a heap of sandhills, but by digging deep, one may make even sand into a firm foundation. Now the population is nearly 50,000, the streets straight, the houses strong, white, and clean, with banks, hotels, and small factories worked by the electric power supplied by the Ruthenberg system, soon to be maintained by the small but sufficient force of the Jordan and another river. It is a modern town, and along the shore all the modern delights of bathing places, casinos, cinemas, boating, and riding may be enjoyed. It was indeed a cheering sight to watch the young Jews exulting there in new-found freedom and the open sunshine beside the sea.

In a similar manner the large town of Haifa on the northern side of Mount Carmel is extending northward along the coast. A large tract of deserted land, mainly sand or marsh, towards Akka (Acre) has been purchased for future development, and if the de-

sign of the Mandated Government is carried out, Haifa is likely to become the most important port in Palestine, not to say in the eastern Mediterranean. For it is intended to convert the estuary of the river Kishon into a harbor, and in that case the Zionist city would run round it and away to the north. Already the Jews have big houses along the slopes of Mount Carmel, and a large School of Science for practical training besides. On the level stand cement works and soap works that appear to prosper. When I was there I saw gangs of Jewish youths toiling almost naked in the swamps — always a dangerous task owing to the frequency of malaria. But I am told that now the Government are employing Arab labor upon the harbor scheme, because an Arab will work for five piastres a day (equal to twenty-five cents) whereas the Jew demands as much as fifteen.

I think what struck me most in examining the Zionist activities on the spot was the courage and hardihood of the Jewish pioneers (the *Halutzim*, as they are called) in fighting against the malarial marshes at Haifa, and just south of the Sea of Galilee, and throughout the long, broad reach of the Emek (the Valley of Jezreel, Esdraelon, or Armageddon, from which our poetic journalists took their name for the Great War). It stretches southeast from Mount Carmel right away almost to the Jordan, and bears many Zionist colonies on both sides of its length. But among Jewish towns one must also reckon Jerusalem itself, at least one-third, and some say two-thirds Jewish. It has a large Jewish quarter and a wealthy Jewish suburb to the northwest, not to speak of the Jewish University slowly rising on Mount Scopus whence the camp of Titus overlooked the ancient city before its destruction.

The Jewish population in Palestine is now reckoned at about 160,000 inclusive, as against about 750,000 Arabs. The number of immigrants permitted is regulated by the *Keren Hayesod* in consultation with the Mandate officials. In 1925 the immigrants were far too numerous, and counted among them too many professional people, for whom no place could be found. What the effect of the recent atrocities is upon immigration or emigration I cannot say, but Jews have suffered similar abominations so often and so long that probably they will not be discouraged. Zionist contributions at all events are said to have largely increased, and it must be remembered that the Zionist movement has the word and the support of the British Empire behind it. As Professor Einstein, finest of living intellects, has written:

> The Jewish people, beset with a thousand physical wrongs and moral degradations, saw in the British promise the sure rock on which it could recreate a Jewish national life in Palestine, which, by its very existence as well as by its intellectual and material achievements, would imbue the Jewish masses, dispersed all over the world, with a new sense of hope, dignity, and pride.[1]

One feels a touch of reproach in that reference to the British promise as a sure rock; and, unhappily, the reproach is justified. It would take too long here to trace the negotiations leading up to the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 — negotiations largely carried on between Mr. Balfour and the Zionists of those days in the United States.[2] The main clause of the famous Declaration runs:

> His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object.

During the negotiations Mr. Balfour (now Lord Balfour) professed himself "a Zionist," and has since given proofs of his sincerity by supporting the Zionist cause, by laying the foundation of the Zionist University overlooking Jerusalem, by risking the hostility of the Moslem populace in Damascus, and by sitting patiently through interminable speeches at Zionist dinners. In accordance with the Declaration, the League of Nations conferred upon Great Britain the Mandate over Palestine, making her "responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative, and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of a Jewish National Home and the development of self-governing institutions;" also "for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine irrespective of race and religion."

Thus, with the consent of the other European Powers, such as France and Italy, Great Britain became the Mandatory responsible to the League for the good government of Palestine, and in many respects she has fulfilled her Mandate well. She sent Sir Herbert Samuel as High Commissioner, and his report upon his five years of administration is a model of what such a report should be. She sent Lord Plumer, one of the most distinguished generals in the war, and by his side stood Colonel Symes, a model of equity. Now she has sent Sir John Chancellor, an administrator with experience of the East; but, unfortunately, he was absent in

[1] Letter to the *Manchester Guardian*, Oct. 18, 1929.
[2] See especially "Louis D. Brandeis," by Jacob de Haas: pp. 48–123.

London during the recent troubles. Mr. Luke, whom he appointed to act in his place, appears not to have shown the requisite wisdom or foresight in his charge, but his case has not yet, as I write, come before the Commission of Enquiry.

The Mandatory Power began characteristically by improving the water-supply of Jerusalem and cleaning up its filthy streets. But we owe to the British Governor of the City, Sir Ronald Storrs, its preservation from destruction by broad roads running through the ancient centers and tramways laid up the Mount of Olives. The government also instituted a tolerable system of justice under British judges, with an Arab and a Jewish assessor. They also offered an elective Council in place of government by Orders in Council, but the Arabs refused to take part, fearing, as they said, that Jews and British on the Council would combine against them. The fear was groundless, for among the government officials, as in the Roman and Anglican Catholic Churches, there is always a certain prejudice in favor of the Arabs. British officials favor uncivilized or partially civilized peoples as being easier to govern. Charges of favoritism arise from both sides, and there is no doubt that, in the appointment of police, the government has unhappily favored the Arabs, partly for cheapness, because the Arab will work for about a third of the Jew's wages, as I noticed above. In giving evidence before the Commission of Enquiry early in November, Major Saunders, Commandant of Police, admitted that during the atrocities he could not depend upon his force because they were nearly all Arabs — a shameful lapse from good government.

In building the admirable new roads the government have shown more consideration for both races. Along both sides of the central track for motors they have left soft paths for the camels of the Arab population, and the frequent sight of camels and motors upon the same road suggested to me a comparison between the two races. Like the ancient and picturesque race of Arabs, there go the camels, stalking through this puddle of a world with turned-down noses and disdainful air, like members of a British House of Lords under a Labor Government. They will make their fifteen or twenty miles a day without much to eat or drink. But down the center of the road rushes the motor at more than fifteen or twenty miles an hour. Such is the clash of two races, of two civilizations, the eastern and the western, and that clash lies at the root of all the present woe.

In passing, I must notice certain charges brought against the British action throughout — charges of self-interest. I do not know what thoughts influenced Mr. Balfour in framing his Declaration. I believe they were mainly a noble idea of seeking a home for Jews in their historic and religious land, but he may well have sought also how best to please the 15,000,000 Jews in the world at a crisis of the Great War. At all events the Mandate now gives us advantages which Mr. Balfour could not then foresee. By the recent Treaty we are now withdrawing the British troops from Cairo, with the apparent intention of camping them upon the Canal for its own defense. But in the war we found how absurd it was to make the Canal its own defense, and only people entirely ignorant of the Canal would have expected British soldiers to live healthy and contented upon its banks. I cannot doubt that ultimately we shall place our protective force somewhere in Palestine, as being far preferable for health and defense.

We shall also now have to consider, not only the reëstablishment of order in Palestine itself, but our defense upon the eastern frontier. Jews are not permitted to settle in the large and scantily populated region of Transjordania, which is a separate province under the Mandate. Its eastern frontier is vague and arbitrary, and beyond it lies the enormous land of Arabia proper. When I was in Ammam, the furthest outpost of Transjordania, and the seat of the Ameer Abdulla, son of Hussein, formerly Sherif of Mecca, and brother of King Feisal of Iraq, it appeared to me the weakest point of the Empire. Our British force there was obviously small. The Arab armed force was small too, and no one could say how trustworthy. If Ibn Sa'ud, the conqueror of the Hedjaz and ruler of all Arabia but the Yemen in the extreme south, were to sweep over the frontier with his fanatical Wahabis — ! Well, all controversies between Christians, Zionists, and Palestinian Arabs would then be choked in the Mediterranean. Happily, Ibn Sa'ud is our friend, and we have Treaties concluded with him in May 1927 by Sir Godfrey Clayton, an administrator so grievously lost to the cause of peace this year. But Arab chiefs are not immortal, and it would be folly to remain blind to the possibilities of the peril. Now that we are withdrawing from Egypt, it is in Palestine that our line of defense must run. As to the charge that we hold Palestine for the sake of a possible pipeline to carry oil from Mosul to Haifa, that is an advantage which need hardly be considered yet.

"But," say the Arabs "what about us? There are between 700,000 and 800,000 of us in Palestine. We have lived here for some thirteen centuries, under one rule or another; for four centuries under the Turks. But we claim to belong to the great Pan Arabian movement that has been growing since the beginning of this century, and was encouraged by the promises of the British and other Allies, if only we would join in the revolt against the Turks in the Great War. We Arabs did join. In January 1916 Sir Henry MacMahon, British Resident in Cairo, made an agreement with Emir Hussein, then Sherif of Mecca and the Hedjaz, promising to help the formation of an independent Arab empire, one of the boundaries of which was to be the Egyptian frontier and the Mediterranean. How are you going to get out of that?"

I admit the terms are explicit, and we cannot get out of them, except on the assumption that Sir Henry in the confusion of the war either went beyond his instructions or forgot Palestine. The course of events swept that agreement away. Only a few months later the treaty between Great Britain and France known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, marking out Iraq and Syria as their several spheres of influence, laid it down that central Palestine should come under an international administration to be arranged by the Allies and the Sherif of Mecca. The Conference of San Remo and the Treaty of Sèvres followed. The Emir Hussein was driven from Damascus by the French, and from the Hedjaz by Ibn Sa'ud. His sons have been granted kingdoms in Iraq and Transjordania. Writing to Professor Felix Frankfurter, of Harvard University, in March, 1919, the Emir Feisal, now King of Iraq, expressed as follows his sympathy with the Zionist hopes:

> We feel that the Arabs and Jews are cousins in race, have suffered similar oppressions at the hands of Powers stronger than themselves, and by a happy coincidence have been able to take the first step towards the attainment of their national ideas together. We Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with the deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement. . . . We will do our best, so far as we are concerned, to help them through; we will wish the Jews a most hearty welcome home. . . . We are working together for a reformed and revived Near East, and our two movements complete one another. The Jewish movement is national, and not imperialist. Our movement is national and not imperialist, and there is room in Syria for us both. Indeed, I think that neither can be a real success without the other.

I have a copy of the original letter, and that appears to me a strong argument as coming from one of Emir Hussein's sons. But I admit the wording of Sir Henry MacMahon's promise was a

mistake, and it gives the Arabs of Palestine fair ground for complaint. It is calculated that out of a probable total of 10,000,000 Arabs, some 7,000,000 have now been delivered from Turkish rule, while about 2,000,000 live under the French Mandate in Syria, and 1,000000, under the British Mandate in Palestine together with Transjordania. That is the extent to which the rash promise has been fulfilled.

As to the dispute over the Wailing Wall which was the immediate occasion of the recent abominable onslaught upon the Jews throughout Palestine, the subject, as I write, is still under investigation by the special Commission, and in any case it was only a symptom of deep-lying antagonism. All the evidence at present before me certainly points to the evil influence of the Arab Mufti, Amin el Husseini, sentenced to seven years' imprisonment for his share in the outrages in 1920, but unhappily amnestied and then elected to his present position. Evidence also seems to show great negligence on the part of Mr. Luke, whose duty it was to maintain order and impartial justice in the absence of the High Commissioner. But we shall presently have the Commission's judgment, and to them we may leave the decision.

The future is obscure. At the present time Arab hostility thus aroused continues unabated. External order will be restored by British troops and a reformed police. But one cannot sit still on bayonets, and I can only hope that the wise words of King Feisal in the letter above quoted may be fulfilled. Only of one thing I am certain. No matter what clamor certain popular papers in London may raise, the Balfour Declaration will not be withdrawn, nor our Mandate over Palestine abandoned. Writing to Dr. Weizmann, chairman at the great Albert Hall meeting of indignant protest after the news of the Arab atrocities reached London, that aged and honored statesman, Lord Balfour, said:

> Events in Palestine move my indignation and disgust, but they do nothing to shake my confidence in the general wisdom of the policy which you and your colleagues have been pursuing so successfully in Palestine under the Mandated system with all its inherent difficulties. The British Empire and all the Powers with whom it has been so closely associated, have solemnly declared their intention of again rendering Palestine the National Home of the Jewish People. That policy is in harmony with the best opinion of Western civilization in all parts of the world. To its fulfilment is promised the support of the British Empire. That pledge has been given. Depend upon it, it is not going to be withdrawn.

This appears to me conclusive.

PAN-EUROPE?

By Edouard Herriot

I. THE THEORY AND THE FACTS

AMERICAN public opinion is naturally somewhat exercised at a movement which has been developing for some months past in favor of a European Federation. M. Aristide Briand's frequent remarks on this subject in the French Chamber have been of a striking character; and M. Theunis, President of the International Chamber of Commerce, following the convention at Amsterdam, made what amounted to an exposition of a careful program. The Belgian statesman (who has headed the government of his own country and who now plays an important economic rôle at Geneva) declared that he aims to bring "greater reasonableness, greater harmony, into the economic relationships existing between the peoples of Europe." "Anyone who follows the trend of events attentively," he recently remarked to a French newspaperman, "must be aware of a growing conviction that the different nations of the world are interdependent." And he added: "This solidarity in the realm of fact is a good thing: it should find its counterpart in a similar solidarity in thought and feeling." Now it is a truism to say that Europe suffered most from the war, and that she has encountered great difficulties in her efforts to recover her old position. While the United States, thanks to her immense natural resources, her highly perfected plants, her splendidly trained engineers, and her vast home market, has been enjoying great prosperity, Europe finds herself today more seriously disorganized than ever. New states have come into being. New frontiers have been drawn. Each country is striving to secure its economic independence and has been raising one customs barrier on top of another. "The hundred and twenty million people living in the United States," continued M. Theunis, "enjoy a territory eight times larger than Europe, if we exclude Russia. Fourteen countries in Europe are smaller in size than the state of Ohio." The United States, furthermore, has the advantage of a single language and a single system of commercial legislation. If, therefore, Europe is concerned about surviving, she must reorganize in

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harmony with England. In so doing she would be following the advice repeatedly given her by American economists.

Such is the thesis of European federalism as expounded by a man experienced in the problems both of statesmanship and of business. It is grounded, moreover, on figures that have frequently been brought to public notice. Trusting that our friends in America are eager to be accurately informed, I shall venture to explain that French public opinion — that portion of our public opinion, at least, which is interested in the facts and looks to the facts for hints as to the laws that will obtain in the future — has been much impressed by documents like those appearing in the May 29, 1929, issue of the Bulletin of our *Societé d'Études et d'Informations Économiques*. It summarized a series of articles which had been sent from New York to the *Frankfurter Zeitung* on the subject of American investments abroad. It is noteworthy, said the author of those articles, that foreign loans on the American market did not fall off appreciably during the year 1928: they amounted to 1592 million dollars in 1927, and were only 105 millions less in 1928. The 1928 investments were distributed as follows (in millions of dollars):

Europe	650.92
Latin America	437.48
Canada	237.37
Far East	154.84
All Others	7.26

In Europe the nations which borrowed most were Germany, 292.48; Italy, 65.96; Denmark, 61.50; Norway, 14. Great Britain and Ireland subscribed to 25.46; France to only 17.25.

The *Frankfurter Zeitung* pushed its analysis still further, studying the use made of American loans during the period between 1914 and 1928, and showed that they were put to the following uses (in millions of dollars): railroads, 777; banks, 666; paper, 443; sugar, 349; mines, 261. And the newspaper concluded that, quite apart from war loans and strictly private credits, American foreign loans had risen, between 1914 and 1928 inclusive, to something like 13,147 millions.

These figures (the responsibility for which rests on the German economist who prepared them) required, of course, some comment. "Financial imperialism," wrote M. Lucien Romier in the

Revue des Deux Mondes, "implies long extended domination only as regards young or backward peoples still lacking domestic initiative, technical training, mechanical equipment, creative genius. Everywhere else it stimulates forces which some day or other will come to compete with it and equalize things to its detriment." And I have heard M. Joseph Caillaux, speaking before a congress of the Radical Party, vigorously defend the same theory, which happens also to be my own.

But to be frank, one should add that such figures (and the prospect, besides, of new tariff restrictions) have aroused grave uneasiness in many minds, as indicated by such speeches as one delivered recently by a deputy, M. Julien Durand, during our recent debates on the French public debt. The lay-off of a considerable number of French workmen as a result of disputes over American films filled many minds with grave forebodings.

Ideas of this kind, statistics of this kind, facts of this kind, have been largely responsible for creating an atmosphere favorable to the growth of a concept which we may conveniently, however inadequately or inexactly, express as "Pan-Europe" or "The United States of Europe." This concept, of which M. Aristide Briand is now appearing as the avowed champion, has found both friends and adversaries, and has encountered both encouragement and objections.

II. THE ARGUMENT PRO

At the time when these speeches in favor of "Pan-Europe" were delivered, certain publicists, such as the Washington correspondent of the London *Times*, had just made known the impression produced in the United States by the protests advanced in connection with proposed American tariff legislation. We were informed that the Senate Finance Committee had decided to make public the warnings of some thirty-eight foreign nations and we were apprised of the attitude taken by Argentina and Canada, and by Cuba on the specific subject of sugar. There were hints of a coalition — a course of action always opposed by fair-minded people, for what we want is not a conflict but an understanding; and we must strive always to keep the discussion free of everything that might inflame national vanities and raise the stupid and barbarous notion of reprisals.

But these reports gave momentum to the longstanding project of Pan-European union, for which Count Coudenhove-Kalergi

has long maintained a systematic campaign of publicity. The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, which we have already quoted, raised a question in its issue of July 12 as to whether M. Briand had not set out to revive the historic *grand dessein* of Henry IV and Sully. Henry IV, in fact, dreamed of making himself the arbiter of Europe, of recasting the map of the Christian world, and driving the Turks back into Asia. In accord with this plan, which M. Pfister as long ago as 1894 expounded in the *Revue Historique*, Europe was to be divided into six hereditary monarchies, five elective monarchies, and five republics, and governed by a sort of Amphictyonic Council which would be the guardian of everlasting peace and arbitrate all quarrels between kings and peoples. But despite evident similarities between the old plan and the new, Henry IV's prime intention was to humble the House of Austria and establish France as a sort of permanent arbiter in the interests of religious toleration and political stability. Let us, therefore, avoid useless comparisons between M. Briand and Sully, and let us not return without proper precautions to the still older notion of the Amphictyonic Council, though the history of that institution might supply much suggestive information. That Council was devised for the purpose of uniting Greece and preventing war. If a nation condemned by one of its decisions did not submit, there was provision for calling the whole confederation to arms against the rebel. The Council indeed proclaimed several "sacred wars," and came to supply Philip with a pretext for intervening in Greek affairs. Such precedents are not without interest at a time when means are being sought for guaranteeing nations against the violence of possible aggressors. But if the League of Nations would maintain peace, it must proceed more wisely than the Amphictyonic Council did in defending the treasure of Delphi!

In spite of the allusion of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, I do not believe that M. Briand is indulging in historical reminiscence. It is not his way of doing things. And Mr. Stresemann, no less, uttered favorable comment on the scheme of a Pan-Europe and seemed to endorse it. "I believe," he declared before the Reichstag, "that a time will come, born of economic stringency, when French economic policy, German economic policy, and perhaps other economic policies in Europe, will seek some common avenue of support in the face of successful competition." In the *Berliner Tageblatt* of July 13, Mr. Günther Stein made sympathetic if restrained comment on the idea, and in the *Neue Freie Presse*

of July 14 a former Minister of the Reich and a member of the Reichstag, Mr. Erich Koch Weser, leader of the Democratic group, endorsed the Briand plan as indispensable, in his opinion, for the safety of Europe. Certain newspaper men remarked forthwith that a European Federation would do away with two terribly irritating problems: the problem of the *Anschluss* and the problem of minorities.

It seems to me that one essential idea runs through all the great variety of considerations brought out in these discussions: namely, that the efforts which have been made so successfully to bring about a certain degree of political organization in Europe will sooner or later come to naught unless the political order is supplemented and supported by an economic order. That is the kernel of the plan, something that makes it interesting to the entire world, and therefore to the United States — quite as interesting, indeed, as it is to us.

Great Britain has herself been strongly impressed by the development of American enterprise. In the *Daily News* of July 20, Mr. J. A. Spender welcomed M. Briand's project, with some skepticism it is true, but none the less sympathetically. In Spain, *El Sol* has editorially contended that the best way to unify Europe would be to generalize the scientific methods and procedures which have so notably contributed to the prosperity of the United States; and in the *Vanguardia* of Barcelona, Señor Carlos Espla has given warm support to the Briand plan.

III. THE ARGUMENT CON

Such reserves as may be noted in the reception given to the Briand proposal arise from the fact that it has not been made sufficiently detailed. It is still in the stage of generalities — it is still a tendency of thought rather than a definite platform of action. Nevertheless, Pan-Europe has already encountered numerous objections.

The first of these — in spite of my desire to be quite impartial, I can hardly take it seriously — was raised against the speech of M. Briand by the German Nationalists. A European Federation? they cried. Such a thing would simply enable the French to give their country hegemony over Europe! The *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* shouted that it would be a resurrection of the old Continental policy of France. It would be a military machine built up against the United States, against Great Britain, against Russia.

An absurd objection, surely, contradicted by everything we know of M. Briand's character and of the things he has achieved.

The second might be called the "British objection," which may be found developed in the *Sunday Referee* of July 14. After being compared by an Englishman to Julius Caesar and Napoleon (just as a German had compared him to Henry IV and Sully), M. Briand is then accused of imperialistic designs. The British Empire, he must understand, constitutes a real unit, a unit all by itself. The Empire reserves the right to intervene or not to intervene, at its pleasure, in European affairs. It will never be willing to unite with Europe in any final contractual fashion.

Very well — we understand! But can one be sure that the British Empire always constitutes a *real unit?* And do not present-day events justify us in thinking that that unity in the economic sphere, as well as in the political sphere, may already have broken down? Has not that breakdown, indeed, been one of the great dramas of our time? A sorrowful drama, indeed, for all those who love Great Britain, as I love her.

Again, early in September, the *Daily Express* voiced an emphatic protest against any suggestion of a European Federation, for the reason that the British Empire should form a complete economic unit, stronger than America, and stronger than Europe. Our people, wrote that newspaper, have as little intention of becoming a part of Europe in a social sense, as they have in a political sense. We are called to a future far more exalted than that! Let us think of the British Empire, and strive to organize it as a single economic unit. Let us bear in mind the limitless capacities for production possessed by the Dominions and the Colonies, and tie them up with the manufacturing resources of Great Britain, in a mutual and particularly profitable alliance. Let both Great and Greater Britain find their first and their largest market in buying and selling the one to the other. Then their security will be perfect, their prosperity limitless; and the welfare of each part of the Empire will be the welfare of all!

Civis Britannica sum, cries a writer in the *Sunday Referee*, and then goes on to repeat the arguments just made. The British Empire has essential elements in each of its constituent parts. It needs all the oceans. "It cannot throw all its eggs into the European basket." "The real gold mine of the Empire resides in its immense territories, still unexploited, and in its capacity for

production. The peoples of the British Empire have unequalled reserves of raw materials and labor at their disposal."

We fully appreciate the inspiring quality to be noted in such assertions of British spirit. The words just quoted are, as it were, an echo of a *credo* compiled and proclaimed in bygone days by Mr. Chamberlain when he met the Manchester Freetraders with his doctrine of protectionism, urged a customs union with the Colonies, and dreamed of uniting all the "Britains in the world" in a vast empire and of "weaving its still scattered ribbons into an imperial cloak for old Mother England."

We are quite familiar, I say, with this old dream of an England who would be Queen of the Universe, with the oceans for her canals. But for the very reason that we love England, because we believe her prosperity indispensable to the stability of the world, because we see in her the guardian of political liberty and democracy, we wonder whether the course of events will not incline her to some modification of her traditional program. Indeed, what do we see going on already? At Geneva a very responsible Englishman, Mr. Graham, the President of the Board of Trade, brought forward a suggestion for a committee of producers — European in scope, if my memory does not fail me — to guarantee a fair distribution of coal. In a public speech delivered at Oxford on September 14, Mr. Graham went further still, and called for a rationalization of international labor. Similarly at Geneva, on September 9, Foreign Minister Henderson stressed the advantages of a European Federation for the improvement of labor conditions.

Such is the language of wisdom, and for my part I believe that Great Britain would have much to gain in favoring a European Federation which would lend powerful assistance to her and which, furthermore, would be inconceivable without her participation.

We need not concern ourselves with certain insults from Italy, vulgar denunciations of M. Briand in newspapers like the *Tevere*.

More serious is a third objection of an economic character, which may be found stated, among other places, in an article by Mr. Günther Stein in the *Berliner Tageblatt*. You will be involving yourselves, cautions M. Stein, in all the complications of economic geography. You will be unchaining earthquakes of a revolutionary character. What will happen, for instance, to impoverished regions which would be brought into competition with more productive and fertile lands?

In this objection one senses the uneasiness felt by representatives of German agriculture, who fear it will be submerged in such an organization as Pan-Europe. But Mr. Arnold Reihberg enters the fray and becomes more definite. His views have the greatest weight. He has, in fact, been among those who supported the policy of large combinations in industry, and the *Cartels* he sponsored have so far been giving most satisfactory results. Very fortunate contacts have been established between French industry and German industry. Shall we go farther along this line — as regards the present, at least? No, says Mr. Reihberg, in the *Berliner Boersen Courier* of July 14. "No, the removal, or even the lowering, of tariff frontiers in the interior of Europe would have this consequence: that the highly developed manufacturing of some European countries would crush less well developed industries in other countries; while the agriculture of certain regions of Europe, which are specially favored by climate or by quality of soil, would at once destroy the agriculture of other regions less favored by climate and with lower fertility of soil."

Let us try, counsels Mr. Reihberg, to rest content with the results already achieved through the concentration of the great industries in Germany and France, with the Franco-German accord on iron, the Franco-German accord on chemical products. Let us strive to derive all possible benefits from the contracts of 1926 and 1927. It should be observed that Lord Melchett has brought the Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. — the focus of the great English chemical factories — into the Franco-German consortium. There, in M. Reihberg's opinion, we find indicated the best means for bringing British isolation to an end. Let us generalize agreements such as the potash combine, and the little states of Europe will of their own accord fall into line with the nations of high production.

These considerations, these arguments, are put forward in earnest and they are of such character as to suggest long and careful reflection. Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, I may add, seems to be hostile to the Pan-Europe idea as a matter of principle, and also, perhaps, as a matter of policy. This he made clear in a speech at a meeting of the *Deutsche Industrie und Handelstag* at Munich on June 28, 1929. He said: "We see not the slightest reason for joining in those complaints which tend to spread the fear that all Europe is on the way to becoming a colony of the United States."

A fourth objection is based on difference of languages and na-

tional cultures in Europe. Nationalists beyond the Rhine point quite properly to the deep-lying differences that separate the European states of the northwest from the Balkan peoples. German unity and Italian unity have been established, and not without difficulties, between populations speaking the same language. Since the fall of the Holy Roman Empire and the end of the universal Christianity of the Middle Ages, one vainly seeks for an idea-power capable of unifying the Western World.

There is finally another — the Russian — objection. The *Pravda* has risen impetuously against any bourgeois conception of European unity, in opposition to which it sets the theory of world revolution. And it is true, I think, that Pan-Europe cannot be solidly organized so long as Russia is left isolated. But the day is destined to come when the country at present monopolized by the Bolsheviks will enter the concert of world activity. It is a question of time — only time.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Evidently, then, if the concept of Pan-Europe has found support of the greatest weight in the endorsements of Mr. Stresemann and of ex-Chancellor Seipel, it is still faced with serious difficulties. I have tried to analyze them in the most dispassionate spirit, taking into account such data as is available as I write. The fundamental idea can meet only with approval from all liberal spirits, and especially from our French Liberals: the idea, namely, that all nations, whether they be great or small, shall possess the same rights; an idea peculiarly dear to me, and which I defended with all my might at Geneva in 1924 when we were at work on the Protocol (a measure in which, by the way, I still have not lost trust). Anyone who raises the spectre of hegemonies is really to be suspected of bad faith, for the one point involved is to assure to the weak the same right to happiness which the strong can assure to themselves.

I believe it would be to the interest of the United States to help us who are struggling here in Europe, so badly prepared by history, in our work of putting an end to the old traditional doctrine of alliances, counter-alliances, not to mention the classic system of balance of power. In substituting for these the still new conception of federation, we must not fail to observe that the last war did away with a number of great historic institutions — the Russian Empire, the German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian

Empire — which were open to many criticisms, but which, nevertheless, expressed a long labor of human intelligence. Never more than today has Europe been cut into pieces, broken into fragments, forced backwards toward a primitive form of cantonal organization. No amount of energy is to be judged too costly in this effort of ours to transmit to these numberless nations some current of unifying sentiment.

But would such a federation, if ever it came to pass, be a menace to the United States? It would be as childish to believe it as it would be criminal to desire it. In my opinion, Pan-Europe would become a danger to the United States only if Russia were organized. The Black Lands grow a wheat something like that of our French Beauce, and would permit the creation of formidable reserves, if once science could find its way into that hell, deal with the misdeeds of drought in certain regions, and in others with the destruction wrought by heavy rains. There would be similar future riches in rye, oats, barley, corn, potatoes, sugar-beets, flax, hemp. Russia has breeding grounds for horses of every blood, from the little Kalmyk pony to the heavy dray horse of Central Russia. There are cows everywhere, and from what one can see between Novgorod and Vologda — or at least was once able to see in days gone by — one may imagine the development that dairying might have under really scientific management. As regards sheep raising, nothing is to prevent a growth rivalling the achievements of the Australian squatters. There is no visible limit to the production of pork. The forests cover the land with birch and poplar, oak and maple, streams of fresh water shelter limitless resources of food for man, and the subsoil is rich in oil, coal, gold, platinum, copper, manganese, quicksilver, zinc, salt. Yes, in very truth, if a modernized Russia, equipped with adequate machinery, directed by trained engineers, supplied with good avenues of transportation, and a vast network of railroads, should become part of the European Federation, the United States might have reason to fear.

But our poor little decrepit Europe as she is today — allow us to try our hand at organizing her! Give her a chance to live, sell her products, preserve her technical proficiency, develop her science. Give us encouragement in the work of lessening her interior barriers, her hostilities between nation and nation. Difficulties enough lie across our path, as I have striven to show. May

no new obstacles be raised before us in a work by nature so complicated and, for that matter, still so vague!

For centuries past, from the fall of the Roman Empire, this Europe of ours has been vainly striving to attain a settled order. The system into which Charlemagne consolidated her lasted a bare century, and from its ruins issued the states whose names we know — France, Germany, Italy. Gradually other nations to the north and east arose. The close of the fifteenth century gave Europe, save as regards Holland and Prussia, the general outlines she has since preserved. Later on, much later on, one might have thought that the revolutionary idea was about to give her unity in freedom. A man of genius ruined that experiment and brought back the piecemeal system that had prevailed before. Then, from war to war, from treaty to treaty, she began again to divide, tear apart, destroy. If perchance, some years hence, men of good will could find rest for her within the concept of federation, it would be a benefit not only to herself, but to the world at large; for we would then at last see extinguished our traditional torch of world discord. Then Europe, hand in hand with America, might set herself to what is to be the task of the centuries to come — the complete utilization of this great world in which such huge numbers of human beings still live in misery.

DUTCH RULE IN THE EAST INDIES

By M. W. F. Treub

IN both Africa and Asia the twentieth century has presented the colonizing nations with new and difficult problems of administration. Black and brown races alike are beginning to feel conscious of their nationality and are making claims to self-government. Perhaps the movement has taken most definite form in the Far East. Holland is struggling with her colonial problems in the Indies just as Britain is doing in India and the United States in the Philippines. Because the "native movement" in the Dutch East Indies has its counterpart in other Asiatic and African colonies and dependencies, and also because of the strategic situation of those islands between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, the recent developments there carry lessons for both American and European students of international affairs.

The Dutch East Indies are a great archipelago. Indeed, the distance between the easternmost and westernmost islands of the group is greater than the distance from New York to San Francisco, and the population numbers over 50,000,000. There are about 49,000,000 natives of different races, about 1,000,000 Chinese (most of them born in Java) and from 200,000 to 250,000 Dutchmen and other white people. Nearly 70 percent of the so-called Europeans in these islands are really Eurasians, having a native mother and a European father.

Scattered as they are over a vast number of islands, the natives have little mutual intercourse; furthermore, they belong to nearly forty different races and tribes, with different languages and dialects and varying degrees of culture and civilization. So that when advocates of the native movement speak of "the Indonesian nation," they refer to something which does not exist, for not even the three races of Java consider themselves a nation, and certainly the inhabitants of the other islands do not think of the Javanese as compatriots. It is fair to say that the Dutch East Indies are held together by no other bond than the supremacy of Holland, which extends over all the islands of the archipelago. One of the extreme revolutionary nationalists in Java, obliged to admit this fact, put it in a different way when he said: "We are bound together by our common hate of the oppressor!" But the

contrary is true. If the natives really hated the white men living among them and considered the representatives of the Dutch Government as oppressors, Dutch sovereignty over the archipelago would have ended years ago, for though the commander of the military force in the colony and the higher officers are recruited from the mother country, most of the common soldiers and many of the lower-rank officers are natives. The policemen also are natives and with few exceptions they are absolutely loyal. In the communistic disturbances of 1926–27 only one European was murdered, but a comparatively large number of natives suffered at the hands of violent revolutionaries of their own race.

All this does not imply that the native movement in the Dutch East Indies or elsewhere in Asia should be considered lightly. In the Dutch East Indies, as in British India, it is a serious phenomenon, even though it may not necessarily become dangerous. Certainly it demands insight and firmness of will on the part of the statesmen responsible for handling it.

The respect of the colored races for the white has been diminishing gradually ever since the beginning of this century. It received its first serious blow in the victory of little Japan over great semi-European Russia in 1905. It received its second and even more weighty blow in the World War, when nearly all the nations of the white race, with the help of colored soldiers from their colonies, were fighting one another.

It would take us too far afield to consider here in detail the origin and development of the native movements in Asia and Africa. But one element in this phenomenon that we cannot pass by is the influence of the instruction given by the ruling governments to their colored subjects. Of course no one who has a right conception of the duties of a colonizing nation toward its native subjects will raise any objection in principle to the education of the natives; the duty of the dominating nation to further the intellectual and moral as well as the economic development of its subjects cannot be denied. However, it is an open question whether the sort of instruction offered by white nations to their brown or black subjects is adapted to the practical wants of the latter. In the Dutch East Indies, for example, the instruction given in the primary schools should be arranged with a more intelligent view to the uses that can be made of it in later life.

Those natives who have received some instruction (which

places them on a higher plane in their own eyes as well as in those of their illiterate family and neighbors), but who cannot put their strenuously acquired small fund of knowledge to practical use, are apt to be led astray by the preachings of revolutionary agents. An intellectually "half-baked" proletariat is one of the least desirable and most turbulent elements of any society. It is no secret that revolutionary agents are active continually in every colony in Asia and Africa, nor is anyone duped by the efforts of the Soviet Government to hide itself behind the very transparent camouflage of the Third (Communist) International. The Dutch East Indies are especially favored by the interest of able and unscrupulous Russian communist agents. Aroused by the disturbances of 1926–27, the government of the colony had to deal severely with such communist leaders as it could lay hands on. Many of the native communists were deported to a "delimited district" in New Guinea, controlled originally by a military governor, but later by a director taken from the ranks of the civil service officials.

The severe attitude of the government against communist agitators resulted in their disappearance; soon, however, they appeared again under a clever disguise — that of extreme nationalists. This change did not occur only in the Dutch East Indies; for the revolutionary teachers in Moscow advocated it as a method of spreading bolshevist propaganda all through the Far East and especially in the colonies there. Consequently one notices in nearly all Asiatic countries a deceptive disappearance of bolshevism and a growing movement that can best be characterized as national bolshevism or bolshevist nationalism.

In the East Indies it is very difficult to distinguish this revolutionary nationalism from loyal and legal nationalism which attempts to advance the rights of the natives and to bring them to self-government within the scope of the Dutch Kingdom. Accordingly, the police allow all sorts of revolutionary speeches at so-called nationalist meetings. Such an attitude does not constitute an immediate danger, but it induces a feeling of insecurity among some of the white inhabitants which is just as understandable as is the reluctance of the government to make martyrs of the agitators.

As a result of having governed Java for centuries through the medium of prominent natives belonging to the nobility, the Dutch Government adopted the same course when the other

islands came under their real domination. This is an outstanding fact to be remembered in examining the political administration of the Dutch East Indies. In some districts of Java and the other islands native sultans continued to rule. But all these dignitaries are subject to the commands of the Dutch authorities, and it is remarkable how these officials have learned to impose the will of the government without hurting their feelings.

But from the beginning of the present century, and especially since the World War, democracy has extended its influence even to these remote parts of the world. The movement might have improved the welfare of the colony and aided the native population if, in its attempt to democratize Oriental political conditions, the government had not been influenced by Parliament to adopt a policy of grafting western institutions onto Oriental conditions. The average Oriental native wants to be governed by, or at least through, his own noblemen; he understands that he is protected by the Dutch Government against vexations from his own rulers, but he does not understand that his rulers should be criticized by representative bodies in which people of the lower classes can bully those who are their superiors by birth. Despite this fact, western democrats have insisted on the establishment in the Dutch East Indies of different representative bodies, the members of which cannot resist indulging in violent criticism of those whom the people as a whole have been accustomed to think of as their superiors. The result is that democracy has succeeded in lessening the authority of the hereditary native rulers without really creating a democratic spirit in the educated element of the population. The great problem that will soon face the government will be how to save the newly created representative bodies and at the same time strengthen the diminished authority of the hereditary native rulers. Given the respect that the population intuitively feels for its own nobility, the stabilization of the Dutch sovereignty over its colonies in the Far East largely depends on how tactfully these two objects are pursued and how far they are attained.

On the whole, social and economic conditions in the Dutch East Indies can be considered as exemplary, but they differ in different regions. In Java, for example, the population is extremely dense, and this has marked consequences. The labor supply there is sufficient not only for native and Chinese agriculture, commerce and industry, but also for the large western en-

terprises; furthermore, the density of population makes overpopulation and unemployment a serious problem for the government. Nevertheless, the rate of mortality has been reduced to a very satisfactory level. Several hygienic and prophylactic measures have been undertaken by the government, in spite of the opposition of the native population, which did not and does not understand their importance, and as a result pest, cholera, typhus and other contagious diseases are now confined mostly to individual cases. Although this result is primarily due to governmental initiative, it would be unjust to forget the private hygienic and prophylactic work which has been done. Several western enterprises in Java have built and are financing modern hospitals, which are not reserved for the use of their working people exclusively but are open to the whole native population of the district as well. Sumatra also boasts interesting examples of hygienic and medical measures undertaken by the owners of large agricultural estates.

When western agricultural enterprises, especially those concerned with the growing of tobacco, began their work in Sumatra more than half a century ago they did not find any laborers in the island, and therefore they had to import them from Java and China. Now, as they were at great expense in this connection, they naturally wanted to be sure that the men would not be allowed to desert the plantation but would be forced to fulfil the work which they, of their own accord, had agreed to do. However, so many abuses were reported to the government that in 1879 an ordinance was issued which laid down a number of rules regarding the treatment of the coolies by their employers. Punishment was provided for any infraction of the rules. The ordinance also introduced a penal sanction to be applied to laborers who refused to work as contracted, and to those who deserted; both were to be brought by the police before the judge competent in these matters. Though the ordinance concerning this famous penal sanction has been modified, the main provisions concerning the liability of both employers and workers to fines and imprisonment have remained as they were fifty years ago. But the coolies have been guaranteed more humane treatment, especially since the introduction of a regular official labor inspection.

I give this much of the history of the penal sanction connected with labor contracts in the Dutch East Indies (omitting Java, which has a sufficient labor supply), because of the erroneous

statements often made about it. Socialists have drawn this economic and juridical question into the sphere of politics, and have even gone so far as to represent the penal sanction as a remnant of slavery, though it has not the least resemblance to slavery and in fact was instituted long after slavery was abolished. The problem is not nearly so simple as most advocates of the abolition of the penal sanction think; otherwise one would not find its counterpart in nearly every colony in the world. For unless our modern society can and will do without the products obtained from the plantations of Sumatra and the other islands (excluding Java) it is essential to safeguard the labor being done there, and no one has yet proposed an adequate substitute for the present system, especially one which is so favorable to the health and welfare of the laborers themselves.

I have made these few remarks on this problem — which has even been brought before the International Labor Bureau in Geneva — as a necessary introduction to a description of what has been done in Sumatra for the health of the imported coolies. Before the introduction of the ordinance of 1879, and for a few years thereafter, the death rate of these coolies was very high, as much as 9 or 10 per hundred. The employers soon realized that this condition was inhuman, and also was against their own interests. To put it cynically but clearly: they understood that a dead workman has no value at all and that a sick one generally costs more than he is worth. Therefore, when the law obliged them to care for the health of their coolies, they took this obligation so seriously that the clinics and hospitals they created have become renowned and are now recognized as model institutions by everyone who has studied labor conditions in colonies. The death rate has now diminished to 8 or 9 per thousand — a rate not higher than that of the most advanced nations in Europe — and this wonderful result is largely due to the much-calumnied penal-sanction institution, which permitted the employers not only to send their laborers to the clinic of the plantation, and to its hospital when they were so ill that the physician thought special treatment necessary, but also to force the coolies to submit to the treatment of the diseases which they had brought with them from their native villages as well as to the prophylactic measures prescribed by the physicians of the plantations.

In this way the east coast of Sumatra, where the agricultural exploitation of the island started, has become a model of hygienic

and medical care. This has certainly not been the result of charity; but it is no less remarkable as a result of well-considered and well-executed self-interest on the part of colonial employers. Would that self-interest could always and everywhere boast of such results! It would not then have to cope with the bad reputation it has acquired, though it remains and will remain the basis of enterprise and social development under every political system, under socialism and communism as well as under capitalism. But to return to our subject.

I have said that the stability and reliability of labor in the Dutch East Indies is a matter of importance not only to the owners of plantations there, to the Dutch colony in general, and to the mother country in Europe, but also to world economy. This is especially true, at least as regards certain products, in the case of the United States. One example will be sufficient to show the importance of the products of the Sumatran plantations to the world market. The world production of rubber in 1928 is estimated to have been 560,000 tons, of which the Dutch East Indies produced about 40 percent, or 240,000 tons. Nearly a quarter of this was produced under the system of the penal-sanction. Everyone familiar with the rubber question will understand the gravity of any steps that would introduce uncertainty into the production of about 60,000 tons of rubber a year.

The production of tea, palm oil, agave, and other commodities under the penal-sanction system is as yet less important than that of rubber, but the world market would suffer seriously if measures taken under the influence of political considerations without due regard to economic consequence were to upset this production and perhaps curtail it drastically.

There is still another consideration which brings this matter into the sphere of international problems. For nearly sixty years the Dutch East Indies have followed with growing success the policy of the open door. The consequences of this policy are less clear in Java, but many of the other islands — Sumatra, for example — are economically less Dutch than international. Indeed, what occurs in the Dutch East Indies has an international importance in more than one respect. Some of the Great Powers would probably not remain passive onlookers if the activities of bolshevist-nationalist agitators resulted in serious troubles in the archipelago which separates the Indian Ocean from the China Sea and the Pacific.

We Dutchmen are proud of our colonial production not only and not primarily because of its importance in the world market, but also and especially because of the close coöperation between science and practice in our colony. This coöperation finds its highest expression in the production of sugar; the sugar plantations can without exaggeration be compared to enormous botanical, chemical, and industrial laboratories. Nowhere in the world is this coöperation between science and practice so complete and so efficient as it is in the Dutch East Indies.

The other branches of tropical agriculture are not so far advanced as is the sugar industry, but they are following the same lines of development. In the rubber industry particularly remarkable scientific progress has been made in the past ten years and will certainly be continued in the next decade. The selection of plants is in its first stage only, and it is certain that improvements will be made in the chemical and industrial process that the latex has to undergo before being marketable. I am convinced that the production price of rubber will go down appreciably during the next ten years, and that the market price will follow; the rubber growers will then make very satisfactory profits at a much lower price level than that prevailing at present.

This will mean a revolution for several branches of industry which can make widespread use of rubber, as soon as the price becomes sufficiently stabilized to enable growers and manufacturers to agree upon a regular offer. But it will take some time to achieve this. For, as far as I can see, the rubber growers are not yet ready for a combination similar to that of the selling organization of the Dutch-India sugar. Their losses in the rubber market have not yet been sufficiently severe; probably a new and still more severe crisis will be necessary before they will agree to give up some of their individual freedom in order to bring stabilization of prices by a sellers' combination as strong as the combination of American rubber buyers. It would be interesting to go further into this question and to speculate on how an economic policy of this sort on the part of the rubber growers might effect the production of native rubber. But this would lead us too far afield.

It is evident that the importance of the Dutch East Indies is still much greater for the mother country in Europe than for the world in general. This can easily be illustrated. The tonnage of Holland's commercial fleet holds one of the first places among

European commercial fleets proportionally to the population of the country. Now, although from the beginning of this century Holland has had a remarkable industrial development, its most important sources of income, after agriculture, are navigation and overseas trade. And half of the tonnage of the Dutch commercial fleet is employed in trade with or in the Dutch East Indies. Without this traffic the port of Amsterdam would become one of the Dead Cities of the Zuyder Zee. Our Far Eastern colony, indeed, is giving work to a great many laborers not only in the ship building and ship chandlering trades but also in several industries that apparently have only a remote connection with the Dutch East Indies and its inhabitants.

But the economic side of the question, however important it may be, is not the only one to be considered. For the fact that a nation of seven million inhabitants has the advantage and the responsibility of governing a territory on the other side of the world, with an area nearly as large as that of Europe, leads to other no less important considerations. In the first place, the administration of so large a domain demands a considerable importation of students of law and administration. This provides employment for many university and high-school graduates. Western agriculture, trade, navigation, and industry in the colony require another contingent of educated young men. But however vital the maintenance of Dutch supremacy over the Dutch East Indies may be for Holland, that is not the most important aspect of the question when we view it from the standpoint of world security and peace.

But before considering that, I wish to discuss a very widespread argument against colonization in general. All colonies demand capital. It would certainly be more profitable for them if they possessed the capital necessary to exploit their own natural resources, but since they do not possess that capital it is better, both for the development of the country itself and its native inhabitants and for the welfare of the mother country and the world in general, to make use of those natural resources, the necessary costs to be paid by the nations that can afford it. But naturally the investment of capital is not and cannot be an act of charity. The capital invested abroad must be made to pay. The interest of the capital invested in the Dutch East Indies, which goes to the shareholders and bondholders elsewhere, is estimated at from $150,000,000 to $200,000,000 a year.

The argument of the adversaries of colonization is that by paying out such large sums in interest the colony is impoverishing itself. If this were true, colonization would be condemned on economic grounds. But the argument cannot stand against even the most elementary critic. A person or a colony might be said to be being drained of its resources if more were taken from it than was given to it, if after the transaction he or it were poorer than before; but if the transaction is profitable to both sides, so that the borrower (in this case, the colony) is richer not only after but also because of the borrowing, then there is co-operation and participation instead of exploitation. In the case of the Dutch East Indies, it has been calculated that the foreign capital invested in the colony brings into the country every year in the form of wages, land hire, taxes, etc., about twice as much as it takes out in interest, dividends and royalties.

Even the most fervent opponents of colonization must admit that in the Dutch East Indies the advancement of the natives through the building of public schools and public roads, and through the establishment of a system of irrigation for their rice fields, could not have been achieved to anything like the same degree without the direct and indirect contribution of western enterprises. If this be true — and it *is* true — it proves that the argument of pretended "draining" is utterly fallacious and that it serves merely as a demagogic means of agitation to impress the masses, who are unable to comprehend its falseness.

To give a concrete example of what can really be meant by the draining of a country or a continent, I shall take the much-discussed case of the European countries involved in the World War, which the American reader will easily understand. Let us put aside for the sake of demonstration all political reasons that prompted the Allied nations to compel Germany by the Treaty of Versailles to pay an enormous indemnity; and let us consider only the obligation to pay. In this light, we must own that Germany could, on strictly economic grounds, complain of being drained by having to pay the indemnity. In the same way, all the belligerent nations of Europe, which by continuing the war far beyond their real economic powers contracted economically unproductive debts to America, can be said to be drained by the payment of their war debts. But, on the other hand, certainly one cannot pretend that Germany is also being drained by the capital America is investing in order to help it — evidently not on a

charitable basis — to rebuild its social and economic system. Here, as in the case of colonial investment, draining is beside question.

I wanted to state this clearly, because of the necessity of justifying the economic basis of colonization; for if it had an economically unsound basis, it would not be worth while to attempt to justify it on a higher plane.

The supremacy of a given country over a certain colony always has a historical background, and this historical background will generally be sound enough not only to justify the relations between the colony and the nation to which it belongs, but also to make this nation responsible for the development of its colony and for the maintenance of order in its territory. But such a historical explanation, though it may justify the colonial power of a certain nation over a special colony, does not justify the relation of supremacy on one side and subjection on the other, for that relation between peoples of different nationality and different race can be justified only on higher motives. It can be justified before the forum of humanity only when the dependent races, and mankind in general, find moral as well as material profit in and through this relation. So long as this profit can be demonstrated, colonization is justified and to a certain degree necessary. This implies that the dominating country is bound to help the inhabitants of the dependent colony develop their moral, intellectual, economic, and political powers, so that they will gradually grow out of their actual dependence and become able to look after their own interests and govern themselves.

There is no great variety of opinion on this theoretical consequence of the relation between a colony and its mother country. But there is a very great difference of opinion as soon as it comes to the question of putting this principle into action. If it is a crime against humanity to hold a people in dependence when it has attained the ability to govern itself, it is no less a crime to leave a people that has been accustomed to the rule of a more advanced nation to its own devices before it is really prepared for self-government.

In former centuries the colonizing nations were inclined to deny their colonies self-government even when it was evident that they had the necessary political abilities. But in our democratic century statesmen do not always give sufficient attention to differences in aptitude between nations and races; these differ-

ences cannot be overlooked without causing harm to the race to which are attributed abilities which they have not yet acquired.

Of course a colonizing nation cannot and must not postpone granting independence until there is equality between itself and its colony. For equality does not exist even between the nations of the white race that are governing themselves. On the other hand, the colonizing nation ought not to withdraw its protecting hand until the native inhabitants of the colony have approached equality with the mother country in economic and political abilities. Just as a man is not justified in releasing his protection and his control over the education of a boy or girl of fifteen who is under his guardianship, so a nation is not justified in freeing a colony that history has given into its guardianship at a time when the native population of the colony has not really acquired the abilities necessary for economic and political self-government.

In former centuries it was not necessary to give warnings of this sort; but in our century, with its tendency to search for equality where it does not yet exist, and for economic and political abilities where they can result only from constant and painstaking education, such a warning is, unhappily, not superfluous. In writing this I am, of course, thinking primarily of tendencies in Holland and in the Dutch East Indies; but I am sure that it applies also to the colonies of other countries in Asia and Africa. A policy of idealism may give satisfaction to the heart, but it cannot achieve its purpose if it is not soundly based on fact.

If Holland, led by the highest motives, should give up its supremacy over its colony in the Far East, or if it should be forced out because it lacked confidence in its ability to fulfil its task, it would not only have forsaken its duty toward the native population of the colony as well as toward the inhabitants of the mother country, but it would also endanger the peace of the world. Happily, there is no immediate danger that such a course will be followed by the responsible authorities in Holland and the Dutch East Indies; but it is bad enough that one must deal with the possibility of such a proposal being made in the not distant future, and that one should feel it necessary to point out the great responsibility it would involve.

BRITISH LABOR AND THE SOVIETS

By Louis Fischer

POST-REVOLUTIONARY relations between the Kremlin and Downing Street are a composite of Anglo-Russian and Anglo-Soviet relations. There is much that is old and the product of geography; there is as much that is new and the product of opposing social philosophies and economic systems. In the east and in the west, understanding between Great Britain and Russia has become less likely than under Tsarism.

The Labor cabinet headed by Ramsay MacDonald in 1924 made a sincere effort to bridge the financial and political chasm between the two states. Yet the good results were not at all proportional to the good will shown on both sides. Today, after the resumption of relations agreed upon by Arthur Henderson, the British Foreign Secretary, and Valerian Dovgalevsky, the Soviet Ambassador to France, the two nations face exactly the same problems that they faced in 1924, and although the same good will actuates both Downing Street and the Kremlin, the chances of settlement in 1930 seem to be more remote than they were six years ago.

The Protocol signed by Henderson and Dovgalevsky on October 3, 1929, calls on Russia and England to define their attitudes to the agreements signed in August 1924 by Ramsay MacDonald and Christian G. Rakovsky, the Soviet chargé d'affaires in London. Though the coming negotiations will cover exactly the same ground that was covered in 1924, and probably in much the same way, the propaganda issue has been eliminated, because in the preliminary pourparlers Henderson and Dovgalevsky accepted Article 16 of the 1924 treaty. That article pledged the contracting nations "to refrain and to restrain all persons and organizations under their direct or indirect control, including organizations in receipt of any financial assistance from them, from any act, overt or covert, liable in any way whatsoever to endanger the tranquillity or prosperity of any part of the territory of the British Empire or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or intended to embitter the relations of the British Empire or the Union with their neighbors or any other country." This clause may mean very much. It will probably be interpreted as referring to the activities of the Comintern and Soviet trade

unions, and as an undertaking with respect to Afghanistan and Persia. It is susceptible of considerable legal hair-splitting and may cause trouble in the future. But for the moment the question of propaganda should not clog the machinery of negotiations. Debts and property, however, remain to plague the discussions.

According to one authority,[1] Russia's public debt to Great Britain amounts to:

Government and Railway bonds	$333,000,000
Commercial investments	261,000,000
War debt	2,766,000,000
Total	$3,360,000,000

The Bolsheviks in 1924 pressed counterclaims. They asked for reparation for damages done by British and British-supported forces in Russia during the Soviet civil war. Rakovsky, in a memorandum to the Labor Government which Ponsonby, MacDonald's Under-Secretary of State, pronounced "vague and unsatisfactory," set the sum at approximately £2,000,000,000 sterling. But regardless of the actual sum, the Bolsheviks insisted that their counterclaims for an indemnity be duly recognized. "One million three hundred fifty thousand human lives alone," Rakovsky affirmed at the May 15 session of the Anglo-Soviet conference, "were lost in the fight against intervention." Three thousand five hundred bridges were destroyed. Whole provinces were laid waste. "I repeat," Rakovsky continued, "that the question of British claims is insolubly connected with the Russian counterclaims." History supplied a precedent for this stand. The Russians invariably cited the case of the privateer *Alabama* which, though fitted out in England, did not belong to the British Government. Yet the Geneva Court of Arbitration, on September 14, 1872, ordered the British Government to pay the United States Government $15,500,000 for damages caused by the *Alabama* in helping the Confederacy against the North. Britain's action in Russia between 1918 and 1920 was more direct and more destructive.

Rakovsky stated, however, that "the Soviet delegation does not consider the Soviet counterclaims as ranking against the whole mass of British claims but principally as ranking against the British war debt. The Soviet delegation fully understands

[1] "The Inter-Ally Debts," by Harvey E. Fisk. Bankers Trust Co., New York-Paris, 1924, pp. 111 and 302.

that private British claimants must receive some satisfaction." The Genoa Conference of 1922 had brought into prominence the theory that Entente war debts to Russia and Soviet counterclaims for interventionist and blockade damages cancel each other. But this involved the entire problem of Inter-Allied debts, for France and Italy would demand at least as favorable treatment from Great Britain as Soviet Russia received. Ponsonby therefore urged, on May 15, that the war debts and counterclaims "shall be reserved for discussion at a later date." Subsequently, he announced in Parliament that they had been placed in "cold storage" and it was generally agreed that the British government accepted the Soviet contention for cancellation.

There remained, however, the claims of private British bondholders and the demands of former property owners in Russia. These, and small personal losses by British subjects — bank deposits, salaries, jewelry, furniture, etc., totalling, according to the British, £26,000,000 — were debated throughout the conference. The members of the British delegation were Arthur Ponsonby, to whom MacDonald handed the presidency of the British delegation, Sir Victor Wellesley, J. D. Gregory, Owen O'Malley, F. Phillips, Sir Sydney J. Chapman, who had participated in the Genoa and Hague conferences, Sir William Clark, who negotiated in Moscow with the Bolsheviks in 1918, and H. Fountain. The Russians were led by Christian G. Rakovsky. Important Soviet leaders seconded his efforts, among them Tomsky, chief of the Soviet trade unions and member of the supreme Political Bureau of the Communist Party, Scheinmann, president of the Soviet State Bank, Stomonyakov, Preobrajensky, Radchenko, of the Miners' Union, Shitkov, Haidar Aliev, representing Turkestan, Kutuzov, of the trade unions, A. A. Joffe, the Russian diplomat, and Shvernik.

On the day the conference opened, April 14, a memorandum was submitted to the British Government and press above the signatures, among others, of Sir Charles Addis and E. C. Grenfell of the Bank of England, Walter Leaf of the Westminster Bank, Reginald McKenna of the Midland Bank, J. W. Beaumont Pease of Lloyds Bank and Lord Swaythling of S. Montagu and Company. Lord Revelstoke of the Baring Bros. bank, where considerable Tsarist gold was still on deposit, also played a rôle in connection with the memorandum. The bankers demanded 1, that the Bolsheviks recognize Russia's public and private

debts; 2, that an equitable restitution of private property to foreigners be made; 3, that a proper civil code be brought into effective operation, independent courts of law created, and the sanctity of private contract again firmly established; 4, that the Soviet Government guarantee that in the future private property should in all circumstances be free from confiscation by the state; 5, that British bankers, industrialists and traders should be able to deal freely with similar private institutions in Russia; and 6, that the Bolsheviks abandon propaganda.

The second demand was one that the Bolsheviks had refused at Genoa and the Hague; the third was a demand such as might be made under a capitulary régime in China and pre-war Turkey; the fifth required the abolition of the Soviet Government monopoly of foreign trade, a most fundamental tenet of Bolshevik statecraft. The authors of the memorandum were well-known financiers and business men. They knew that no Bolshevik government could accede to their program and live. Their memorandum revealed the opposition of the British financial and business mind to a settlement with Russia. This obviously complicated MacDonald's position, for an economic agreement with the Soviets depended on the City more than on Downing Street.

The opening session of the conference consisted of an address of welcome by MacDonald and a reply by Rakovsky. The next day's meeting dealt with those Anglo-Russian treaties which required cancellation or modification. Sessions on April 16 and 24 were devoted to questions of procedure, old treaties, the organization of committees and other technical and secondary matters. Both delegations were feeling their way. At the meeting of May 15, however, the conference came to grips with the real problem of war debts and counterclaims, and finally on May 20 private expropriated property came under discussion. Rakovsky had declared on May 15 that "nationalization as a result of the revolution is legal and . . . we must refuse to pay for its consequences." Since the British would not accept this principle and since the Bolsheviks would not budge from it, the chief Soviet delegate therefore suggested that they try to reach a practical settlement. He now asked for information. What were the claims of former private property owners? Did they ask for concessions? The Bolsheviks realized that a refusal to consider the claims would make agreement impossible. For this reason, and not because they thought it right, they consented to listen to applications for compensation.

As to pre-war bonds, Rakovsky submitted this formula: "On condition of the conclusion, with the assistance of the British Government, of a long-term loan for productive purposes [*i.e.*, not for budget purposes] the Government of the Soviet Union agrees, in accordance with the amount of the loan and its conditions, to determine by agreement with the British Government a lump sum in order to cover the pre-war debts of Russia in relation to British subjects."

The Soviet point of view had always been clear. The Bolsheviks could not and would not recognize or pay their predecessors' debts unless they received credits or loans from the country whose bondholders they were satisfying. The workers and peasants, they argued, would object to paying the bills of Tsarist wars and Tsarist bad administration. Not only the socialists and communists but even the moderate liberals in Russian pre-war political life warned foreign creditors on numerous occasions that the successors of the autocracy would not assume responsibility for its loans.

Had the Soviet régime held fast to a dogmatic, theoretical position it would have refused to pay pre-war debts or war debts. But it behaved realistically. Such a policy in respect to peace-time obligations would have made normal economic relations with foreign lands too difficult and strained. Expediency demanded some settlement, and Moscow therefore proposed the following: Great Britain would give the Soviet Union a loan of say £50,000,000 sterling, at an annual interest of say 8 percent. In Russia the interest on money was say 13 percent. Moscow would devote the difference — or 5 percent of £50,000,000 — to satisfying the claims of the holders of pre-war bonds. In other words, one million pounds or more, depending on the volume of borrowing, would be available each year for that purpose.

A loan was the *sine qua non* of debt payment. "The central question is the loan," Rakovsky said in an interview with the *Izvestia* on July 30.

Under the Trade Facilities Act no large British export credits could be utilized to further Russian trade. The Soviet Government, moreover, required cash in order to employ credits wisely. To use imported factory equipment, for instance, the state needed money to pay workers and to buy domestic construction materials, and although Rakovsky intimated that by far the greatest part of the proposed loan would be spent in England, it was un-

derstood that Moscow expected at least a small fraction in liquid funds. Besides, efforts made in February 1924 to extend the benefits of the Trade Facilities Acts to Russia remained ineffective.

While the Bolsheviks based their hopes for the success of the entire conference on a loan *guaranteed by the British Government*, the Labor cabinet opposed the giving of any such guarantee. At the session of May 20 Ponsonby stated emphatically that "the British Government can in no way guarantee such a loan." MacDonald maintained that the Bolsheviks should negotiate directly with the City. He felt that the good will of the government, not its guarantee, was required. But when Rakovsky went to the City, the quest was vain. He spoke to Reginald McKenna, Lord Inverforth, and Henry Bell of Lloyds Bank. But Inverforth said the Bolsheviks really need not borrow at all. Did they wish to build railways? That could be done directly by British bankers and industrialists. Did they wish to develop their oilfields, coal mines, gold deposits, etc.? It was only necessary to invite British capitalists to undertake the task of production in Russia.

After several such meetings Rakovsky and the Labor Government became convinced that no loan which lacked a state guarantee could be secured in the City. A struggle now commenced to win MacDonald and his ministers over to the idea of giving a guarantee. Litvinov spent a few days in London in the middle of June and left with a pessimistic impression. Labor circles were divided. Those in contact with the banks and industries opposed the guarantee. Left-wing leaders who were exposed to strong trade union pressure to solve the unemployment problem by winning the Russian market, favored the guarantee. When Rakovsky left London for a hurried aeroplane trip to Moscow on July 26, 1924, the question still hung in the balance. En route he received a message from Ponsonby stating that the guarantee would be granted.

The decision to grant the guarantee followed a bitter and prolonged struggle at a cabinet session in the last week of July. Snowden persisted in his uncompromising opposition and violently attacked the Ponsonby suggestion of a £30,000,000 loan. He found supporters in J. H. Thomas, Lord Olivier, the Secretary of State for India, and — much to the surprise of many — in Colonel Josiah C. Wedgwood, who fought the project bitterly. The Prime Minister and Henderson stood firmly by Ponsonby, and finally won the day. MacDonald had opposed a guarantee as

long as he believed that the bankers could be persuaded to lend to Russia without it, but when this proved an illusion, and knowing that without a loan no settlement could be reached, he decided to support the guarantee. Time, moreover, was pressing. Parliament would adjourn early in August and he had to send it home with some definite achievement in the field of Anglo-Soviet relations.

Meanwhile the official conference had been at a standstill for more than two months. At its session on May 27 the prospects of agreement had seemed very dark and Ponsonby had warned the Russians that the government had no majority and could not carry through any "special or extravagant measures." The next session took place more than two months later — on August 4, soon after the guarantee had been adopted.

In the interval, the Soviets had been negotiating directly with the British bondholders. Downing Street took the view that it would interfere in the issue between the Soviets and their creditors only if an agreement could not be reached without such mediation. And the bondholders themselves insisted on direct pourparlers with the Bolsheviks. The first meeting of Rakovsky and Scheinmann with the representatives of the bondholders was held in the British Foreign Office on June 12.[2] Ponsonby and Gregory made non-committal introductory statements and departed. Sir George Marjoribanks, and Messrs. C. Birch Crisp, Trotter, Cooper and Cramp attended for the creditors, with Charles Edward Barnett, of Lloyds Bank, presiding. They refused to present a statement of their claims but asked Rakovsky to make his offer. It was generally agreed that the total debt would suffer reduction. But how large was the total? The second meeting, held at 17 Moorgate Street on June 23, revolved around the same issue. Rakovsky showed a report which had been handed him officially by the Board of Trade on May 1, according to which a government registration of claims ending March 31, 1924, revealed a total of £39,023,165. This figure, Rakovsky added, approximated very closely that of the Tsarist Ministry of Finance. Chairman Barnett, however, suggested that £50,000,000 be accepted as the basis of discussion. But Rakovsky insisted on the Board of Trade sum, and then declared that the Soviets would, if they obtained a government-

[2] The summary of the proceedings of this and subsequent meetings has been made by the writer from the unpublished protocols.

guaranteed loan in England, pay £6,000,000 or, roughly, 16 percent of the whole. This, Rakovsky remarked, was more than three times the present market value of all the bonds held in Great Britain.

The third and final session of the conference with the bondholders met on June 27. The bondholders refused to accept Rakovsky's offer and likewise refused to make one of their own. Rakovsky accordingly declared that unless he heard from the bondholders within a few days, the bondholders' claims would be discussed in the official Anglo-Soviet conference at which the bondholders would not, of course, be present. The private pourparlers thus ended without result. But before the close, Mr. Crisp, a prominent bondholder, passed a pencilled note to Rakovsky, which Rakovsky later showed the writer. It contained the following proposal for a settlement: "Amount outstanding to be reduced to 50 percent. Soviet will pay 2½ [percent] on ½ of balance and the bondholders will give an option to Soviet to pay off principal at 50 percent discount, *i.e.*, 25 percent of original sum." If the option were not exercised during five years, Mr. Crisp added, payments would be spread over a period of fifty years. On this basis a settlement might easily have been reached at that time. Mr. Crisp apparently believed that he could mobilize 50 percent of the bondholders for his solution — a belief which was reflected in the final treaty.

The bondholders' claim having been reserved for the consideration of the inter-government conference, and the guarantee having been accepted by the British cabinet, the official discussions now reached their final stage. The decisive session, which took place on August 4, lasted twenty hours and left the participants in a state of physical collapse. It ended with a sensational rupture.

When the proceedings opened, Ponsonby stated: "At the earlier meetings I repeated more than once that the government could not undertake to guarantee a loan. That decision has been reversed. . . ." MacDonald's objection to the guarantee had threatened the success of the negotiations; his acceptance of it seemed to pave the way to a final settlement. The Russians, indeed, felt that an agreement was within reach. Both sides made compromises.

The cancellation or emendation of old treaties had been

provided for by the experts. The draft of an important commercial treaty presented no difficulties. A fisheries convention had been drawn up which gratified British fishing interests.[3] Only two problems now remained outstanding: bonds and nationalized private property. Rakovsky argued that since direct negotiations with the bondholders had been fruitless, the British Government must interfere. He did not expect it to negotiate with the bondholders; that was Moscow's affair. But the British Government would represent the nation, and when an agreement had been reached with at least half the claimants, the Government would regard the settlement as legal and satisfactory. This Ponsonby accepted, and it was written into Article 6 of the draft General Treaty.

Article 7 "reserved for discussion at a later date" all claims in respect of British war loans to Russia, Russian gold deposited in England by the Tsarist Government in the course of the war or by Germany under the Brest-Litovsk treaties, Tsarist and Kerensky non-war debts, and Bolshevik counterclaims. Articles 8 and 9 provided for the settlement of petty claims of British nationals by the payment of a lump sum by Moscow to the British Government for distribution among the claimants.

Now the session, having found an acceptable formula for the solution of the bondholders issue, attacked the problem of private property. The Genoa and Hague conferences had foundered on this rock. Much of the foreign opposition to the Soviet Government found inspiration and support in industrialists whose properties were sequestrated. The MacDonald cabinet had in fact (as Ponsonby declared) acceded to the Soviet demand for a loan guarantee only on condition that the article of the draft treaty referring to nationalized private property remain essentially unchanged.

Practically all the former owners had presented their claims to Rakovsky in London. One Englishwoman wished to call on the Soviet envoy and collect rent for the three years he had lived in her house in Kharkov while Prime Minister of the Ukraine. More serious demands came from the Lena Goldfields Company, Urquhart's Russo-Asiatic Corporation, etc. Sir Henri Deterding, however, never presented any demands for compensation or a

[3] For text see British White Paper, Russia No. 4 (1924) "General Treaty between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." London, 1924 Cmd. 2260, p. 4 *et sep.*

concession. He wished merely to be reinstated in the ownership of his former plants. Progress was registered in discussions with several of the companies, for the Soviet Government intended to grant a considerable number of concessions to former owners — not because it considered nationalization wrong, illegal or outlived, but, as Rakovsky stated on August 5, "because we believe the concessionaires will be valuable workers in Russia."

The Bolsheviks, however, could not satisfy all the former owners. A controversy developed on the topic of losses vs. claims. The substitution of the word *losses* for *claims* would, Rakovsky warned, make the treaty entirely unacceptable. "We are under no obligation to pay losses," he affirmed, "but we are prepared to pay compensation" in the form of concessions or perhaps even cash. To pay reparations for losses would mean to recognize the illegality of nationalization, whereas to settle claims would merely permit the capitalists to return to Russia and be of service to the country.

Also, an important legal point was involved. In the Anglo-Russian commercial treaty of March 16, 1921, the Bolsheviks had accepted private British claims. Subsequently, in April 1922, the Rapallo Treaty had been negotiated with Germany. Accordingly Scheinmann declared that "if this idea of the settlement for losses were adopted, then such claims could be presented not only by British but by all other nationals." A precedent would be set from which the Bolsheviks might suffer in future pourparlers, notably with France and the United States.

Ponsonby thereupon explained that the British Government did not expect the Bolsheviks to pay all claims but only "valid" ones. The tired delegates now commenced to discuss the question of validity. Who would decide? Since the loan would be forthcoming only when, in the opinion of the British, sufficient progress had been made in the settlement of claims, the decision as to validity lay with Downing Street. Rakovsky suggested instead that only those claims be satisfied the justice of which had been recognized by the Soviet Government or by both governments. It was now 7:15 on the morning of August 5. Perhaps if the negotiators had had some sleep an understanding might have been arrived at. Perhaps if Gregory of the Foreign Office had not nudged Ponsonby at 4 A.M. and suggested a break, none would have occurred. Perhaps a few minutes' talk between Ponsonby and MacDonald or between MacDonald and some Labor leaders

might have sufficed to heal the breach. As it was, Ponsonby arose at 7:15 to announce that the treaty, unfortunately, could not be signed and the negotiations, therefore, "fall to the ground."

A Labor government and a Workers' and Peasants' government had split on a question involving the private property of expropriated capitalists. The position of Moscow was clear: it did not want to pay more than necessary. It felt that nothing ought to be paid, but on grounds of expediency it was ready to make concessions. The British Government felt the pressure of the industrialists and the banks. To yield too much would endanger Labor's position in Parliament. MacDonald desired to have the whip hand. He asked that all the private property claims be satisfied, or at least that it rest with Britain to determine which were valid.

When Rakovsky returned home after the exhausting twenty-hour battle, he telephoned Andrew F. Rothstein, the interpreter of the Soviet delegation, to inform British Labor leaders of the split. That afternoon England was stirred. The Conservative press rejoiced. Labor realized that, apart from the intrinsic significance of its failure to agree with the Russians, the collapse of the negotiations would probably involve the fall of the cabinet. Labor leaders thereupon prevailed on MacDonald to postpone the adjournment of Parliament to permit of one more attempt to heal the breach. The same evening, Rakovsky answered a summons to report on the negotiations before a special caucus of about twenty-five Labor M.P.'s. Commander Kenworthy, then still a Liberal, likewise attended. Furthermore, Purcell, Morel, Wallhead, Lansbury, Maxton and other Left trade unionists and M.P.'s consulted with Ponsonby and probably MacDonald, and the same evening brought to the chief of the Russian Delegation the glad tidings that the negotiations would be resumed the next day, August 6. The next morning, in fact, Gregory brought a new Foreign Office formula which Rakovsky rejected. The Russian considered it worse than the previous proposal. Within several hours, the Left leaders submitted to Rakovsky a third formula, drafted by Ponsonby and submitted to MacDonald. This time, after consultation with his colleagues, he accepted.

That very day, August 6, the Anglo-Soviet conference met again. Ponsonby read the new draft of the disputed article on private property and Rakovsky immediately approved.

Article 10 elaborated the procedure for the settlement of private property claims. Article 11 provided for a second treaty which would contain: 1, conditions for the settlement of bondholders' claims; 2, the amount and method of payment of compensation for petty British losses; and 3, "an agreed settlement of property claims other than those directly settled by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." This was the formula on nationalized property reached after the break. Moscow would negotiate separately with the expropriated owners. But claims not satisfied by this method of private agreement would have to be settled according to the provisions contained in the second treaty. This was generally understood to mean that tribunals would be set up to adjudicate claims preferred by numerous governesses, teachers, and small property holders who had suffered through the revolution. But the larger more important claims of Urquhart and firms of the same magnitude would be settled by direct negotiations and thus pave the way to the loan. The loan would be forthcoming only after the second treaty had been signed. Only then would the British Government "recommend Parliament to enable them to guarantee the interest and sinking fund of a loan to be issued by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." No amount was stated, nor were the conditions and terms.

On August 10 the Anglo-Soviet General Treaty as well as the supplementary commercial treaty were signed by MacDonald and Ponsonby and by Rakovsky, Joffe, Radchenko, Scheinmann and Tomsky.

So far as the British were concerned, the treaty undoubtedly contained many shortcomings. Mr. Garvin summed up the feeling about it in the *Observer* of August 10 when he wrote: "It restores what can be restored, and leaves the rest for time and good will. . . . " It was a half-solution with the promise of a complete solution.

Concretely, the General Treaty settled the old treaties problem; it provided for a fisheries settlement which greatly pleased the British fishermen; and it pledged both contracting parties to refrain from propaganda and interference in internal affairs. It was supplemented by a detailed commercial agreement. Whether or not Russia received a loan, these settlements stood. Furthermore, the treaty recorded the Soviet's recognition of their responsibility to settle the claims of the bondholders,

petty losers, and expropriated private owners. It also set up machinery for the settlement of those claims, and provided the method. If the machinery failed and the claims remained unsettled, the Bolsheviks got no loan.

The treaty, then, was not a final settlement, but it leveled the road to one in the future. It was obvious from the Rakovsky negotiations with the bondholders and property owners, from his declarations registered in the protocols of the official Anglo-Soviet conference, and from the declarations and tenor of the Russian press, that the Soviet Government wished to reach a final agreement. Had its intention been different, it would never have agreed to concessions which in fact exposed it to strong criticism in the Soviet Union.

But though the treaty opened the door to British participation in the reconstruction of Russian economy, many Englishmen were not disposed to contribute to the strengthening of a potential enemy of the Empire and to the buttressing of a country which, by its very existence, challenged the capitalist system. Some were not prepared to help under any condition. Others wanted a higher price than the Soviets would pay by the terms of the treaty.

Powerful opposition to the treaties soon developed. In spirit it was not unlike that of the bankers' memorandum of the opening day of the conference.

The treaties had to lie on the table for 21 days before they could be ratified by Parliament. Since Labor controlled no majority the balance was held by the Liberals. Lloyd George's eye was now on the domestic political scene. He preferred to risk an autumn election before Labor had made too long and too good a record in office. The polemic raged throughout September. October 2, the London *Daily Herald*, organ of Labor, carried a full-page headline: "Prepare for a General Election."

It so happened that during this period the government withdrew the proceedings against John Ross Campbell, editor of the Communist *Workers' Weekly* who had been charged with inciting the King's armed forces to mutiny. The Tories' and Liberals' motions of censure against the MacDonald cabinet referred to this action, but it was no secret that the Campbell case merely served as a convenient excuse for burying the government which had signed the Anglo-Soviet treaties.

It did not come as a surprise when, on October 8, the govern-

ment suffered defeat in the House of Commons. National elections were scheduled for October 29. There followed the short campaign, featured by the famous "Zinoviev" letter, which brought into office — for a five-year term — a firmly entrenched Baldwin-Chamberlain cabinet. Its obligations and convictions were anti-Bolshevist, and after several years of unfruitful recrimination it severed relations with Moscow in May 1927.

The break continued till Ramsay MacDonald once more became Prime Minister in 1929.

Mr. MacDonald took office on June 7. His government resumed relations with Moscow on October 3, and Parliament confirmed the step on November 5 by a vote of 324 to 199, with Lloyd George supporting the Labor proposal. But the vote is not to be taken as an indication that the negotiation of a treaty is to be free from difficulties. Both in Moscow and in London the situation has altered greatly since 1924. The Left tendency among British Labor ideologists is far weaker than it was, and Labor and trade union politicians are less disposed to break a lance on behalf of good relations with the Soviet Union. Nor is there any widespread popular demand for a quick settlement with Russia. Labor wishes to remain in power, and it does not propose to endanger its tenure of office by attacking Russian questions with excessive zeal or haste. Certainly it will not sponsor a government-guaranteed Soviet loan. The Anglo-Soviet treaty of 1924 brought the first MacDonald cabinet to its fall. Labor will at all costs avoid a similar experience.

Moscow, on the other hand, is more indifferent to Great Britain than it was six years ago. British recognition at that time was the signal for most of the other European powers to establish diplomatic relations with the Bolsheviks. This advantage, once gained, cannot be repeated. Economically the Soviet Union is stronger, more confident, and more independent of British aid than in the past. There exists in Moscow a definite tendency to continue industrial expansion on Russia's own resources and on ordinary foreign business credits without assuming the burden of pre-war debt payments in order to create the possibility of floating loans in England and other European countries. If, therefore, Great Britain demands what the Soviets may consider an exorbitant price of settlement, Moscow will refuse to pay it, especially in view of the improvement of Soviet-American business and extra-diplomatic relations.

THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCH

By William Miller

THE Eastern question has been simplified by the almost complete exclusion of the Turks from the Balkan peninsula, but the organization of the Orthodox Eastern Church has been complicated. Before the resurrection of independent Balkan states in the nineteenth century, the Turkish Government was wont to classify its Christian subjects rather by their common religion than by their distinctive races, and the Œcumenical Patriarchate at Constantinople had ecclesiastical jurisdiction not only over all the Greeks,[1] but also over the Serbs, Bulgarians, Rumanians and Albanians. This has gradually been modified.

When Greece became an independent kingdom, statesmen felt the political inconvenience of a system which allowed the head of the Greek church to be an ecclesiastic residing in the capital of a foreign and hostile state; for that state could make him, according to his strength or weakness of character, his patriotism or his opportunism, into a national martyr (like the Patriarch Gregory V) or into a Turkish instrument (like some of Gregory's predecessors). Consequently, in 1833, under the Bavarian Regency, there was created an autocephalous church of Greece, which was recognized by the Œcumenical Patriarch in the "Synodal Tome" of 1850, and with which he made complete peace in 1852. After the annexation of the Ionian Islands and of Thessaly and the district of Arta in 1864 and 1881 respectively, the Ionian and Thessalian sees were incorporated with this autonomous church, and thus the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, or *klima*, of the Œcumenical Patriarchate was further diminished even among the Greeks.

The creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870, the prelude to the establishment of a practically independent Bulgarian state, was a further blow to the Œcumenical Patriarchate; for the old Bulgarian Patriarchate had ceased to exist in 1394, a year after the fall of the mediæval Bulgarian Empire.

In 1922, a century and a half after the abolition of the old Serbian Patriarchate of Petch by Mustapha III, the Serbian

[1]Except those of Cyprus, whose archbishop has been head of an autocephalous church since the Council of Ephesus in 431, and enjoys the privilege of signing his name in red ink.

Patriarchate was revived at Karlovitz (then in Austrian territory), whither the church had fled for refuge in the Turkish days. The Patriarch was thereupon enthroned at Belgrade and, in 1924, installed on the old patriarchal seat at Petch. He now usually resides at Belgrade, but the meetings of the Synod are held at Karlovitz.

A Rumanian Patriarchate was created in 1925. On the death of King Ferdinand, the first Patriarch, Myron, became and still remains a member of the Regency.

To complete the separatist tendencies of southeastern Europe, in 1928 an ecclesiastical *coup d'état* created an independent Albanian Church, whose head has the title of Archbishop of Tirana though he resides at Koritsa. No orthodox church has recognized this uncanonical establishment, and in February 1929 the Œcumenical Patriarchate deposed the bishops irregularly consecrated in Albania, protested to the Serbian church against the participation of a Serbian bishop in this consecration and demanded his punishment, and protested to the Albanian Government against what it considered to be a breach of the agreement concluded in June 1926 between the Patriarchate and the Albanian authorities. A similar protest was made by the Archbishop of Athens; but in March 1929 the Albanian Government expelled the Greek Metropolitan of Koritsa, who was acting as patriarchal Exarch in Albania. Considerable indignation was expressed in Athens, because there is a large Greek minority in South Albania. By the terms of the new Albanian ecclesiastical charter, however, King Zog can on his own initiative suspend the Metropolitans.

After the enlargement of Greece by the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 there arose the problem of the ecclesiastical sees of the new provinces, hitherto directly dependent upon the Patriarchate. Various schemes were put forward for the solution of this delicate question; but finally a law published on July 12, 1928, provided for the practical ecclesiastical amalgamation of the "old" and "new" Greece. By this law "all the Metropolitan sees in the new provinces recognize as their administrative authority the Holy Synod in Athens, to which their administration is entrusted by the Œcumenical Patriarchate, his canonical rights being preserved. The Metropolitans of the new provinces, being made equal in all things to those of the autocephalous Church of Greece, participate in the Synod in Athens, which con-

sists of nine members," *viz.*, four from "old" and four from "new" Greece, besides the Archbishop of Athens and All Greece, who is President. The quorum is five and the annual session begins on October 1. It is, however, specially provided that "the present law does not apply to Crete;" and the Metropolitan of Crete (with the seven episcopal sees of that island which became autonomous in 1900 after the creation of the principality) still depends directly upon the Œcumenical Patriarch, though having his own synod. The Metropolitans of the new provinces are, however, bound to mention the Patriarch's name in the liturgy, and, in theory, the Metropolitans of "new" Greece may vote in the election of a Patriarch; in practice, however, the Turkish Government will not allow them to exercise their votes, but they may, and do, telegraph that they approve the holding of an election. This was done on the occasion of the last election, that of Photios II in October 1929.

The above is a provisional arrangement; but a new ecclesiastical charter has been drawn up, though it has not yet been ratified by the Greek Parliament. This enlarges the numbers of the Holy Synod to thirteen, *viz.*, seven Metropolitans from "old" Greece, including the Archbishop of Athens as President, and six from "new" Greece. The annual session is to begin on September 1, the quorum is seven, and the Synod's duties include the prevention of proselytism, the supervision of theological education, including the lectures of professors of theology, the appointment of preachers, and the publication of the official organ of the Church, *Ecclesia*. The charter enumerates the thirty-two Metropolitan sees of "old," and the forty-seven of "new" Greece, and includes the Metropolitan of Crete with five Cretan bishoprics in the Church of Greece, thus practically severing "the great Greek island" from the jurisdiction of the Patriarch, and assimilating the Cretan Church to those of the other new provinces. There is only one Archbishop (that of Athens, as at present), and the number of Metropolitan sees may be diminished by a vote of two-thirds of the Synod, which action is to be communicated, in the case of the new provinces, to the Patriarch.

The practical jurisdiction of the present Patriarch has, therefore, considerably shrunk. There are now only eighteen Metropolitans actually in Turkey, of whom twelve, with the addition of the Patriarch, compose the Holy Synod; thirty-five others (including that distinguished ecclesiastical diplomatist, Chrysan-

thos of Trebizond, who acts as the Patriarch's Exarch in Greece and in that capacity, together with the Archbishop of Athens, received the Archbishop of Canterbury when he recently visited Greece) were driven from their sees in Turkey and Bulgaria by the Asia Minor catastrophe and the exchange of populations. The small number of Metropolitans still dependent upon the Patriarchate will be further diminished if the Italians succeed in forming (on the alleged analogy of the Church of Cyprus) an autocephalous Church of the Dodecanese. This would supposedly be under Apostolos, Metropolitan of Rhodes, and would comprise the three other Metropolitans of Kos (at present vacant), Kalymnos with Leros, and Kasos with Karpathos, besides the Abbot of the Monastery of Patmos. The Cypriote parallel is scarcely exact, because Great Britain found the Cypriote Church already autocephalous when she went to Cyprus in 1878, and would certainly have no more interfered with the constitution of that church, had she found it dependent upon the Patriarch, than she interfered in the ecclesiastical relations between the Ionian Islands and the Patriarchate during the British Protectorate. The Metropolitan of Rhodes, whose return from three years' exile in 1924 was contingent upon his signing a document submitted to him by the Italian authorities, is favorable to the Italian plan, but it is strongly repudiated by the Dodecanesians abroad, who can freely express their opinions, and by the Patriarchs of Alexandria and Jerusalem and the bishop of Cyprus. The new Patriarch, unlike his predecessor, is also understood to be against it.

A native of the island of Kalymnos informs me that the question, abstruse as it may seem to us, deeply interests the sponge-fishers as well as the intellectuals, because "where the discussion of politics is forbidden, the Greek takes refuge in debates on theology." The whole of Byzantine history points to the truth of this remark. But Italy may cut the Gordian knot by force, putting the reluctant Patriarch before an accomplished fact, based on the cannons of her fleet rather than on the canons of the church. The recent Lateran arrangement with the Papacy may also tend to a weakening of the Orthodox Church and a strengthening of Roman Catholicism in "the Italian Islands of the Aegean." It should be added that there now is a Roman Catholic Archbishop of Rhodes.

After the expulsion of the Patriarch, Constantine VI, from Con-

stantinople in 1925, on the ground that he was an "exchangeable" Greek, it was suggested that the Patriarchal residence should no longer be Constantinople, but Mount Athos, which since 1920 has been a theocratic republic under Greek sovereignty. But this opinion has not prevailed. Historical continuity and the desire to keep the Patriarchate as a nucleus of Hellenism even in the much-diminished Greek colony of Constantinople maintain the Patriarch's seat in the Phanar, but he is now merely *magni nominis umbra*. Professor Karotides in his valuable "Contemporary History of the Greeks" regrets the separation of the Greek Church of Greece proper from the Patriarchate; but during the last century the jurisdiction of the former has waxed, while the latter's has waned, and the Turks have even endeavored to constitute a separate Orthodox Church of Turkey under the notorious Papa Epthym.

In addition to the Orthodox Churches in southeastern Europe and Asia Minor which have been mentioned, there exist the Orthodox Patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem and Russia, and the Orthodox Church of Poland under a Metropolitan. The Orthodox Church alike in the United States, Great Britain, Malta and Australia depends upon the Œcumenical Patriarchate. There is an Orthodox Archbishop of North and South America, whose seat is New York, and under him are the bishops of Chicago, Boston and San Francisco. Until 1928 there was a schism among the American Greeks, some of whom asserted their dependence upon the Patriarch while others acknowledged the autocephalous Church of Greece. But a decision of that year settled the question in favor of the Patriarch. The Metropolitan of Thyateira — Germanos, who resides in London — is patriarchal Exarch for not only the Orthodox Churches in Great Britain and Malta, but also for those of northern and western Europe. The Metropolitan of Australia and all Oceania is resident in Sidney.

Except on the "Holy Mountain" of Athos, with its twenty monasteries, monasticism is on the decline in Greece. The tendency of modern life is against it, and there is a feeling that the funds of the monasteries might be better employed in improving the educational and material condition of the clergy. By a decree of 1926, ratified by the present Greek Constitution of 1927, Mount Athos, while forming a part of the Hellenic state (including the famous historic Serbian monastery of Chilindar), enjoys administrative autonomy, but ecclesiastically depends upon the

Œcumenical Patriarchate. Greece is represented by a governor, controlled by the Foreign Office, and order is maintained by a force of Greek *gendarmerie*. The twenty monasteries enjoy exemption from taxation and their lands are inalienable.

But in Greece outside of Athos monasticism is the subject of discussion. The two hundred and forty-seven monasteries and thirty-five nunneries of Greece are considered too numerous, and in 1926 the Holy Synod resolved that, while rejecting General Pangalos's proposal that all monks under 50 years of age be dismissed, no further additions to their ranks be admitted and novices discharged. Recently the suggestion has been made that in picturesque sites — and Greek monasteries are usually to be found in such — these institutions should be converted into hotels.

Greek monks are rarely devoted to learned research, and the writers upon Greek monasteries and their treasures have usually been laymen. But in its present head, the Archbishop Chrysostom, the Greek hierarchy possesses a scholar of great learning who has published historical works and has lectured upon the Greek Archbishop of Canterbury, Theodore of Tarsus. As former director of the Rhizareios School, he gained a practical insight into the conditions of clerical education and is anxious to improve them. During his seven years' tenure of the Archiepiscopate, twelve theological seminaries have been founded on the lines of the Rhizareios School at various places, and a hostel for theological students has been opened in the historic monastery of Petrake, near the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. There was urgent need for the better education of the Greek priests. Often married men with families to support, they had to keep shops or in some other way add to their meagre stipends, derived from the fees paid by their parishioners at weddings and (since 1909) from a fund formed out of the surplus revenue of the monasteries. By the proposed charter of the church the Archbishop will receive a sum equivalent to the salary of the President of the Supreme Court, and each Metropolitan the same salary as a judge of that Court. With few exceptions, the clergy in Greece take small part in political or social life; since 1827 they have lost the right of sitting in Parliament, and a *mondain* Metropolitan of the type not uncommon among Roman Catholic *Monsignori* is rarely seen in Athenian drawing-rooms.

The Greek Church is very jealous of any attempt at publishing

a "Revised Version" of the Holy Scriptures. Warned by the experience of the "Gospel Riots" of 1901, when the Theotokes Cabinet fell over the question of the translation of the Gospels into a form of the vernacular, the present Constitution ordains that "the text of the Holy Scriptures remains unchanged. The rendering of it into another linguistic form is absolutely forbidden without the previous approval of the Church." It may be doubted whether the people would appreciate a vulgarization of the original, while scholars and divines envy the Greek Church its possession of the language in which the New Testament was written. Orthodox ecclesiastics express some suspicion of Uniate propaganda, but the Roman Catholic Church coexists with the Orthodox in Greece, and at the last vacancy in 1927 the Vatican wisely appointed a Greek as "Latin Archbishop of Athens," instead of a foreigner. The Constitution forbids proselytism, while allowing "the free exercise of the service of every known religion, provided it be not opposed to public order and good morals." Thus there has been an English Church in Athens (attended also by Americans, who are represented on its financial committee) since 1843, and the Jews, who form such an important element at Saloniki, enjoy full toleration, like the Moslems of Western Thrace. Athens now has a synagogue, and it has been proposed to build a mosque there for the use of Moslem visitors. Jewish and Moslem deputies are elected to Parliament from special constituencies and sworn respectively on the Talmud and Koran. Anti-Semitism, evidences of which occurred a generation ago at Corfu, is warmly repudiated by the Government. The relative numbers of various religions in Greece will be known when the religious census of 1928, the first held since 1907, is published.

Thus, while the Orthodox Church has become more alive to the racial feelings of its various flocks, it has ceased to be preponderantly Greek. The time is over when the Œcumenical Patriarch was the *Ettinarch*, or national head of the Greek people; he is now, in practice, merely the head of the small Greek community left in Constantinople, and, for the present, of the Dodecanesians. The separation of the various Orthodox churches from his sway was inevitable, as soon as independent states arose in the Near East. Hence the liberation of Orthodox Christians from Turkish rule has led not only to their ecclesiastical liberation from the Greek head of the Orthodox Church, but to the diminution of his authority over the larger portion of his own race. Whereas non-

Italian Roman Catholics have acquiesced in the tenure of the Papacy by Italians alone for over four centuries, the races of the Near East have preferred to establish hierarchies of their own blood. Whatever the future may have in store for the Œcumenical Patriarchate, it seems improbable that he will recover the authority which he once possessed as head of the only Christian church of the East. All the omens point in the contrary direction. But, as the Balkan states now have fewer "unredeemed" brethren subject to their neighbors than before the recent wars, their respective churches have less political importance than in the days when a Greek, Serbian or Bulgarian bishop in another country was usually also a political propagandist, and they can accordingly devote their whole attention to religious work, to education and to social reforms. Possessed of a splendid ritual, a great history and a distinguished list of martyrs, the Orthodox Church may thus adapt itself to the new conditions of life in the East.

CADORNA AND DIAZ

By Count Carlo Sforza

MILITARY literature often recruits its authors among unlucky leaders: Cadorna wrote his memoirs, and Diaz did not. Ludendorff explained at length how it came about that, in spite of his genius, he was beaten; and Foch kept silent. Again, military experts — even when they have no personal interests at stake — are inclined to see only the military elements of problems that essentially are social and human. As I am neither a military leader nor a military expert, but knew Cadorna fairly well and his successor, Diaz, intimately, I believe that my impressions (avoiding the solemn word judgment, which is conventionally left for posterity to pronounce) regarding the direction of the war on the Italian front will at least have the merit of being thoroughly sincere and disinterested.

I

A member of an old Piedmontese family that had always served the House of Savoy, Count Cadorna was a soldier by breeding, temperament and tradition. His father, in September 1870, had commanded the Italian troops that seized Rome; the son, then eighteen years old and a lieutenant in an artillery regiment, was at his side. A normal career brought Cadorna to the post of Chief of the General Staff in 1914, on the eve of the European conflict. He reorganized the army and prepared it for the great trial. And in May 1915, when it went to war against Austria-Hungary, he became its head under the nominal Supreme Command of the King.

The diplomatic errors that helped make Cadorna's difficult task even more difficult are not unknown to the readers of FOREIGN AFFAIRS.[1] They are all summed in Baron Sonnino's narrow conception that the Italian intervention should consist exclusively of warfare against Austria, with aims which not only had not been brought into harmony with those of Austria's other direct enemies, like the Serbians, but which even in part directly thwarted some of the Slav aspirations. This private war, inserted into a more general one, might be supposed to have

[1] See "Italian Diplomacy During the World War," by Gaetano Salvemini, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1926.

made Cadorna's task easier; in reality, it brought him increased difficulties. He felt this himself, for he wrote: "This is not a localized war between Italy and Austria-Hungary; it is a general war, wherein Russia and Serbia share with us the same final objectives on the enemy territory: the three armies must therefore act together at the same time for the common final aims." And he added: "After these three armies have overthrown Austria, Germany, reduced to her own means only, will have to give in at once."

This was clear-sighted. It was not his fault if Russia suffered a terrible reverse precisely on the eve of Italy's entrance into the war. However, he is not quite free of all responsibility on account of the fact that he failed to insist with Sonnino that the Treaty of London, which the latter negotiated as the basis of Italian intervention, should not work against his strategical conception of the conduct of the war. Sonnino was able to include Dalmatia amongst the lands to be annexed by Italy, in the face of Cadorna's advice to the contrary; Cadorna declared that even when it had been conquered Dalmatia would still remain indefensible. But it would have been even more difficult for Sonnino to brush aside misgivings about the advisability of certain clauses in the Treaty if the Commander-in-Chief had previously given him to understand that they might well lessen the strength of Serbia's attacks against Austria, and in particular that they might provide the Vienna Government with a means of making its Slav troops believe that they were fighting against a pretended Italian imperialism.

Military critics have accused Cadorna of having been too slow in the first operations when, just after the declaration of war, Austria was still weak on the Italian front. I do not share their opinion. It may well be that the first leap would have brought him nearer Trieste. But military science, which should be based on experience, is often fettered with abstract formulæ, and I am afraid that in this case the views of the military critics have their origin in one of Bonaparte's maxims: "The worst course in war is the course inspired by too much prudence." Cadorna could not but know that a brilliant initial advance on Trieste itself would not mean anything decisive in the course of the war, and that the war would only be won by the destruction of the Austrian forces, which would change the World War into a mere siege of Germany. The loss of Trieste would not have

meant much for Austria, since we already had the command of the sea. The ten battles which Cadorna gave to the Austro-Hungarian army accomplished the aim of destroying the Austrian force. Given the exceptionally difficult theatre of operations of the Italian armies — that stony Carso where each rough and grottoed hill constituted a natural fortress — the battles could only be tactical victories; but the supreme objective was reached nevertheless.

The Italian army and people, who persisted in this sanguinary and apparently useless task, must be accorded great honor even if the tradition which prescribes that military history is to be made up of spectacular events has sometimes prevented full justice from being rendered to them. Nor did the Austro-Hungarian army accomplish its part in the terrible duel with any less heroism; and it had a dreadful task — to hold Italians and Serbians on the one hand, Russians and Rumanians on the other, all bound in a deadly and exhausting siege war. Such is the reputation of the German military machine that there is a tendency to forget the value of the Austro-Hungarian effort. After all, it was only thanks to the continuity of that effort that the German armies were able to develop freely the constantly recurring "manœuvres along interior lines of communication" which were the secret of Germany's triumphs — until the day when the framework collapsed. The German and Austro-German armies covered themselves with military glory by destroying first the Rumanians, then the Serbians, then the Russians; even, for a moment, in October-November 1917, they could believe that they had also destroyed the Italian armies at the battle of Caporetto. But all those victories had been won because the Austrian armies desperately defended the edges of the gigantic chessboard.

No one would ever have seriously questioned Cadorna's merit in the thankless task of slowly destroying the Austrian forces, had it not been for the battle of Caporetto.

If Caporetto weighs more heavily on Cadorna's name than Charleroi on Joffre's — all the Allied Commandments underwent similar disasters — it is because Cadorna chose to account for his defeat by alleging the existence of moral causes beyond his control. Anyone who knew him well knows that his sincerity was unquestionable. But it has been proved beyond doubt that the breach in the long semi-circular Italian front line was due es-

sentially to military errors. Along some of the Alpine passes there were gaps in the Italian defenses, and it was through one of these that the Germans and Austrians passed, after an artillery storm such as had not yet been witnessed on any front.

The moral reasons that Cadorna invoked to explain his failure were, according to his own account, the pacifist propaganda of the socialists on the one hand and, on the other, Pope Benedict's message about "useless carnage," which preceded Caporetto by three months. What is worse for Cadorna's reputation, in his communiqué after the defeat he tried to impute the success of the German invasion to this supposed crisis in the morale of his troops. I heard his communiqué on board an Italian destroyer while I was crossing the Adriatic on October 29, having been summoned by Sonnino to confer with him in Rome; the German and Austrian wireless were hurrying the news of their victory to the world, and, to make it more important still, were giving the words of Cadorna's message. If horror at hearing a general clearing himself by attacking his army did not turn into fear for my country, it was because I had had a chance of knowing the man; I had admired his qualities of endurance, of silent courage, of authority; but I knew also how egocentric he was, how lacking in flexibility and imagination, how in all good faith he might well believe that the mistakes and the responsibility rested with the others — the damned civilians.

Now there really were moral causes which existed and which — although in slight proportions — contributed to the giving way of the Italian front, in about the same degree that moral causes contributed to the French defeats of that same year 1917. But they resulted only minutely from the "defeatist" messages of the Pope or the campaign of certain socialist agitators who threw out the dreadful and misleading challenge: "*our* dead, *their* war." The essential and most direct of the moral factors at work was Cadorna himself.

Cadorna, as hard on others as on himself, was really a general of the days of Louis XIV risen again in the twentieth century. Had he been chief of a professional army in which discipline was maintained by dint of hanging and of flogging, one of those armies of Condé or of Eugene of Savoy, he might have done wonders in the elaborate sieges we admire in old war pictures. War, indeed, he conceived of as a gigantic siege operation; filled with a sort of mystical sadism, he held that it was a supreme honor

for a regiment to hold out indefinitely in the trenches; the changes and reliefs practised in the English and French armies seemed to him democratic mawkishness. As the war progressed, this trend of his mind changed into brutality; his genuine strength of character became an exaggerated and fateful attitude of silent anger, which he used to keep off the advice of civilians.

People are inclined to believe, alas, that a hard jaw is a sign of genius, and that brutality is a proof of energy. Cadorna, then, became all-powerful with the middle-class Italians. But the millions of men at the front drew their own conclusions; they were paying for their knowledge with their own blood. They were not a professional army, as he believed, but a people in arms, and they saw themselves cut off from the rest of the nation, with no arrangements for regular and periodical leave to see their families, insufficiently fed, and with the slightest fault punished by decimations.[2] This psychological misunderstanding of the moral needs of a modern army, in which soldiers always remain citizens, was Cadorna's chief mistake. Ready himself to submit to an iron rule, he did not understand that the masses are swayed by other laws.

Overbearing, autocratic, after Caporetto he had the merit of having gone serenely on giving orders for the forming of a new front line long the Piave, where the Italian troops had stayed their retreat and had once more engaged in battle. When Foch came to the new Italian front for a rapid visit he made a long study of the maps and then had a short discussion with Cadorna:

"Il faut envoyer là de l'artillerie" . . .

And Cadorna:

"C'est fait."

"Il faut masser là des reserves" . . .

"C'est fait."

After an oft-repeated *C'est fait*, Foch rose and said:

"But everything is all right again."

It was, even more so than Cadorna thought; but that was one of those moral miracles which were beyond Cadorna's imagination. His *C'est fait* had so rapidly materialized because on that left bank of the Piave, now sacred for all Italians, all the units, even the troops that were still disorganized, had said to them-

[2] An inquest presided over by an army general, Caneva, proved that soldiers were shot in decimations who had not even been present on the day when the fault for which they were being punished had been committed, and that volunteers who had come from abroad to join up with the Italian army had been shot.

selves, as at a sort of mysterious command, that the enemy must not go further on Italian soil; that here they must fight and die.

If at that moment Cadorna understood that the wonderful new unity of national spirit sprang from a free impulse of the mind, whereas all his decimations had been in vain, he must for an instant have doubted his whole conception of life and of men. An autocrat seized with doubts is a wreck.

II

With the passing of Cadorna there exploded on the Italian front the myth of the "strong silent man" just as it had exploded twelve months earlier with Joffre on the French front. But if the French had the luck of performing this operation a year before the Italians, they had the misfortune to replace Joffre by someone who had been over-advertized as a thunderbolt: Nivelle. The result was the bloody defeat of the Chemin des Dames.

After the trial of Caporetto, after the immediate reëstablishment by the Italians of their line of resistance on the Piave, Cadorna was deposed from his command and honorably relegated to Versailles, whither he was sent as the representative for Italy at the new Inter-Allied Supreme War Council. In the same way, for essentially analogous reasons — the assertion of infallibility, waste of human lives, discontent among the troops — Joffre had been removed from real command with the pompous but empty title of "Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces" and, a few weeks later, definitely put aside with the title of Field Marshal.

In Rome, meanwhile, Signor Orlando had succeeded the decrepit Boselli as Prime Minister. Orlando's first task was the choosing of a man to whom the Italian army could be entrusted at a time when the retreat had been checked, when the troops were fighting heroically, but when the Austro-German offensive was going on furiously in the effort to break through the new lines of resistance.

These days saw the dawn of a stupendous revival of national union and faith; the enemy having invaded the Venetian plains, forty million Italians united in one thought: to drive the Germans out of Italy. It was once more the moral unanimity of 1848.

Arriving in Rome from Corfu on the morrow of the Caporetto rout, I succeeded at once in going north, where my three brothers were all in the firing line; I saw, on my way, the usual stream of

wretched refugees flying before the enemy as the Belgians had done, as the French had done. Then finally I saw our new front on the Piave. I felt at once that Italy had conquered. Never before had I seen the men so doggedly determined. On all their faces there seemed to be written: "It is our homes we defend."

When, immediately after the Armistice, I went to Constantinople as High Commissioner, I discovered that my feeling had been shared by foreigners who had judged the situation better than it was judged at the time in Berlin and in Vienna and, possibly, in London and Paris. Everything was for sale in Constantinople, and it was easy for me to obtain copies of the old deliberations of the Sublime Porte. I read an ostentatious, self-satisfied report of the Austro-German successes on the Italian Alps, which ended with a request that a Turkish detachment be sent to share in the occupation — described as imminent and certain — of Venice. The Austro-Germans imagined, perhaps, that a Turkish flag floating on the Piazza San Marco would help to break the spirit of the Italians.

The blunt answer of the Grand Vizir, Talaat Pasha, was:

"This is our greatest defeat after the Marne; if the Italians have succeeded in making a stand after such a reverse it means that they believe in final victory, and that the Austro-German triumph, great as it may seem, is merely a tactical success."

But even though such was the truth — as later turned out — it was natural that the responsible government in Rome should feel the gravity of the situation, with the attacks of the enemy succeeding one another furiously all along the new and still untried Piave front line. "The Italians," declared at that time Conrad, the Austrian Commander-in-Chief, "are like people who hang onto planks for their lives, with the strength of despair; enough to cut off their fingers, and they will all fall off."

It was in this situation that Diaz was chosen to succeed Cadorna.

Diaz was — the unknown general. He was born in Naples in 1861 and so was at this time between fifty and sixty. An officer in the regular army, he had gone normally from promotion to promotion. In the war in Tripoli he had served as a colonel and had been wounded. He had commanded the XXIIIrd Army Corps since June 1917, and at the head of this Corps had led a successful operation on the Selo, one which, however, was but a part of a more comprehensive action. Such was the man — a

new man, unhampered by precedents, silent, with neither pretensions nor genius. He struck Orlando, when his name was suggested to him, as the very opposite of Cadorna. Orlando submitted Diaz's name to the King, who approved of the choice. The choice was simply the result of a general weariness which Cadorna's violent personality had produced everywhere.

But it was felt immediately that if patient steadiness and resistance were asked of Diaz, some spirit of initiative must be linked up with him. General Badoglio was therefore chosen as Under-Chief. A novel case in Italy, the Neapolitan Diaz was to represent stolid reflection, and the Piedmontese Badoglio imagination and daring.

Although junior to Diaz by ten years, Badoglio, who had begun the war as Lieutenant-Colonel, had in 1917, by a series of rapid promotions on the battlefield, become Lieutenant-General and Commander of an Army Corps, like Diaz himself. His Army Corps, the XXVIIth, had, as it happens, held the very sector through which the Austro-Germans had made their first breach on October 25, 1917, and through which the whole invasion had poured. It is to Orlando's credit that he did not on this account disqualify Badoglio. I had Badoglio with me as military expert during the negotiations over the Treaty of Rapallo in 1920, and in our talks he never admitted that he had committed serious errors; but if he did, as some maintain, it was an advantage when he came to occupy his new post of highest responsibility, for the burning recollections of past risks made him humbler and more prudent and his natural ardor gained in manliness by it. From November 1917 until the final victory a year later, Diaz and Badoglio made up an inseparable binomial: the case presents, for once, a refutal of the legend that only a single mind can mature victories.

Diaz and Badoglio started on their joint command with two great advantages, despite the tremendous losses of Caporetto. I have already shown one: the strong and spontaneous revival of the spirit of resistance amongst the whole Italian people, the very opposite of what had been anticipated in Berlin and in Vienna. The other was a material advantage: the shortness of the Piave line enabled the Italian army to draw itself up in heavy lines and to concentrate its reserves in such a manner that they could be more easily handled.

Diaz had taken over his duties on November 8. Three days

later the enemy violently resumed the offensive against the new Piave line and on the Alpine plateau of Asiago. The attack lasted three weeks; along the whole line of the improvised Italian defenses the Austrians sought to force the passage which alone would have given a decisive value to their October victory. Towards the middle of December, after a short lull due to the strain to which the attacking armies had been put, the offensive started once more and lasted until the end of December 1917. Then only did the Austrians at last realize the truth: they would not get through, at least not for the time being.

During those two months, on each day of which Italy might have been either saved or doomed, Diaz, the unknown man of yesterday, appeared as the man of destiny. He knew the Italians were determined to hold out, he knew that there was no stroke of genius to be attempted, that it was solely a question of resisting and of dying; and he succeeded in incarnating this spirit, in creating an infectious atmosphere of fatalistic optimism.

January 1918 brought in four months of snows and storms. They were a precious natural rampart. Diaz, behind this screen, did not lose his time; not only did he, with Badoglio, carry out a technical reorganization of both the army and the defenses, but he managed to keep up amongst the combatants that fever of patriotic passion born of the danger their country had just run. He did what Cadorna in his stubbornness had never condescended to do, and he did it precisely because he did not overrate himself. I mean that he allowed all the free spiritual energies to flow towards the soldiers; he instituted propaganda offices in all the large units to explain to the men the moral aims of the war; he had them told why they should be glad to fight now in order that their sons should know no more wars (which, for Cadorna, would have been sheer blasphemy); Wilson's newly-come message was spread as widely as possible; he allowed newspapers of all opinions to circulate freely in the trenches.

But it was in the organization of propaganda among the enemy that Diaz showed that he understood the moral requisites of the war against Austria in a manner which Sonnino and Cadorna had never done. Diaz accepted the idea (for which in vain I had appealed from Corfu during the two previous years) that there should be organized a propaganda service destined mainly to show the sympathy of Italian democracy for the cause of the nationalities oppressed in Austria and in Hungary, and to use for

that service the collaboration of Czech and Jugoslav prisoners and deserters. He encouraged the formation of Czechoslovak legions on our front, and I know for certain that he deplored Sonnino's veto on the formation of analogous Jugoslav legions, a measure which would at least have provoked a deep moral uneasiness among the Slovene and Croat troops who still were fighting so stubbornly against us. All this was obvious, of course, but obvious things are so frequently overlooked; and, indeed, under Cadorna's purely military régime they had been.

On its side, the government in Rome was powerfully aiding Diaz in this new policy. Taking advantage of the revival of enthusiasm for resistance, Finance Minister Nitti floated a loan, called the Victory Loan, which to the astonishment of the world quickly mounted to six milliard lire. Having thus felt how the country freely responded, the government allowed Diaz to provide regimental heads with funds for helping the families of officers and soldiers. Any combatant who was worried about the condition of his family could safely ask his chief for pecuniary help. Every officer and every soldier was given insurance. In case of death, they knew that a sum of money would be paid in to their family at once; if they lived, they knew that on being demobilized they would find a sum of money to help them take up their regular work again. An organization was also founded on behalf of the combatants — Opera Nazionale per i Combattenti — with a capital of three hundred million lire and possibilities of developing a scheme of wide social scope.

The Italian is, essentially, a homing bird. Those measures — which Cadorna had never thought of — did a great deal toward keeping up the morale of the troops, who felt that their homes were being looked after. It is perhaps difficult for foreigners to realize how cruel had been the sufferings of the soldiers' families during the war, especially in southern Italy.

As Diaz's lucky star would have it, after the winter the Austrians decided to attack the Italian army again with all their forces. This was in June 1918. On the other side of the trenches, in Italy, it was better known than in Vienna how much the Caporetto disaster had fortified our troops, but signs of impatience nevertheless were manifested here and there because Diaz did not engage a decisive battle quickly enough. Italy has always been the land where Fabius Maximus was called the *cunctator* — the procrastinator — because, after the defeat of

the Romans at Trasimeme, in B. C. 217, he had urged prudence as the secret of final victory over Hannibal. For Diaz as for Fabius, events changed the jest into a title of glory.

The battle of the Piave (June 15–23, 1918) was the greatest of the battles waged by the Austro-Hungarian armies in five years of war. All the forces of the monarchy — 60 divisions — found themselves for the first time united in one single aim — the destruction of the Italian army, about ten divisions less numerous than they. If Italy were once destroyed, thought Berlin and Vienna, the Flanders front would quickly be broken in by the combined efforts of the two Central Empires.

The secret of the tactics adopted by Diaz and Badoglio during the battle of the Piave was never to let their troops fight in advanced positions, but to reserve the counter-attack for the intermediary zones into which the enemy was allowed to advance. New and more efficient artillery tactics did the rest. The Austrians themselves admitted a loss of 200,000 men, 200 guns, 2,000 machine guns. But they lost something even more important in that battle: all hope of ever being able to crush the Italian army.

For Italy the price of this victory of the Piave was 90,000 men. Henceforth, Diaz the *cunctator* rejected all suggestion of "adventure," as he termed it. He thought, as Foch did, that the decisive crisis of the war would come during the spring of 1919 and he wanted to have his troops fully efficient by that time.

But by autumn events once more got the better of the plans of chief commanders. The imminent collapse of the Balkan front decided an Italian offensive, and this began on October 24. The resistance of the Austrians on the Italian front was still so stubborn that in four days Italian losses amounted to 40,000 men. But it was the resistance of what I, from my post on the Macedonian front, had described in reports as "the crust;" underneath (as I saw from deserters, some of them officers even) the mass of Emperor Karl's army was ripe for disruption. A little later, the Austrian defeat took shape. The Austrians could not withstand the rapid advance of General Caviglia's army on their flanks. On the thirtieth the enemy front on the Grappa gave in. Defeat turned to rout. On November 4 the end had come.

Caviglia, not unreasonably, claimed the merit of this final victory, just as Badoglio had certainly been the main artisan of the Piave victory. If one said that Diaz was the wise coördinator

of the efforts and decisions of his lieutenants and cleverly turned favorable circumstances to account, one would have done something to explain what occurred. But it would be too much to say that Diaz gave his name to the victory as a notary rather than as a protagonist, and that as commander of the army he played no other part than that assigned by Thiers to the constitutional king who "*règne et ne gouverne pas.*"

Diaz as an historical problem must be considered from a different angle. He had been the right man in an extremely critical and psychologically involved situation. In that situation certain qualities, in themselves mediocre, or negative, assumed a positive value.

The whole period of the Diaz command proves that, in modern warfare, a great problem of social economics and psychology has superimposed itself on the strategical problem. In November and December 1917 on the Piave, in June 1918, and in October 1918, victory did not smile on one chief gifted with any special genius of his own; victory crowned the collective preparation and — more still — the moral unanimity of officers and soldiers, and, behind them, the whole Italian nation.

If there is any merit in having conceived, or willed, or encouraged, this military and moral coördination of the efforts of that great human and social mass which the Italian army represented, it must be ascribed to Diaz — to his practical mind and to his moral character, free of jealousies and personal concerns. To the great lessons of humility that the European tragedy should have given to our plastic taste for heroism, another should still be added: the twilight of the war gods.

A SOLUTION OF THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY CONFLICT

By C. C. Wang

CHINA has always considered that the wording and spirit of the agreements between Soviet Russia and China for the joint administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway purported to put the management on a fifty-fifty basis between the two parties. In spite of the erroneous impression which the coup of July 10, 1929, might have created, China's only purpose, so far as the railway is concerned, is to have the 1924 agreements carried out and respected both in letter and in spirit. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the local authorities have repeatedly declared, China does not intend to possess the railway by seizure nor does she seek any preponderance of management. But she does believe that the 1924 agreements give her a fifty percent voice in the interest and management of the railway, and that she will insist upon.

First let us look at the organization of the directorate of the railway. Under the 1920 agreement it was composed of five Chinese (including the president) and five Russians (including the vice-president). Some commentators[1] seem to think that in the event of a tie vote the president had a casting vote in addition to his vote as a member of the board. This is a blurred impression, but it is a natural one, because, according to that agreement, the president did have two votes while the other nine members of the board had only one vote each. That extra vote of the president, however, was not intended to be, nor ever actually became, the *casting* vote. For in another place of the same agreement it was provided that each decision of the board of directors must have seven votes in order to be effective. This "joker" made it impossible for the voting in the board of directors ever to reach a tie vote which would enable the president to utilize his extra vote. This is not such a complicated mathematical problem when we examine it closely. With ten members on the board and seven votes to pass any decision, the nearest tie-voting approaching the effective margin was five votes on each side. In that case the president's extra vote could break the tie but could not carry the decision, for his extra vote only brought the number of votes to six on one side and five on the other, which was just one vote less than necessary to be effective. Therefore, the president's extra vote had only a complimentary and numerical value instead of any *casting* force.

As a matter of fact, it would appear that the four Russian members of the board usually voted as led by the Russian vice-president, while the Chinese members usually voted in the same way as the Chinese president. This was only natural under the circumstances. In actual practice the decisions of the board of directors under the 1920 agreement were usually arrived at by discussion or "negotiation" between the two sides. During my connection with the railway from January 1920 to October 1924, we seldom thought of calling for a formal vote in our meetings. We always endeavored to arrive at

[1] See especially "The Russo-Chinese Conflict in Manchuria," by K. K. Kawakami, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1929.

some conclusion upon each proposal by a thorough discussion of the pros and cons, and usually knew whether any question was to be acted upon or postponed for further consideration. Thus, practically all the decisions of the board during that period were unanimously approved by all the directors present at the particular meetings. Though it sometimes took considerably more time than one would expect, we seldom failed to arrive at some conclusion.

Now in regard to the two 1924 agreements. These agreements, which allowed for the same ratio of representation as did the 1920 agreement, are silent on the point whether or not the president has a casting vote in case of a tie. We have already analyzed the way in which prior to 1924 the board of directors conducted its business. This system should still apply under the 1924 agreements. For in view of the fact that the regulations governing the working and administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway give the board of directors very extensive powers over the activities of the railway, and that all such powers have to be exercised through the president of the board, China, with her four directors in addition to the president, may certainly be considered to have a fifty percent responsibility over the railway.

It is sometimes said that since the board of auditors is composed of three Russians and only two Chinese, this would constitute a plain departure from the principle of parity, even though one of the two Chinese was to be chairman. On the face of it this is correct, for two Chinese members are certainly less than three Russians. Let us, however, look at the regulations governing the working of the board of auditors to discover the reason why China accepted this apparent departure from the principle of parity. The fact was that the regulations governing the working of that board stipulated that all decisions of the board must bear the signature of the chairman. Thus, no matter how many Russians there might be on the board, so long as the chairman is a Chinese, China's voice on that board cannot be less than fifty percent. This was the reason why China preferred to appoint only two members including the chairman, rather than three without the chairman.

Then there is the clause providing that the general manager was to be a Russian, with one Chinese and one Russian assistant manager. On the face of it, this arrangement might be taken as giving a certain margin of superiority to the Soviet. But we must consider the different branches of the railroad as a whole and not form any conclusions on any single phase or department. It may be pointed out at once that by this arrangement it was intended to balance the apparent margin of superiority which the "allotment," so to speak, of the first positions in the board of directors and board of control seemed to give China, so as to arrive at a proper balance of power between the two parties. Therefore, this article of the 1924 agreement stipulates that the manager and assistant managers shall be appointed by the board of directors — that is, candidates for these positions must be agreeable to both parties — and, what is more, "the rights and duties of the manager and assistant managers shall be defined by the board of directors." With the board of directors constituted as it was, the intention was that the "rights and duties of the manager and assistant managers" should be so defined as to have the whole organization properly balanced in accordance with the "principle of equal representation" between the two parties.

It is also said that the agreement gives the Soviet a certain margin of superiority in the appointment of the department chiefs and assistant chiefs. The exact words of the two consecutive articles dealing with this point are:

> Art. IV. The chiefs and assistant chiefs of the various departments of the railway shall be appointed by the board of directors. If the chief of department is a national of the Republic of China, the assistant chief of department shall be a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and if the chief of department is a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the assistant chief of department shall be a national of the Republic of China.
>
> Art. V. The employment of persons in the various departments of the railway shall be in accordance with the principle of equal representation between the nations of the Republic of China and those of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In this connection, we need only call attention to the fact that: 1, the stipulation concerning the chiefs and assistant chiefs of departments first mentions the nationals of China — and not those of the Soviet; and 2, the phrase, "employment of persons in the various departments," seems clear enough to cover persons of all grades, including the chiefs and assistant chiefs. If the interpretation of the two articles excluded the chiefs and assistant chiefs, then it would seem that China would have just as much right as, if not more than, the Soviet in claiming some margin of superiority, for the simple reason that the articles concerned mention the nationals of China first.

Concerning the main issue between China and the Soviet, it seems that oftentimes both parties are wrong. With the world's longest frontier between them, which cannot be guarded by force, China and Russia must realize that they must endeavor to be good neighbors. Little advantages and petty gains should never be allowed to enter into consideration in conducting their neighborly affairs. When their permanent interest is considered, they should at once realize that the Chinese Eastern Railway neither justifies nor is worthy of the present conflict. The only course to follow is to emulate the healthy example set by Canada and the United States.

To be precise: 1, the ghost of the Tsarist contract and Statutes of 1896 should be driven out of the body of the 1924 agreements by the immediate adoption of some clear and definite regulations governing the functions and working of the Board of Directors and the important executive officers of the railway; 2, a standing rule should be adopted for settling all disagreements between the two sides by arbitration; and 3, a railway expert of some neutral country should be selected by the board of directors as General Manager of the railway.

The fundamental principle of the 1924 agreements requires that the Chinese Eastern should be managed as a purely commercial enterprise, to be shared in equally by China and Russia. The only way to do that without interfering with the efficiency of the railway seems to be to take the management of the railway out of politics and place it in the hands of a neutral expert. Considering the temperaments of the Chinese and the Russians, and with the whole experience of the Chinese Eastern to guide us, we see that it would be extremely difficult to reach the desired object with either a Chinese or Russian as General Manager of the Railway, and it would therefore seem that the adoption of the "city manager" plan, as it has been introduced in American cities, is the only one likely to prevent the Chinese Eastern from getting into its old habits and once more becoming the center of a whirlpool of diplomatic squabbles.

THE NEW KINGDOM OF JUGOSLAVIA

ON October 3 one of the states of Europe changed its name: the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes became the Kingdom of Jugoslavia. The event passed without notice from the American press, along with the equally important action taken simultaneously by the Jugoslav Government, namely the abolition of the administrative system in existence since 1924. Since the war the official Jugoslav map has not borne the historic names of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Herzegovina or Montenegro; and now the thirty-three administrative divisions, or departments, which were decreed in 1922 to supplant the old pre-war divisions have been replaced by nine provinces, or "banovines." Eight of the banovines have been named for historic rivers, the ninth being called the "Littoral Province." The influence of King Alexander is seen not only in the division of the state into larger units, each possessed of considerable local autonomy, but even in the names given them; for the Serbian army divisions were always called after the river valleys where they were recruited, and it was probably in that way that the King (a soldier before he was a statesman) got his idea for the new provincial nomenclature.

The new frontiers have been deliberately arranged to cut across old national and provincial lines, and also to diminish the importance of religious and party factors. Nevertheless, heed has been paid to the susceptibilities of the different sub-divisions of the Jugoslav race as well as to the preservation of economic unities.[1] Thus, Zagreb and Ljubljana, respectively the principal Croat and Slovene cities, retain sway over the major portions of the Croat and Slovene lands: the territory allotted Zagreb, indeed, is the second largest of any of the provinces. The other provincial centers are: Sarajevo, the principal city of Bosnia; Skoplje, the growing metropolis of Macedonia; Split, the chief port of Dalmatia; Novi Sad, a prosperous Danubian town on the former Hungarian plain; Nish, the ancient capital of little Serbia; and Banjaluka, a market town south of the Sava. Belgrade and its suburbs form a separate entity outside the scheme of provincial administration. Though the Croat and Slovene lands are left nearly intact, Bosnia and Herzegovina (both Mohammedan strongholds) and Dalmatia are considered as mere geographical expressions; as such they are sacrificed to the obvious advantage of having the narrow coastal strip, which formerly comprised two administrative regions, joined up with its complementary hinterland in two substantial banovines. A further improvement is the tendency not to use rivers as administrative frontiers (as in the old arrangement), but to turn them into regional arteries.

Although full details as to how the banovines will function are not yet available, the bans, or governors, have been already appointed by King Alexander, and he has shown regard for local wishes and needs in choosing local celebrities in several key posts. The bans will have quite wide latitude in the exercise of their powers, and will name and dismiss all the lower officials employed in their districts. Part of the work of the Ministries of Trade, Public Works and Social Welfare will be turned over to them, as well as control over the finances of each province, which are to be handled separately. They are to be assisted

[1] Cf. "The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes: Administrative Divisions in Relation to Natural Regions," by B. Z. Milojevitch: *American Geographical Review*, Jan. 1925.

by deputy bans (chosen from among experienced public officials) and by departmental chiefs, all named by royal decree on nomination of the ban and with the approval of certain of the Ministries at Belgrade competent in this matter. Perhaps elected provincial diets will come as a later development.

As was to be foreseen, neither extreme "centralists" nor extreme "autonomists" seem very much satisfied with the arrangement. The centralists, most of them strong Serb nationalists, look with foreboding on the grant of local autonomies and dislike seeing the historic name of Serbia disappear from its premier place in the title of the state. The autonomists, mainly Croats,



are not to be reconciled to any plan which does not provide a Croatian diet, and fear that the compromise offered by the King may appeal to the Croatian masses and weaken the devotion of these to the thorough-going federalist tenets propagated by the late Stephen Raditch.

It will be remembered[2] that on January 6, 1929, King Alexander marked the opening of the eleventh year of his triune realm by dissolving Parliament, rescinding the Constitution and placing the government in the hands of a non-

[2] Cf. "The Royal Dictatorship in Jugoslavia," by Hamilton Fish Armstrong: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1929.

party cabinet responsible directly to himself. His action was taken, in his own words, because parliamentary habits of delay and conflict had begun "to provoke spiritual collapse and national disunion." He said he assumed the duty of safeguarding the unity of the state at any cost, and proposed to "look for new working methods and blaze new trails."

Of the large number of new decrees which it was known King Alexander would promulgate, none was awaited with more impatience than this move to reorganize the national administration. The change in the title of the state is significant of the spirit of pacification and unification which the King aims to

make the keynote of his whole policy; the abolition of the system of small subdivisions (copied after the French administrative model) is conceived in the same way. He seems to have realized that although the Croat autonomists went much too far in proposing the division of the country "on historic lines" into seven large provinces or states (these to be represented at Belgrade by delegations empowered only to decide questions of foreign policy), nevertheless local autonomy ought to be granted in a great variety of matters. This being impossible through an "atomized" administration, he has now created entirely new machinery. Its success in meeting the King's three chief demands of efficiency, economy and national solidarity, and in satisfying the bulk of the

Jugoslav people as a means of safe-guarding both their local and their national interests, remains to be seen. But it is plainly a step on the road to decentralization and the fusion of the three chief elements of the state into a harmonious whole.

The population, area and capital cities of the nine banovines are as follows:

Banovine	*Capital*	*Population*	*Area in Sq. Kilometers*
Drava	Ljubljana	1,040,000	15,936
Sava	Zagreb	2,320,000	36,897
Vrbas	Banjaluka	850,000	20,558
Littoral	Split	800,000	19,417
Drina	Sarajevo	1,400,000	29,273
Zeta	Cetinje	740,000	32,322
Danube	Novi Sad	2,100,000	28,160
Morava	Nish	1,200,000	25,721
Vardar	Skoplje	1,405,000	39,566

The law of October 3 stipulated that the new arrangement should come into effect in two months. Subsequently the date was advanced and the bans assumed their functions on November 11.

THE PUBLICATION POLICY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

By Tyler Dennett

THE Department of State as a publisher is at obvious disadvantages as compared with other offices of the Government.

In the first place, most publications of the Department of State have the character of state documents of international significance. Usually they include communications which originate with other governments. These documents must be carefully printed without variation from the original text, and with every precaution for securing accuracy of translation where the original language is not English. It should be also a matter of pride to give dignity of appearance to the publications in which they appear together with the correspondence of the American Government, and carefully to avoid sloppy and careless editing or printing. To insure the desired accuracy it is necessary to read back to an original source. It not infrequently happens that original sources are unavailable, and it may be necessary to send halfway around the world for them. Compilation and editorial work under such conditions must necessarily be slow.

A second obstacle to rapid production is the necessity laid upon the Department of State by the rules of international courtesy not to publish documents which originate with another government without the express permission of that government. To be discourteous on an international scale is not only to be discourteous indeed but is also to forfeit international confidence. However, the securing of "permission to print" is often tedious, not necessarily because a foreign government is reluctant to give permission, but because such requests have to be handled in a routine fashion which requires time. As a matter of fact, the Department of State is meeting relatively little objection from other governments in its effort to supply the American public with information about foreign relations. In that respect all governments appear to realize that there is abroad in the world a new spirit.

The greatest obstacle, however, to successful publication by the Department of State is one least recognized by the public. The volume of demand for its publications is relatively small, so small, in fact, that the Department in the last fifty years has probably not published a single volume which had a sale sufficient to justify a commercial publisher in venturing to bring it out. For example, "Proceedings of the International Conference of the American States on Conciliation and Arbitration," Washington, 1929, cost for printing and binding nearly $8,000. To this must be added at least $2,500 for editorial work and proof reading. Even if "overhead" is not charged against the cost, it is apparent that this volume cost the Government in excess of $10,000. The edition was 1,400 copies. Although the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, has had the volume for sale for nearly five months at $1.60, a small fraction of the actual cost of production, he has sold at the time I write only 28 copies. Probably eventually he will dispose of all the two hundred copies which he has in stock, but his "turnover" on this particular publication

will be very slow, so slow that no commercial publisher would have been warranted in publishing the volume.

It is of importance for the public to understand the publishing policy of the United States Government, for only then can one understand the part which the Department of State shares in it. The cost of composition and of a first edition of any publication of the Government, except those which originate with Congress, has to be borne by some office other than the Government Printing Office. The Superintendent of Documents has a revolving fund with which he pays for his stock of government publications. He is charged for the cost of paper, press work and binding on the number of copies which he orders, and he pays for nothing else. Theoretically the presses stop for a moment, the originating office is charged with all costs of production up to that point, and the Superintendent of Documents pays only for the cost of the work after operations have been resumed. He is permitted to add ten percent to the cost of the edition which he has ordered and these terms determine the sales price to the public. With a limited fund at his disposal, the Superintendent of Documents must buy stock much as an ordinary bookseller would, with due regard to the sales demand. Nothing in his records warrants him in carrying a large stock of Department of State publications nor is he in a position to store large stocks of them, notwithstanding the fact that the demand for these publications, while not initially large, is fairly steady over a long period of years.

Let us choose as an illustration a fairly well known series of the publications of the Department. It is probable that, with the increasing interest in international affairs, five hundred complete sets of "Foreign Relations of the United States," a series which began in 1861, could be sold by the Superintendent of Documents in the next twenty-five years. And yet in the past twenty-five years probably no single volume in the entire set has sold to the extent of 500 copies. "Foreign Relations" is now out of print for all years prior to 1895, as well as for 1898–1905, 1914, 1915 and 1916; and it is understood that the volume for 1917 is also nearly sold out. It might be argued that the Superintendent of Documents ought to feel the obligation to keep complete sets of "Foreign Relations of the United States" in stock at all times. It has been pointed out that while the demand for publications of this sort is not large, it is important. However, it is questionable whether the importance is of such a character as to warrant the very large outlay of capital which would be required to reprint in an edition of 500 the volumes of "Foreign Relations" which are now out of print and carry them for the twenty-five or more years which would be necessary to work them off at prices which represent but a small fractional part of their cost of production.

It should also be recalled that through the office of the Superintendent of Documents there is distributed free to approximately five hundred libraries complete or partial sets of all congressional documents and in fact many other government publications. These libraries, many of which were selected in the early days of the Republic with reference to location and ability to care for the volumes, are called "Depository Libraries."

Quite clearly the United States Government should not go into the publishing business on a commercial basis, and, in fact, it never has. The present policy, by which the public is charged hardly more than a nominal price for govern-

ment publications, prevents much waste of governmental expenditures such as was common in other days. The nominal charge for government publications should be retained; probably it should be increased, for the public would value these publications more highly if it had to pay more for them. As for publications of the Department of State, it is likely that they will always be quickly out of print and the book-buyer will do well — and profitably — to buy early. The surest method of obtaining what is desired is to place with the Superintendent of Documents a deposit and a standing order. Only in this way is that office able to gauge the demand and order accordingly. I am informed that at the present moment, notwithstanding the vocal demands for publications of the Department of State, the Superintendent of Documents has only eighteen deposit accounts for all publications of the Department, and only forty-seven subscriptions for "Press Releases."

The publications of the Department of State fall into two categories, "serials" and "occasionals."

The serials are "Foreign Relations of the United States," "Treaty Series," "Proclamations," "Executive Orders," "Register of the Department of State," "Foreign Service List," "Diplomatic List," and to this list have recently been added "Press Releases" and "Bulletin of Treaty Information." A third new sub-series will be known as "Executive Agreement Series." It will contain the text of international acts, such as exchanges of notes, which hitherto have appeared in the "Treaty Series" and which have thus made the term "Treaty Series" a somewhat incorrect title. "Executive Agreement Series" will be serially numbered and will also bear a statement showing where it may be inserted into a file of the "Treaty Series" to provide an unbroken list of texts, chronologically arranged, of all international acts of the United States.

By occasional publications is meant such books and pamphlets as "Proceedings of the International Conference of American States on Conciliation and Arbitration," "Report of the Chairman, Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation, Bolivia and Paraguay" and "The American Foreign Service," all of which have been published within the last few months.

Beginning with October 1929 these publications, with the exception of "Treaty Series," which is already numbered, were brought within a single serially numbered series so that each new publication receives on the verso of the title page, or elsewhere, its appropriate serial number as a publication of the Department. Usually the publications which naturally fall into sub-series are also numbered serially on the title page. One now has a means, therefore, of knowing whether one has all of the preceding publications of the Department, or all of the preceding publications of a certain sub-series. Wherever the Department of State is in a position to assure the Superintendent of Documents of the approximate total number of pages for a year, subscription prices may be fixed. It is obvious, however, that many publications, often those most desired, are in the "occasional" class and their size or frequency cannot be foreseen. The problem of the distribution of publications of the Department of State is inextricably knit with the larger problem of the sale and distribution of all Government publications. This is largely a matter of law, and doubtless the Public Printer, the Joint Committee on Printing, and Congress would listen sympathetically to any constructive suggestions which can be made for the

improvement of the methods by which Government publications are sold and distributed.

The two publication projects of the Department of State which have recently claimed the most public interest are the preparation of a new and definitive edition of the "Treaties and other International Acts of the United States" and the clearing up of the arrears in the publication of "Foreign Relations of the United States," the last published volume of which is for the year 1917.

The appropriation act for the Department of State for the current fiscal year authorized the creation of the position of Treaty Editor, and this was offered to David Hunter Miller, well known as an international lawyer and scholar. Mr. Miller assumed his duties on October 1, 1929, and his work is well under way. Strangely enough, it does not appear that any edition of the treaties and agreements of the United States has ever been published where precautions were uniformly taken to read back to original texts and to check translations, dates and such other facts as are essential to the perfection of a treaty text publication. Great precautions are now being taken to provide texts so accurate and complete that the pages can be plated and held available for all time to come. The original language of the authorized text of the treaty will always be included; and where that text is not English it will of course be accompanied by a translation. The publication of the texts of treaties will be followed by a volume of notes giving briefly the diplomatic, legislative and judicial history of the document, with appropriate citations to related Congressional documents and judicial decisions. In view of the fact that the treaty texts are now difficult to obtain, effort is being concentrated on the preparation of the earlier volumes of this series. Mr. Miller's notes will be postponed until after the texts have been published and made available.

The publication of diplomatic correspondence of the United States for recent years has been subjected to many annoying delays but it is believed that most of the obstacles are now cleared away and that the work can go forward rapidly. Unquestionably, new problems are just over the horizon and will soon have to be met. Will it be possible, for example, for the Department of State to publish a record of the Paris Peace Conference which will be sufficiently adequate to warrant publication at all? The decision of this question rests in part with other participating governments whose assent would have to be obtained before many of the most important documents could be published.

Immediately following the World War the diplomatic correspondence of the United States increased in direct ratio to the increase in the complexity and extent of the international interests of the American Government. Publication for the post-war years on the scale on which publication for the pre-war years was carried on would involve a great increase in the size of the volumes for any single year. The compression of documentation will become one of the most perplexing problems. It is even possible that some further subdivision of the correspondence will have to be made, perhaps by segregating correspondence with certain political areas as, for example, the Far East. It seems quite possible that "Foreign Relations" for 1929 will comprise from four to six volumes, each of 500 pages and each devoted either to a political area or to a series of topics. Such suggestions are of course speculative but they raise questions which those

who use these volumes might profitably discuss. The Department of State would be interested to have the views of such persons.

It may be fairly claimed that the Department of State now has, with reference not only to the publication of its correspondence but also to the use of its archives, the most liberal policy of any government in the world. This is in obvious accord with the spirit of the times. It should be repeated, however, that in carrying forward this program the American Government is meeting with an extremely gratifying degree of coöperation from other governments. More and more the foreign offices of the world are coming to realize that a public which is enlightened and intelligent about international relations is an asset to those upon whom are placed the special responsibilities for the conduct of foreign relations.

SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By William L. Langer

NOTE—FOREIGN AFFAIRS will supply its readers, *post free*, with any book published in the United States, at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, accompanied by check or money order, to Book Service, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 25 West 43rd Street, New York City.

General International Relations

THE GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL THOUGHT. By F. MELIAN STAWELL. London: Butterworth, 1929, 250 pp. 2/6.

A stimulating introductory survey, in the *Home University Library* series.

DIE STAATENVERBINDUNGEN. By JOSEF L. KUNZ. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1929, 818 pp. M. 45.

A valuable treatment of international combinations, reprinted from the *Handbuch des Voelkerrechts*.

LE RÔLE DU CONSEIL DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS DANS LE RÈGLEMENT DES DIFFÉRENDS INTERNATIONAUX. By A. H. PHILIPSE. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1929, 285 pp.

An unusually penetrating and original discussion of the part of the Council in the settlement of international disputes, by an eminent Dutch jurist.

LES ATTRIBUTIONS COMMUNES ET LES RAPPORTS DU CONSEIL ET DE L'ASSEMBLÉE DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS. By MILENKO MILITCH. Paris: Derre, 1929, 316 pp.

A doctoral dissertation setting forth the lack of system in the division of power and in the relations between the Council and the Assembly of the League.

LES PRISONNIERS DE GUERRE. By GEORGES CAHEN SALVADOR. Paris: Payot, 1929, 320 pp. Fr. 25.

An authoritative treatment of the theory and practice followed during the war in regard to prisoners, written by the chief of the bureau of prisoners at the French war office.

PACIFISM IN THE MODERN WORLD. EDITED BY DEVERE ALLEN. New York: Doubleday Doran, 1929, 296 pp. $2.00.

A series of essays by Tagore, J. H. Holmes, Kirby Page and others, in defense of the pacifist attitude.

THE RED NAPOLEON. By FLOYD GIBBONS. New York: Cape and Smith, 1929, 475 pp. $2.50.

A story of "the great war of 1941," in which white civilization is made to depend for defense on the American navy.

International Relations of the United States

THE IMPERIAL DOLLAR. By HIRAM MOTHERWELL. New York: Brentano, 1929, 310 pp. $3.50.

A well-known foreign correspondent sketches in broad lines the development of American imperialism, and sets forth the fundamental conditions of its growth. For him the imperial dollar is a reality which has to be dealt with as a hard cold fact. Uncritical enthusiasm as well as fanatical condemnation will not help the situation. The

American empire is the ineluctible result of various factors governing the evolution of the United States, combined with a peculiar world situation arising from the war. The American conquest of the world, economically speaking, is well-nigh irresistible, and is not yet complete. The United States will continue to export capital, and consequently will receive an ever increasing tribute from abroad. How this tribute will be used in the future is one of the crucial questions which the writer leaves to the gods. On the whole this is a well-informed and readable discussion of some of the broadest aspects of present-day international relations.

EXECUTIVE AGENTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS. By Henry M. Wriston. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1929, 886 pp. $5.00.

A monumental treatise on one of the key problems of American foreign policy. The author attacks the knotty question of the relative power of the executive and the Senate in the conduct of international business, a question which has given increasing trouble since the emergence of the United States as a world power, and one which underlay the collapse of Wilson's position. The reader will find here an examination of the various phases of the problem from the days of the framers of the constitution onward, an examination based on great erudition and sound judgment. He will hardly be able to escape the conclusion that in this matter too the foresight of the fathers was not great enough to meet undreamed-of developments.

PAN AMERICAN PEACE PLANS. By Charles E. Hughes. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929, 68 pp. $1.00.

The former Secretary of State reviews the accomplishments of the Pan-American Conference at Havana.

I WAS SENT TO ATHENS. By Henry Morgenthau. New York: Doubleday Doran, 1929, 327 pp. $4.00.

The first chairman of the League's commission for the settlement of the Greek refugees tells in detail the story of his difficult task and of his dealings with the European governments and the League.

WHEN THE U-BOATS CAME TO AMERICA. By William B. Clark. Boston: Little, Brown, 1929, 371 pp. $3.00.

The surprising story of German submarine activities on the American coast, dispassionately told.

IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN LOST. By Thomas C. Lonergan. New York: Putnam, 1929, 340 pp. $3.50.

An account of the efforts made by the French and English to incorporate the A. E. F. with the other forces, by an officer of the American general staff.

CRÍMENES DEL IMPERIALISMO NORTEAMERICANO. By Horacio Blanco Fombona. Mexico: Churubusco, 1929, 144 pp. Pes. 1.50.

The title adequately describes this newest Latin American indictment of Yankee imperialism.

Western Europe

DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES FRANÇAIS RÉLATIFS AUX ORIGINES DE LA GUERRE DE 1914. Third series, Volume I. Paris: Costes, 1929, 659 pp. Fr. 60.

A large group of French scholars has been entrusted by the French Government with the work of publishing the important documents in the French archives dealing with the period from 1871–1914. In order to facilitate the progress of this huge work it has been decided to publish simultaneously three series, beginning respectively with the years 1871, 1900 and 1911. The present volume is the first to appear, and covers the period from November 4, 1911, to February 7, 1912, that is, from the signa-

ture of the Franco-German Moroccan agreement to the departure of the Haldane Mission to Berlin. The entire work, it is expected, will fill fifty volumes, and some idea of the fullness can be gained from this first volume, which contains over six hundred documents, more than twice as many as are devoted to the same period in the German collection. The arrangement is admirable in every respect, for the obvious objections to the purely chronological arrangement that has been chosen are met by the inclusion of a topical guide. On the whole, however, the material is disappointing. The lack of marginal notes robs these documents of the intimate touch that is found in the German and English collections, and so much is already known from the existing sources that the reader will look in vain for revelations of major value. Perhaps the most interesting documents in this particular volume are those which deal with the effort of the Russians to open the Straits to their warships in the last months of 1911, an incident which is now pretty much cleared up. The rest of the material serves chiefly as an introduction to the complicated Balkan developments of 1912.

HISTOIRE DIPLOMATIQUE DE L'EUROPE, 1871–1914. Edited by Henri Hauser. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1929, 480 pp. Fr. 50.

Volume I of a pretentious coöperative history, with contributions by such men as Ancel, Cahen, Guyot and Renouvin.

DIE VORGESCHICHTE DES WELTKRIEGES. VOLUME V. DEUTSCHLAND AUF DEN HAAGER FRIEDENSKONFERENZEN. Edited by Georg Gradnauer and Rudolf Breitscheid. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1929, two volumes, M. 36.

The testimony of experts before the investigating commission of the German legislature, which confirms the German view that German intentions at the Hague conferences were good, but that the German tactics were mistaken and suspicious looking.

MOSG ARMII. By B. Shaposhnikov. Moscow: Gosizdat, 1929, three volumes.

A Russian staff officer's detailed and well-informed study of the work and influences of the general staffs of the various countries during the past century. Since the writer has turned Bolshevik, the reader will not be surprised to find in the third volume a detailed account of the period preceding the World War, in which the Russian staff and government is given merciless condemnation. Students of war origins will not be able to ignore this voluminous monograph, but they will probably view with a very critical eye what is said of the activities carried on behind the scenes in St. Petersburg in the fatal month of July.

JULY 1914. By Emil Ludwig. London: Putnam, 1929, 10/6.

The author's name will undoubtedly make this for the moment the most popular and most widely read account of the outbreak of the Great War. In that case, so much the worse for the public. For this book, with all its brilliant writing, can hardly be taken seriously as history. It has quite evidently been written without reference to some of the most important source material, and its conclusions will not stand up under the criticism of well-informed students. In attributing the responsibility to a few dozen incapable and misled statesmen and in white-washing the general population the author facilitates his own task and at the same time satisfies the self-righteousness of the proverbial man in the street.

KRIEGSSCHULDLÜGE UND KRIEGSSCHULDLÜGNER. By Ernst Graf Reventlow. Munich: Lehmann, 1929, 258 pp. M. 4.50.

An extreme statement of the German thesis, by a well-known controversialist.

MIROVAIA VOINA. By V. N. Domanevski. Paris: Rosty, 1929, 83 pp.

The first part of a general survey of the war, dealing with the campaigns of 1914.

PRÉCIS D'HISTOIRE DE LA GUERRE NAVALE. By Adolphe Laurens. Paris: Payot, 1929, Fr. 20.

An excellent, concise survey of the naval war, by the chief of the historical section of the French naval staff.

DIE SEESTRATEGIE DES WELTKRIEGES. By Wolfgang Wegener. Berlin: Mittler, 1929, 86 pp. M. 3.

In spite of its brevity, this is a most stimulating and pregnant essay on naval strategy, approaching the problem from the German side.

HISTOIRE DU BLOCUS NAVAL. By Louis Guichard. Paris: Payot, 1929, 240 pp.

An outstanding book, characterized by scholarliness and detachment as well as by breadth of view. The author, basing his account in part upon unpublished material from the French archives, takes up not only the history of the blockade of Germany, but the story of the commercial war in its broadest sense. The reader will find here a careful and dispassionate study of the effects of the blockade upon neutral powers, as well as upon the armies and population of the enemy states. The conflict between the English policy of making agreements with neutral traders and the French desire to establish a legal blockade is forcefully brought out, and other aspects of the unprecedented situation are set in high relief.

CON L'ESERCITO ITALIANO NELL' ORIENTE BALCANICO. By Mario Apicella. Milan: Pro Oriente, 1928, 224 pp.

The reminiscences of an Italian journalist, who served with the army in the Orient from 1916–1919.

EUROPAS TILLFRISKNANDE. By Rütger Essen. Stockholm, 1929, 330 pp. Kr. 9.50.

An optimistic survey of some important political problems of Europe, with special reference to the Baltic States.

CAPS AND CROWNS OF EUROPE. By Thomas Guerin. New York: Carrier, 1929, 290 pp. $3.50.

Intimate pictures of European rulers and statesmen by a Canadian writer.

FOCH: MY CONVERSATIONS WITH THE MARSHAL. By Raymond Recouly. New York: Appleton, 1929, 332 pp. $3.00.

Recouly seems to have been an unexcelled listener, and the reader will find here much that is interesting in regard to the Rhine policy advocated by Foch and to his conflict with Clemenceau.

TREASON AND TRAGEDY. By George Adam. London: Cape, 1929, 254 pp. 10/6.

Few episodes can exceed in interest the famous trials of Caillaux, Almeyreda and the others who were "traitors" in the war period.

DIE AUSWÄRTIGE HANDELSPOLITIK FRANKREICHS NACH DEM KRIEGE. By Max Högel. Jena: Fischer, 1929, 124 pp. M. 8.

A handy summary account of the evolution of post-war industry in France and the involutions of the French tariff.

LE RÈGLEMENT DES DETTES INTERALLIÉES ET LE PLAN DAWES. By J. M. Nonu. Paris: Blanchard, 1929, 630 pp. Fr. 100.

Volume I of a monumental, exhaustive treatise.

DIVORCE DE L'ALSACE? By Georges Roux. Paris: La Nouvelle Revue Française, 1929, 116 pp. Fr. 6.

A dispassionate exposition of the incongruity of trying to incorporate a particularistic province in a rigidly centralized state. The solution lies in the revision of current French ideas as to the state.

LA QUESTION BRETONNE DANS SON CADRE EUROPÉEN. By Maurice Duhamel. Paris: Delpeuch, 1929, 235 pp. Fr. 12.

The spectre of self-expression raises its head even in France. Duhamel also sees the need for some sort of federalism.

ALBERT: KING OF THE BELGIANS. By Evelyn Graham. New York: Dodd Mead, 1929, 314 pp. $5.00.

As good a biography of the king as can be expected at the present time.

LA BELGIQUE ET LA GUERRE MONDIALE. By Henri Pirenne. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929. $1.25.

A volume of the Carnegie series, in which the great Belgian historian reviews the trials and tribulations of his native land.

PUBLIC RELATIONS OF THE COMMISSION FOR RELIEF IN BELGIUM. By George I. Gay. Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1929, two volumes. $10.00.

A collection of documents bearing on the great enterprise.

VERFALL UND WIEDERAUFRICHTUNG DER BELGISCHEN WÄHRUNG NACH DEM WELTKRIEGE. By Siegfried Marquardt. Berlin: Ebering, 1929, 106 pp. M. 6.

A careful monographic study of Belgium's post-war currency problem.

LOS VALORES HISTÓRICOS EN LA DICTADURA ESPAÑOLA. By José Pemartin. Santander: Arte y Ciencia, 1928, 656 pp. Pes. 6.

A suggestive study of the dictatorship in its larger historical setting.

D'ANNUNZIO POLITICO. By Nino Daniele. São Paulo: Tisi, 1929, 176 pp.

A very lively and interesting account of the preparation of the Fiume expedition, by one closely associated with the leader.

ANDANTE MOSSO. By Roberto Farinacci. Milan: Mondadori, 1929, L. 15.

A reprint of articles from the *Cremona Nuova* covering the stormy and crucial period from June 1924 to March 1925.

LES TRANSFORMATIONS RÉCENTES DU DROIT PUBLIC ITALIEN. By Silvio Trentin. Paris: Giard, 1929, 692 pp. Fr. 100.

Though an exile from his native land, the former Italian professor and deputy succeeds in keeping his writings free from recriminations. The present volume is one of the few constitutional histories of Fascism written by a competent authority. Remembering that the constitution of 1848 is technically still in force, the author examines first the pre-war system and its functioning, but the larger part of the volume is taken up with a careful study of the Fascist régime in its relations to the preceding constitutional system. The student will find in this book much valuable information and much close reasoning.

MAKING FASCISTS. By Herbert W. Schneider and Shepard B. Clough. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1929, 226 pp. $3.00.

The high standard of Schneider's earlier book is maintained in this informative volume, which is based not only upon extensive research in the literature of Fascism, but upon direct experience and innumerable contacts.

IL VALORE ECONOMICA DELLE COLONIE ITALIANE. Trieste: La Vedetta Italiana, 1928, 213 pp. L. 11.

A series of authoritative lectures delivered at the *Associazione Coloniale Triestina* in 1926.

LA POSIZIONE GIURIDICA DELLA SANTA SEDE NEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE. By G. Trezzi. Rome: Desclée, 1929, 113 pp. L. 10.

The international aspect of the recent settlement, with the texts of the treaty and the concordat.

THE TREATY OF THE LATERAN. By Benedict Williamson. London: Burns, Oates, 1929, 102 pp. 3/6.

A competent Catholic statement of the antecedents and negotiation of the agreement, with the pertinent documents.

ERZHERZOG FRANZ FERDINANDS WIRKEN UND WOLLEN. By Leopold von Chlumecky. Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1929, 378 pp. M. 8.

This study of the Archduke, written by one who was closely associated with him, is the best that has been published.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE HABSBURG MONARCHY. By Oscar Jászi. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1929, 512 pp. $3.00.

In the pre-war system of Europe the question of the Hapsburg Empire was hardly less complicated or less pressing than the so-called Eastern Question, though somehow it never aroused the same general interest. As it affected the whole political organization of the Danubian Basin it bore directly upon the international alignment of the powers and constituted a great danger to peace so long as a settlement was not reached. During the last years a number of very good books have appeared which have described the effect of the war on the Dual Monarchy, the collapse of the Hapsburg Empire and the emergence of the new succession states. These books have done much to elucidate the problem, especially as it touched the general question of national self-determination. The present book, however, deals with the background rather than with post-war developments. It is a really excellent piece of work, which will open up many new aspects of the question for the English and American reader. Jászi had distinguished himself before the war by his penetrating and enlightened writings on the Hapsburg problem, and served as Minister of National Minorities in the ill-fated Karolyi cabinet of 1919. In this book he discusses the historical development of the question, laying stress not only upon the racial aspect, but upon the potent economic and psychological factors. No student of Central European affairs should fail to read the book, which shows unusual grasp and exceptional breadth of view. The extensive bibliography, too, should prove a valuable aid to further study.

SELF-DETERMINATION FOR AUSTRIA. By Friedrich F. G. Kleinwaechter. London: Allen and Unwin, 1929, 74 pp. 3/6.

A very forceful presentation of the problem of the *Anschluss*, which the author considers the only feasible solution of the Austrian dilemma.

DIE URSACHEN DES ZUSAMMENBRUCHES IM JAHRE 1918. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1929, 238 pp.

Volume XII of this important collection of testimony before the Reichstag investigating committee deals at length with German annexationist tendencies during the war.

GRAF BROCKDORF-RANTZAU. By Edgar Stern-Rubarth. Berlin: Hobbing, 1929, 174 pp. M. 6.

An admirable and important biography, written by an intimate friend of the late German diplomat who was first foreign minister of the German Republic and served from 1922–1928 as ambassador to Russia.

VOLK UND REICH DER DEUTSCHEN. Edited by Bernhard Harms. Berlin: Hobbing, 1929, three volumes, M. 45.

One of the finest coöperative descriptive works the reviewer has ever seen. The three volumes contain fifty-eight essays written by the leading German authorities and dealing with all phases of the political, economic, social and intellectual activities of the new republic.

ZEHN JAHRE VERSAILLES. Edited by Heinrich Schnee and Hans Draeger. Berlin: Brückenverlag, 1929, two volumes, M. 25.

Another collection of essays by prominent Germans, dealing with the economic and political results of the treaty, as well as with the arguments in favor of revision. An important work.

THE NEW GERMAN REPUBLIC. By Elmer Luehr. New York: Minton, Balch, 1929, 442 pp. $5.00.

An able review of the development of the German Republic from the revolution to the present time.

THE RECOVERY OF GERMANY. By James W. Angell. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929, 444 pp. $4.00.

This volume, published under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations, is unquestionably the best single treatment in English dealing with the economic history and prospects of the German Republic. In view of the enormous American investments in Germany and the close inter-relationships of modern economic life, the importance of the subject need not be stressed. Professor Angell is thoroughly conversant with the tremendous amount of professional literature and with the relevant statistical material, and has secured further information through prolonged personal investigation of conditions on the spot. The book traces at some length the history of Germany's collapse, the beginning of reconstruction under the Dawes Plan and the general rehabilitation since 1924. Of particular interest is the author's consideration of the prospect for the future, in industry, trade, labor and finance.

DER DEUTSCHE UND DER FRANZÖSISCHE REICHSWIRTSCHAFTSRAT. By Friedrich Glum. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1929, 188 pp. M. 9.

A scholarly, but strictly legal study of the German and French economic councils, with an excellent collection of relevant documents.

PROBLEME DES DEUTSCHEN WESTENS. Edited by Friedrich Metz. Berlin: Hobbing, 1928, 160 pp.

A series of essays by eminent German historians discussing Rhine policies and the problems of the Saar, Eupen-Malmedy and Luxemburg.

DAS SAARGEBIET. Edited by Dr. Kloevekorn. Saarbrücken, 1929, 584 pp.

The best descriptive and statistical work on the Saar area, illustrated with admirable maps.

DER LEIDENSWEG DES OBERSCHLESISCHEN VOLKES. By Heinrich O. Olbrich. Breslau: Priebatsch, 1929, 308 pp.

One of the best accounts of the crucial years from 1919–1922 in Upper Silesia, based upon all available sources.

TRIBUTZAHLUNG UND AUSFUHRKRAFT. By Ernst Schultze. Leipzig: Deutsche Wissenschaftliche Buchhandlung, 1929, 200 pp. M. 7.80.

The author examines the old problem of transfer, and concludes that payment in goods is alone possible.

DEUTSCHLANDS REPARATIONSLASTEN. By Bernhard Spangenberg. Dresden: Limpert, 1929, 110 pp. M. 2.20.

A good popular survey of the provisions of the treaty, the Dawes Plan and the Young Plan.

YOUNG PLAN ODER DAWES PLAN? By Friedrich Raab. Berlin: Hobbing, 1929, 246 pp. M. 5.60.

A careful analysis and comparison of the two plans, from the German viewpoint. The author believes the Young Plan to be the lesser of the two evils.

DANMARK UNDER DEN STORE KRIG. By Einar Cohn. Copenhagen: Gad, 1928, 333 pp.

A general economic study of the effects of the World War upon Denmark.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE RECENT FOREIGN POLICY OF SWEDEN. By Eric C. Bellquist. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1929, 127 pp.

Apart from a discussion of the Aaland Islands Question, the book is concerned chiefly with a scholarly presentation of Sweden's activities in the League of Nations.

Eastern Europe

POLCHA, ROSSIA I S. S. S. R. By V. P. Drouin. Moscow: Gosizdat, 1928, 219 pp.

The relations between Russia and Poland, historically considered.

DAS PROBLEM DER TERRITORIALKONFLIKTE. By R. Flaes. Amsterdam: Paris, 1929, 352 pp. M. 14.50.

This is really a survey of the territorial history of Poland, which is taken as the basis for a discussion of ways and means of settling territorial conflicts in general.

L'ANNÉE 1920. By Joseph Pilsudski. Paris: Renaissance du Livre, 1929, 332 pp. Fr. 30.

Fundamental for a study of the Russian-Polish conflict.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION. By Baron Alexander Meyendorff. New York: Holt, 1929, 212 pp. $2.50.

A series of lectures delivered at Brown University by the former vice-president of the Duma.

MÉMOIRES DU GÉNÉRAL BRUSSILOV. Paris: Hachette, 1929, Fr. 15.

An important contribution to the history of the World War, by the commander on the southwest front. The treatment of the Galician offensive of 1916 is especially noteworthy.

PODGOTOVKA PROMYCHLENNOSTI K VOINIE. By G. Chigalin. Moscow: Gosizdat, 1928, 228 pp.

A study of the mobilization of industry during the war, with special reference to Russia.

L'INVASION MOSCOVITE. By Georges Popoff. Paris: Plon, 1929, 248 pp. Fr. 12.

A thrilling account of five months under Bolshevik rule in an unnamed Baltic city.

LA VIE ORGUEILLEUSE DE TROTSKY. By Pierre Fervacque. Paris: Fasquelle, 1929, 190 pp. Fr. 12.

Trotsky as the incarnation of the spirit of destruction. An inadequate sketch based upon non-Russian sources.

SOVIET RULE IN RUSSIA. By Walter R. Batsell. New York: Macmillan, 1929, 866 pp. $6.00.

An elaborate study of the theory and practice of Soviet Government, which makes available to English readers a large mass of hitherto untranslated documentary material.

THE SOVIET UNION AND PEACE. New York: International Publishers, 1929, 291 pp. $2.25.

A collection of lively and argumentative decrees, appeals, declarations and conventions designed to show the consistent and vigorous activity of the Soviet Government in the interests of peace and disarmament.

IN THE LAND OF COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP. By Anatole V. Baikaloff. London: Cape, 1929, 286 pp. 7/6.

Primarily a study of labor and social conditions in Russia.

IN THE CLUTCHES OF THE TCHEKA. By Boris Cederholm. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1929, 350 pp. $4.00.

The appalling adventures of a foreign trade agent who fell into the hands of the Cheka in 1923.

HUMANITY UPROOTED. By Maurice Hindus. New York: Cape and Smith, 1929, 369 pp. $3.50.

The author, who understands the Russian mentality better than most writers on Russia, writes of the Russian scene from wide experience, with sympathy and sweet reasonableness.

KURZE ZUSAMMENSTELLUNG ÜBER DIE RUSSISCHE ARMEE. By A. N. Iwanow. Berlin: Eisenschmidt, 1929, 135 pp. M. 4.50.

A good brief survey of Russia's armed forces.

ISTORIA EKONOMICHESKOGO RAZVITIA S. S. S. R. By S. P. Miliutin. Moscow: Gosizdat, 1928, 491 pp.

One of the best accounts of the economic development of Russia from 1917–1927.

THE SOVIET UNION LOOKS AHEAD. New York: Liveright, 1929, 275 pp. $2.50.

A very welcome English translation of the great five-year plan of economic development recently adopted by the Soviet Government.

DER KAMPF UM UND GEGEN DAS RUSSISCHE ERDÖL. By Wilhelm Mautner. Vienna: Manz, 1929, 261 pp. M. 7.50.

An important chapter in the story of the world struggle for oil.

WHERE THE EAST BEGINS. By Hamilton Fish Armstrong. New York: Harper, 1929, 139 pp. $3.00.

The tangled and confused politics of the Balkan states can hardly be satisfactorily followed from the reports of the daily press or from the periodical literature. General books which set forth the principal factors and leading motives in Balkan affairs will, therefore, always be welcome to the student. On this side of the water there is probably no one better fitted to supply an occasional stock-taking than the writer of the present volume, who has made a study of this phase of international affairs and has constantly renewed his contacts with persons and events in the Balkan scene during the past decade. He discusses the key problems of the various states in a sympathetic and understanding way, with particular emphasis on the new dictatorship in Jugoslavia, the return of Venizelos in Greece, the peasant régime in Rumania, and the Albanian problem in its international aspects. The final chapter, which surveys the broad trend in Balkan affairs since the peace treaties, cannot be too highly recommended to the student of Near Eastern affairs.

THE LITTLE ENTENTE. By Robert Machray. London: Allen and Unwin, 1929, 394 pp. 12/6.

The best and most up-to-date account of the origins and development of the Little Entente as well as of its position in general European politics.

LA ROUMANIE ET LA RÉPARATION DES DOMMAGES DE GUERRE. By Sterian. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1929, 142 pp. Fr. 20.

A technical discussion of the reconstruction problem.

DIE RUMÄNISCHE NATIONALBANK. By Xenophon Netta. Leipzig: Deichert, 1929, 241 pp. M. 12.

A dissertation which studies the organization and activity of the bank in the general setting of Rumanian economic life.

BULGARISCHE WIRTSCHAFTGESCHICHTE. By Ivan Sakazov. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1929, 294 pp.

A valuable pioneer work in a field of which comparatively little is known.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE LETTERS AND FRIENDSHIPS OF SIR CECIL SPRING-RICE. By Stephen Gwynn. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1929, two volumes, $12.50.

The important part played by Spring-Rice during the period of the Russian-Japanese War has been known for some time from the correspondence of Roosevelt and from other sources. That he was not only a charming person, but a keen observer and outstanding statesman becomes more evident yet from a perusal of these volumes. In addition to further information on Roosevelt's mediation in the Russian-Japanese War, the reader will find here excellent chapters dealing with conditions in Germany in the late nineties and in Russia in the succeeding years. But of the greatest importance are the sections dealing with Spring-Rice's ambassadorship to the United States from 1913–1917, which are based upon the extensive use of unpublished material. These years covered the critical period of American neutrality and were filled with the tension resulting from British interference with American trade. There can be no doubt that the moderating influence of the English ambassador to Washington was quite as important as the influence of Page in preventing a conflict. These volumes are as interesting and fascinating for the student of American foreign relations as to the reader interested in the history of British foreign policy.

KING GEORGE V. By Sir George Arthur. London: Cape, 1929, 360 pp. 10/.

The king as a great ruler, in a rather uneven and very subjective biographical essay.

TRAVELS AND RECOLLECTIONS. By the Rt. Hon. Noel Buxton. London: Allen and Unwin, 1929, 224 pp. 10/.

These reminiscences deal with travels all the way from Japan to Africa, but are of particular importance for the pre-war history of the Balkans, for Buxton and the Balkan Committee were powerful influences in shaping English opinion and policies.

TIMES OF STRESS. By Colonel Lionel James. London: Murray, 1929, 12/.

Amusing and instructive memoirs of the London *Times* war correspondent during the years 1905–1913.

THE LIFE OF LORD FISHER OF KILVERSTONE. By Admiral Sir R. H. Bacon. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1929, two volumes, 42/.

The authoritative biography of Fisher, based upon his correspondence, but written in a highly eulogistic and polemical vein.

LORD HAIG. By Sir George Arthur. London: Heinemann, 1929, 164 pp. 2/6.

A good brief sketch, by the biographer of Kitchener.

MEMORIES OF FOUR FRONTS. By Lieutenant-General Sir William Marshall. London: Benn, 1929, 340 pp. 21/.

The recollections of the former commander in Mesopotamia, including interesting reflections on the Gallipoli campaign.

BRITISH STRATEGY. By Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice. London: Constable, 1929, 243 pp. 10/.

Lectures on the fundamentals of strategy, with copious examples drawn from the World War.

JAMES RAMSAY MACDONALD. LABOR'S MAN OF DESTINY. By H. H. Tiltman. New York: Stokes, 1929, 466 pp. $5.00.

Hardly a profound contribution, but a fair account of MacDonald's career.

THE APOLOGIA OF AN IMPERIALIST. By W. A. S. Hewins. London: Constable, 1929, two volumes, 42/.

Contains much information of value on the history of imperial policy, with special reference to the question of tariffs.

THE MAN BEHIND THE SCENES. THE CAREER OF SIR BASIL ZAHAROFF. By Richard Lewinsohn. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1929, 216 pp. $3.00.

The financial editor of the *Vossische Zeitung* says about all that can be said of the mysterious and uncommunicative armament king.

POLITICAL BRITAIN. Edited by Michael Farbman. London: Routledge, 1919, 194 pp. 5/.

A useful compendium of parties, policies and politicians.

L'ANGLETERRE NOUVELLE. By Charles Bastide. Paris: Alcan, 1929, 236 pp. Fr. 15.

A general survey of English politics and society, of the type that has become fashionable.

ANGLO-FRANZOUSKOE SOPERNICHESTVO, 1918–1927. By L. Ivanov. Moscow: Gosizdat, 1928, 164 pp.

The Anglo-French economic rivalry viewed as a typically capitalistic phenomenon.

THE PRESENT JUDICIAL STATUS OF THE BRITISH DOMINIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. By P. J. Noel Baker. London: Longmans, 1929, 422 pp. 21/.

One of the best and most lucid treatments of the problem.

EMPIRE GOVERNMENT. By Manfred Nathan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929, 256 pp. $3.00.

A scholarly outline of the British imperial system.

LE STATUT DE L'ÉTAT LIBRE D'IRLANDE. By Guillaume Faucon. Paris, 1929, 252 pp.

A competent study, dealing primarily with the international position of the Irish Free State.

GENERAL LOUIS BOTHA. By F. V. Engelenburg. London: Harrap, 1929, 352 pp. 15/.

A somewhat too journalistic series of essays on various aspects of Botha's career.

AFTER MOTHER INDIA. By Harry H. Field. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1929, 339 pp. $3.50.

An examination of the leading criticisms of Miss Mayo's book, followed by a reassertion of her argument.

THE DILEMMA IN INDIA. By Sir Reginald Craddock. London: Constable, 1929, 380 pp. 15/.

An official long in the Indian service reviews the reforms of the past period and analyzes their effect upon the administrative system.

The Near East

A HISTORY OF NATIONALISM IN THE EAST. By Hans Kohn. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1929, 476 pp. $7.00.

The German edition of this book was noted a few years ago, but it is of sufficient importance to warrant a special note on this very welcome English edition. Kohn has written one of the few really outstanding books on the recent developments in the Near East and India. His work is based throughout on sound knowledge of the history and literature of this area and is buttressed with an extensive bibliography which is almost unique in this field. The book is not properly speaking historical, but aims to set forth the origins of the national movement and to explain the various factors that went into its making. The discussion of the position of the Great Powers, like Great Britain and Russia, is especially illuminating, and is presented with great detachment. This is

more than a piece of ephemeral political writing, and is a book that should be at the elbow of every student of Near Eastern affairs.

MUSTAPHA KEMAL OU L'ORIENT EN MARCHE. By Paul Gentizon. Paris: Bossard, 1929.

A well-known French publicist, who has been a resident in the Near East for years, traces the whole Turkish revival, which, he believes, is profound and genuine.

BODEN UND SIEDLUNG IN PALÄSTINA. By Abraham Granovsky. Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1929, 206 pp. M. 3.

A book well worth reading, in view of the recent troubles in Palestine.

ON THE ROAD TO BAGDAD. By Lieutenant-Colonel F. S. Brereton. London: Blackie, 1929, 384 pp. 3/6.

Travel impressions of a keen observer.

L'EMPIRE ARABE D'IBN SÉOUD. By Jeanne Broucke. Brussels: Falk, 1929, 89 pp.

Really a scholarly sketch of the history of the Wahabit movement before and during the war.

Africa

DIE REVISION DER KOLONIALMETHODEN IN AFRIKA. By Walter Hagemann. Münster: Aschendorff, 1929, 96 pp. M. 3.40.

The author foresees a great future for Black Africa, though he recognizes the continued necessity for White guidance and machinery.

LA POLITIQUE EXTÉRIEURE DU CONGO BELGE. By Louis Habran. Brussels: Weverbergh, 1928.

A concise history of the Congo question from the beginning to the present time.

The Far East

RED STAR IN SAMARKAND. By Anna Louise Strong. New York: Coward McCann, 1929, 329 pp. $3.50.

One of our most persistent travellers gives an unvarnished picture of Central Asia under communist rule.

EMINENT ASIANS. By Upton Close. New York: Appleton, 1929, 510 pp. $5.00.

The author of "The Revolt of Asia" draws vivid portraits of Sun Yat Sen, Yamagata, Ito, Mustapha Kemal, Stalin, and Gandhi.

THE NATIONALIST PROGRAM FOR CHINA. By Chao-Chu Wu. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929, 116 pp. $1.50.

An authoritative presentation of the nationalist program, by the Chinese minister to the United States.

CHINA: A NEW ASPECT. By H. Stringer. London: Witherby, 1929, 240 pp. 12/6.

A former official of the Chinese Railway service approaches the Chinese problem not from the standpoint of personal rivalries and antagonisms, but from the practical side of developing communications.

LE REVEIL NATIONAL DE LA CHINE. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1929, 240 pp. Fr. 15.

A series of essays written by former students of the *École Libre des Sciences Politiques*.

THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF MANCHURIA. By C. Walter Young. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1929, 307 pp. $3.50.

A book published under the auspices of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and a basic work for all students of Far Eastern affairs. Young analyzes and summarizes all the important agreements and negotiations between the Great Powers as they touched Manchuria for the period from 1895 to the present and indicates briefly their importance. The tremendous urgency of the problem and its endless complexity comes out clearly enough from the documentary material itself, and the writer is to be congratulated upon the skill with which he has mastered the wealth of the source papers. For the student the book should do much to clarify obscure points, and to furnish a reliable and exhaustive guide to past negotiations and agreements dealing with the problem.

A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF DIPLOMATIC EVENTS IN MANCHURIA. By Sir Harold Parlett. New York: Oxford University Press, 1929, 96 pp. $1.25.

This little survey is no less opportune than Young's book. It will, in fact, serve very well as a companion volume and guide. Sir Harold, writing under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and for the British Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, brings to his task an unrivalled knowledge and a wide experience in Far Eastern affairs. His brief survey of the evolution of the question is succinct and accurate, and covers all the salient points of past negotiations. As an introduction and guide it cannot be recommended too highly.

JAPAN IN MODERN TIMES. By A. Morgan Young. New York: Morrow, 1929, 347 pp. $3.50.

A useful survey of the development of Japan from 1912–1926, by the editor of the *Japan Chronicle*.

JAPAN IN THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. By Masatoshi Matsushita. New York: Columbia University Press, 1929, 175 pp. $3.00.

A much-needed and thoroughly reliable discussion of the part played by Japan in the establishment of the League and of her interest in its activities.

Latin America

MEXICO'S CAPACITY TO PAY. By G. Butler Sherwell. Washington: 1929, 119 pp.

An examination of Mexico's financial and economic strength, which comes to the conclusion that Mexico should be well able to meet her obligations.

PARAGUAY. By Adolf N. Schuster. Stuttgart: Strecker and Schröder, 1929, 667 pp. M. 35.

An elaborate and exhaustive survey of the land and the people, their history and their economic life, written by the German consul and filled with valuable statistics and information.

Miscellaneous

NATIONALISM, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS. By Edward Batten. London: King, 1929, 146 pp. 7/6.

Discussing the drawbacks of nationalism in matters of international economic activity, the writer suggests the introduction of a varying domestic currency to equalize the incidence of tariff burdens.

DANGER SPOTS IN WORLD POPULATION. By Warren S. Thompson. New York: Knopf, 1929, 364 pp. $3.50.

Students of international affairs should bear in mind that the much-discussed economic pressure that underlies all relations between states in modern times rests ulti-

mately upon the status of populations. There has always been a great dearth of good books on population problems, and therefore this volume, written by the director of the Scripps Foundation for Research in Population Problems, is all the more welcome. Thompson surveys the most urgent population questions in the world today, in Japan, in China, in India, in Italy, etc., and considers in detail the present tendencies and the prospects of a satisfactory solution. The Pacific, Australia, South Africa and other sparsely settled areas are viewed from the standpoint of possible colonization. No one will lay down the book without being deeply impressed with the unsatisfactory nature of the existing conditions and of the tremendous importance of fearless statesmanship in dealing with this crucial problem.

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS. By Imre Ferenczi. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929, 1112 pp. $10.00.

This is the first volume of a very elaborate and exhaustive study sponsored by the National Bureau of Economic Research and compiled for the International Labor Office at Geneva. When completed this fundamental work will have brought together not only all available statistics, assembled with the aid of many governments, but also a large number of interpretative monographs based upon the statistics. Its tremendous value to those interested in international affairs need not be further emphasized. The first volume, which has just been published, is, in the main, statistical, and supplies an imposing mass of material gathered from all known sources. But special attention should be called to the general introduction, which analyzes and discusses the information contained in the tables. This first volume alone is a source book of prime importance.

DIE NEUE GOLDWÄHRUNG. By Arthur Schweizer. Basel: Helbing and Lichtenhahn, 1929, 215 pp. M. 6.50.

After reviewing the return to the gold standard in the leading countries, and stressing the history of gold movements since 1914, the author brings out the need for international coöperation in the fixation of exchange.

TRUSTS ET CARTELS INTERNATIONAUX. By Edmond Lebée. Paris: Hachette, 1929, 104 pp.

An admirable survey of the greatest international enterprises, which the author considers as valuable agents in removing friction.

RAW MATERIALS OF INDUSTRIALISM. By Hugh B. Killough and Lucy W. Killough. New York: Crowell, 1929, 426 pp. $3.75.

A good account of the world situation with regard to raw materials.

ECONOMIC RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIES OF THE WORLD. By Isaac Lippincott. New York: Appleton, 1929, 656 pp. $5.00.

A general text and reference book surveying the world from the standpoint of raw material supply and industrial development.

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Denys P. Myers

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS OFFICIALLY PRINTED

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Library of Information, 551 Fifth Avenue, New York. *France:* Terquem, 14 rue Séguier, Paris (6e). *League of Nations, Int. Labor Office and Perm. Court of Int. Justice:* World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon St., Boston. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted.

ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION

TRAITÉS généraux d'Arbitrage communiqués au Bureau International de la Cour Permanente D'Arbitrage. Quatrième Série. La Haye, Bureau International de la Cour Permanente d'Arbitrage, 1929. 177 p. 33¼ cm.

TREATY between the United States and Bulgaria. Arbitration. Signed at Washington, January 21, 1929. Washington, 1929. 3 p. 23¼ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 792.)

TREATY between the United States and Bulgaria. Conciliation. Signed at Washington, January 21, 1929. Washington, 1929. 3 p. 23¼ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 793.)

TREATY between the United States and Rumania. Arbitration. Signed at Washington, March 21, 1929. Washington, 1929. 4 p. 23¼ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 794.)

TREATY between the United States and Rumania. Conciliation. Signed at Washington, March 21, 1929. Washington, 1929. 4 p. 23¼ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 795.)

TREATY between the United States and Hungary. Arbitration. Signed at Washington, January 26, 1929. Washington, 1929. 4 p. 23¼ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 797.)

TREATY between the United States and Hungary. Conciliation. Signed at Washington, January 26, 1929. Washington, 1929. 4 p. 23¼ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 798.)

TREATY between the United States and Ethiopia. Arbitration. Signed at Addis Ababa, January 26, 1929. Washington, 1929. 9 p. 23¼ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 799.)

TREATY between the United States and Ethiopia. Conciliation. Signed at Addis Ababa, January 26, 1929. Washington, 1929. 9 p. 23¼ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 800.)

ARMAMENT

ARMAMENTS Year-Book. General and Statistical Information. Albania-Argentine-Austria-Belgium-Bolivia-Brazil-British Empire (Great Britain and Northern Ireland, British Colonies and Protectorates, Australia, Canada, India, Irish Free State, New Zealand, Newfoundland, Union of South Africa)-Bulgaria-Chile-China-Colombia-Costa Rica-Cuba-Czechoslovakia-Denmark-Dominican Republic-Ecuador-Estonia-Finland-France-Germany-Greece-Guatemala-Haiti-Honduras-Hungary-Italy-Japan-Latavia-Lithuania-Luxemburg-Mexico-Netherlands-Nicaragua-Norway-Panama-Paraguay-Persia-Peru-Poland-Portugal-Roumania-Salvador-Serbs, Croats & Slovenes (Kingdom of)-Siam-Spain-Sweden-Switzerland-Turkey-Union of Socialist Soviet Republics-United States of America-Uruguay-Venezuela. Geneva, 1929. 1084 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, C. 374. M. 120. 1928. IX. 1.)

DOCUMENTS of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference entrusted with the Preparation for the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. Series VIII. Minutes of the Sixth Session (First Part) of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. Geneva, 1929. 224 p. 33¼ cm. (League of Nations, C. 195. M. 74. 1929. IX. 3)

LAWS relating to the Navy. Annotated. Supplement-1929. Compiled by George Melling. Washington, 1929. 1361 p. 26¼ cm.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE

INTERNATIONAL Conference for the Unification of the Laws on Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes and Cheques. Geneva, February 17, 1930. Preparatory Documents. Drafts prepared by the League of Nations Experts. Observations by Governments. Geneva, 1929. 135 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 234. M. 83. 1929. II. 28.)

BOLIVIA AND PARAGUAY

COMMISSION of Inquiry and Conciliation, Bolivia and Paraguay. Washington, 1929. (Publications of the Department of State, Latin American Series, No. 1.) 55 cents.

COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, PERMANENT

COLLECTION of Judgments. Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France. Case Concerning the Payment in Gold of the Brazilian Federal Loans Issued in France. Leyden, 1929. 155 double pages. 24 cm. (Series A. Nos. 20/21.)

COLLECTION of Judgments. Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex. Order of August 19, 1929. Leyden, 1929. 51 double pages. 24 cm. (Series A. No. 22.)

COLLECTION of Judgments. Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder. Leyden, 1929. 46 double pages. 24 cm. (Series A. No. 23.)

COMMITTEE of Jurists on the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Minutes of the Session held at Geneva, March 11–19, 1929. Geneva, 1929. 135 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 166. M. 66. 1929. V. 5.)

QUESTION of the Adherence of the United States of America to the Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Report of the First Committee to the Assembly and Draft Protocol. Geneva, 1929. 7 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A. 49. 1929. V. 15.)

QUESTION of the Revision of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Report of the First Committee to the Assembly and Draft Protocol. Geneva, 1929. 7 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A. 50. 1929. V. 16.)

DEBTS, INTERNATIONAL

FOREIGN DEBTS. Obligations of foreign Governments, receipts from Germany, and Treasury administration of alien and mixed claims; extract from Report of Secretary of Treasury on state of finances, fiscal year 1928. Washington, 1929. p. i–iii, 44–57, 89, 95–96, 305–340, 356–368, 560. 10c.

FRANCE. Extension of maturity date of indebtedness of France for war-surplus supplies, hearings, 71st Cong. 1st sess. on H. J. Res. 80, May 29, 1929. Washington, 1929. ii 5 p. 5c.

———. Extension of maturity date of indebtedness of France for war-surplus supplies, report to accompany H. J. Res. 80; submitted by Mr. Hawley. June 3, 1929. Washington, 1929. 2 p. (H. rp. 16, 71st Cong. 1st sess.) 5c.

FRENCH experience with defaulted foreign bonds. Washington, 1929. 19 p. (Department of Commerce Trade Information Bulletin 656) 10 cents.

EGYPT

EXCHANGE of Notes relating to Proposals for an Anglo-Egyptian Settlement. London, 1929. 13 p. 24½ cm. (Egypt No. 1 (1929). Cmd. 3376) 3d.

HAITI

SEVENTH Annual Report of the American High Commissioner at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, to the Secretary of State, 1928. Washington, 1929. 99 p. 23¼ cm.

ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

ADVISORY Commission for the Protection and Welfare of Children and Young People. Child Welfare Committee. Fifth Session. Study of the Position of the Illegitimate Child Based on the Information Communicated by Governments. Geneva, 1929. 107 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. P. E. 141 (1). IV. 5.)

IMPORT AND EXPORT PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS

ABOLITION of import and export prohibitions and restrictions, certified copies of convention and protocol and supplementary agreement and protocol for abolition of import and export prohibitions and restrictions, signed Geneva, November 8, 1927, and July 11, 1928, to which signature of American plenipotentiary was affixed January 30 and July 31, 1928, respectively. Washington, 1929. 43 p. (Senate executive T, 70th Cong. 2d sess.)

SECOND International Conference for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions. Held at Geneva from July 3 to 19, 1928. Proceedings of the Conference. Geneva, 1928. 131 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 611. M. 187. 1928. II. 9.)

LITHUANIA-POLAND

POLAND. Ministerstwo spraw zagranicznych. Documents diplomatiques. Relations polono-it huaniennes. Conférences de Copenhague et de Lugano. Warszawa, 1929. 108 p. (Nr. 4 (1929).)

MANDATES

PERMANENT Mandates Commission. Minutes of the Fifteenth Session. Held at Geneva from July 1 to 19, 1929. Including the Report of the Commission to the Council and Comments by Various Accredited Representatives of the Mandatory Powers. Geneva, 1929. 302 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 305. M. 105. 1929. VI. A. 2.)

CAMEROONS. Rapport Annuel adressé par le Gouvernement Français au Conseil de la Société des Nations conformément à l'article 22 du Pacte sur l'administration sous mandat du territoire Du Cameroun pour l'année 1928. Paris, Imprimerie Générale Lahure, 1929. 136 p. 31 ½cm.

CAMEROONS. Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of the British Cameroons for the Year 1928. London, 1929. 138 p. 24½ cm. (Colonial No. 42) 5s. 3d net.

IRAQ. Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Iraq for the Year 1928. London, 1929. 174 p. 24½ cm. (Colonial No. 44) 5s. 9d. net.

PALESTINE. Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the Year 1928. London, 1929. 133 p. 24½ cm. (Colonial No. 40.) 4s. 9d. net.

TANGANYIKA. Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Tanganyika Territory for the Year 1928. London, 1929. 97 p. 24½ cm. (Colonial No. 39) 3s. 6d. net.

TOGOLAND. Rapport Annuel adressé par le Gouvernement Français au Conseil de la Société des Nations. Conformément a l'article 22 du Pacte sur l'administration sous mandat du territoire Du Togo pour l'année 1928. Paris, Imprimerie Générale Lahure, 1929. 204 p. 31½ cm.

TOGOLAND. Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Togoland under British Mandate for the Year 1928. London, 1929. 72 p. 24½ cm. (Colonial No. 43.) 2s. 6d. net.

SOUTH WEST AFRICA. Report presented by the Government of the Union of South Africa to the Council of the League of Nations concerning the Administration of South West Africa for the Year 1928. The Government Printer, Pretoria, Union of South Africa, 1929. 108 p. 33 cm.

MEXICO

MEMORIA de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. De Agosto de 1928 a Julio de 1929. Presentada al H. Congreso de la Union por Genaro Estrada, Subsecretario de Relaciones Exteriores Encargado Del Despacho. Mexico, Imprenta de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1929. 3 vols. 1831 p. 25 cm.

OPINIONS of Commissioners under the convention concluded September 8, 1923, as extended by the convention signed August 16, 1927, between the United States and Mexico, September 26, 1928, to May 17, 1929. Washington, 1929. 334 p. 23¾ cm.

MINORITIES

DOCUMENTS relating to the Protection of Minorities by the League of Nations. Geneva, 1929. 87 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations *Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 73.)

NICARAGUA

NICARAGUA. Report of the Collector-General of Customs and High Commission for the period of January 1, 1928 to December 31, 1928. Managua, 1929. 213 p. 24 cm.

PASSPORTS AND TRANSIT

ADVISORY and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit. Action taken by Governments on the Recommendations adopted by the Second Conference on the International Régime of Passports. Geneva, 1929. 57 p. 23 cm. (League of Nations, C. 133. M. 48. 1929. VIII. 4.)

ADVISORY and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit. Action Taken by Governments on the Recommendations of the Third General Conference on Communications and Transit concerning Identity and Travelling Documents for Persons without Nationality or of Doubtful Nationality. Geneva, 1929. 24 p. 23 cm. (League of Nations, C. 245. M. 84. 1929. VIII. 8.)

ORGANIZATION for Communications and Transit. European Conference on Cards for Emigrants in Transit. Held at Geneva, June 10 to 14, 1929. Records and Texts. Geneva, 1929. 56 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 326. M. 112. 1929. VIII. 12.)

REPARATION

BANK for International Settlements. Extracts from the Minutes of the Tenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly and of the Second Committee of the Assembly, September, 1929. Geneva, 1929. 18 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 494. M. 158. 1929. II. 41.)

PROTOCOL with Annexes approved at the Plenary Session of the Hague Conference, August 31, 1929. London, 1929. 11 p. 25½ cm. (Misc. No. 5 (1929). Cmd. 3392.) 3d.

The texts, signed by the president, were reconsidered by the adjourned conference.

SCHELDT

BELGIUM. Ministère des affaires étrangères. Documents diplomatiques relatifs à la revision des traités de 1839. Bruxelles, Weissenbruch, 1929. 50 p.

SUDAN

REPORT on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1928, with Report on the Lee Stack Indemnity Fund. London, 1929. 162 p. 24½ cm. (Sudan No. 2 (1929). Cmd 3403) 3s. net.

UNITED STATES

PUBLICATIONS of the Department of State. Publication No. 1–October 5, 1929– . Weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual and irregular, Washington, 1929– . 25½ cm. Annual, probably $10.00 on deposit account; subseries at specific rates.

Press Releases, weekly, separate subscription $1.50, began October 5; semi-annual indexes. *Latin American Series*, irregular, priced individually, has begun. For further details, see note by Tyler Dennett, Historical Adviser of the Department of State, in this issue.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RELEASES

The Department of State issues to the press copies of documents made public from time to time. By special arrangement, it regularly compiles the following list of recent press releases for *Foreign Affairs*, and assigns them identifying numbers. Application for authentic copies should be made to the Division of Current Information, Department of State, Washington, D. C. These press releases are mimeographed and are to be distinguished from publications of the Department which issue from the Government Printing Office.

ARMAMENTS — United States note of acceptance to invitation to London Naval Disarmament Conference, January, 1930, addressed to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, delivered October 10, S.D. 665, Oct. 10.

Secretary Stimson's statement on comment in press on joint statement of the President and Prime Minister MacDonald, S.D. 666, Oct. 11.

Acceptance of Italy to invitation to the London Disarmament Conference, S.D. 667, Oct. 16.

Reply of the Government of Japan, S.D. 668, Oct. 17.

BOLIVIA-PARAGUAY — Statement by Secretary of State expressing satisfaction at success of Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation, Bolivia and Paraguay, in restoring diplomatic relations between these two Republics, S.D. 669, Sept. 14.

Suggestions made by Mexico, Cuba, Colombia, Uruguay and United States to Bolivia and Paraguay looking to a peaceful settlement of their fundamental differences, S.D. 670, Oct. 2.

CALENDAR SIMPLIFICATION — Report of National Committee on Calendar Simplification for the United States, S.D. 671, Aug. 14.

CHINA — Report of capture of Henry Wesche, an American missionary of the National Holiness Mission, by bandits at Tung Chang, S.D. 672, Aug. 12.

Representations made by American Consul at Nanking to Vice Minister concerning capture of Mr. Wesche, S.D. 673, Aug. 14.

Communication, with inclosure, delivered Aug. 19, by Chinese Minister to Secretary of State, relating to controversy between China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, S.D. 674, Aug. 21.

Address on American Policy and the Chinese-Russian dispute by Stanley K. Hornbeck, chief of Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, at Williamstown Institute of Politics, August 27, S.D. 675, Aug. 29.

Note mailed by Minister for Foreign Affairs of China to American Minister to China, Sept. 5, on subject of Extraterritoriality, S.D. 676, Sept. 12.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE — Notice regarding Department of State publications, S.D. 677, Oct. 15.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC — Resolution recommending the erection of a lighthouse on the Coast of the Dominican Republic to honor the memory of Christopher Columbus; members of the National Committee for the United States which will coöperate with the Pan American Union in carrying out plan for construction, S.D. 678, Oct. 19.

FOREIGN SERVICE — List of transfers and promotions, S.D. 679, Aug. 10; S.D. 680, Aug. 17; S.D. 681, Aug. 24; S.D. 682, Aug. 31; S.D. 683, Sept. 7; S.D. 684, Sept. 21; S.D. 685, Sept. 28; S.D. 686, Oct. 5; S.D. 687, Oct. 19.

List of successful candidates in Foreign Service entrance examination, S.D. 688, Oct. 17.

HONDURAS — Remarks of newly appointed Minister of Honduras, Señor Dr. Don Ernesto Argueta, upon presentation of his letters of credence and President's reply thereto, S.D. 689, Aug. 22.

I'M ALONE — Appointment of arbitrators, S.D. 690, Aug. 7.

IMMIGRATION — Statement showing status of quotas for fiscal year ending June 30, 1930, S.D. 691, Aug. 28; S.D. 692, Sept. 27.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES, ETC. — American delegates to First General Assembly of Pan American Institute of Geography and History, S.D. 693, Aug. 2; S.D. 697, Aug. 21.

Delegates on part of Department of Commerce to International Congress on Housing and City Planning, Rome, September, S.D. 694, Aug. 5.

Designation of commissioners provided for under Treaty for Advancement of Peace between United States and Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, S.D. 695, Aug. 15.

Report of Chairman of American Delegation

to International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, S.D. 696, Aug. 19.
Appointment of members to International Commission provided for by Treaty of Conciliation between United States and Albania, S.D. 698, Sept. 7.
Appointment of technical expert to Conference on Treatment of Foreigners, S.D. 699, Oct. 12.
IRISH FREE STATE — Establishment of reciprocal copyright relations between the United States and the Irish Free State (President Hoover's proclamation attached), S.D. 700, Oct. 1.
LIBERIA — Request of Liberian Government for American representation on an International Commission to Investigate Alleged Forced Labor Conditions in Liberia, S.D. 701, Aug. 10.
MEXICO — Memorial album in commemoration of flight of late Captain Emilio Carranza, Mexican Army Air Service, S.D. 702, Aug. 12.
Extension of Special Claims Commission, S.D. 703, Aug. 17.
Announcement of signing of convention extending the General Claims Commission, S.D. 704, Aug. 20.
Designation of American Delegation to First General Assembly of Pan-American Institute of Geography and History, S.D. 705, Sept. 6.
Mexican decree revoking decree which declared invalid payment of fiscal credits made to rebels, S.D. 706, Sept. 7.
Exchange of ratifications of convention extending life of General Claims Commission, S.D. 707, Oct. 12.
Announcement of reconvening of International Water Commission — U. S. and Mexico, S.D. 708, Oct. 22.
NICARAGUA — Request of Nicaragua for the coöperation of the United States in a reconnaissance survey in connection with the construction of an inter-American highway. S.D. 709, Aug. 15, 1929.
PALESTINE — Report of American Consul General at Jerusalem on situation, S.D. 710, Aug. 26.
Report of Consul General upon Americans killed and wounded, S.D. 711, Aug. 27.
Report of Consul General regarding situation, S.D. 712, Aug. 27.
Memorandum of remarks of Secretary of State to Zionist Delegation, S.D. 713, Aug. 27.
Assurance given Ambassador Dawes by British Foreign Office regarding protection of lives and property, S.D. 714, Aug. 28.
Report of Consul General in Jerusalem regarding situation, S.D. 715, Aug. 31.
Remarks of Secretary of State to delegation representing the Palestine National League, the New Syria Party, and the Young Men's Moslem Society, S.D. 716, Sept. 6.
Statement of Secretary of State regarding American Consul General in Palestine and his efforts to protect American citizens and their property, S.D. 717, Sept. 7.
Exchange of messages between Z. H. Rubinstein, City Editor of the "Day," and Department of State regarding conditions in Palestine and Consul General's action, S.D. 718, Sept. 7.
Statement as to filing of claims in respect of destruction or damage to property or in respect of loss of life in Palestine, S.D. 719, Sept. 14.
RADIO — Composition of American delegation to Meeting of International Technical Consultative Committee on Radio Communications, The Hague, Sept. 18, S.D. 720, Aug. 20.
Appointment of technical adviser, S.D. 721, Aug. 22.
List of delegates to meeting of International Technical Consulting Committee on Radio Communications, S.D. 722, Aug. 23.
Revised list of delegates, S.D. 723, Sept. 25.
RUMANIA — Remarks of newly appointed Minister of Rumania, Mr. Charles A. Davila, upon presentation of his letters of credence and President's reply thereto, S.D. 724, Oct. 15.
SIAM — President extends his sympathy to King of Siam on occasion of death of Prince Mahidol, the King's brother, S.D. 725, Sept. 26.
SPAIN — Appointment of commission to represent the United States at the International Exposition being held at Seville, S.D. 726, Sept. 26.
TELEGRAPH — Summary of rules and translations of circulars issued by the International Bureau of the Telegraph Union at Bern concerning the interpretation of rules regarding construction of code words in telegrams, cablegrams and radiograms, S.D. 727, Oct. 1.
TREATY BULLETINS — Bulletin of Treaty Information No. 5, July, 1929, S.D. 728, Aug. 12.
Bulletin of Treaty Information No. 5, July, 1929, First Supplement, S.D. 729, Aug. 29.
Bulletin of Treaty Information No. 5, July, 1929, Third Supplement, S.D. 730, Oct. 19.
Bulletin of Treaty Information No. 6, August, 1929, S.D. 731, Sept. 17.
Bulletin of Treaty Information No. 6, August, 1929, First Supplement, S.D. 732, Oct. 1.
Bulletin of Treaty Information No. 6, August, 1929, Second Supplement, S.D. 733, Oct. 1.
Bulletin of Treaty Information No. 7, September, 1929, S.D. 734, Oct. 18.
WORLD COURT — Aide memoire presented Aug. 14 by Hugh R. Wilson, American Minister at Bern, to Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary General of the League of Nations; informal note, May 2, 1929, addressed by the Secretary General to Mr. Wilson; note, June 12, 1929, from the Secretary General to Secretary of State, S.D. 735, Sept. 5.
Statement of Secretary of State regarding draft protocol recommended by the Committee of Jurists for meeting the objections represented by the reservations of the United States Senate, S.D. 736, Sept. 5.